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Abstract 
The thesis analyses mid-nineteenth century electoral violence in England and Wales 
in order to contribute to our understanding of the character of Victorian electoral 
politics, and to assess the pace of political modernization as it has recently been 
defined. Historians have long acknowledged the presence of physical violence, 
rioting and intimidation during British elections from at least the Middle Ages to the 
turn of the twentieth-century, and yet the precise nature, frequency and scale of this 
phenomenon has remained somewhat obscured by a lack of statistical data on the 
subject. Therefore, by compiling a numerical sample of violence, based on strict 
definitional parameters, this research corrects the quantitative void in which 
discussions of English and Welsh election violence have largely been conducted. 
This study of election violence provides a means of assessing the pace of 
political change because coercion, intimidation and partisan conflict represented a 
visible expression of an older electoral culture; one that stands contrary to 
interpretations of the changes in electoral politics after 1832. Almost fifty years after 
the passage of the Great Reform Act, elections in some English and Welsh 
constituencies continued to turn upon matters of local importance, electoral history, 
tradition and ritual. Within such a framework the outbreak of violence represented a 
continued recourse to traditional, pre-reform electoral practices. Historians discuss 
the rapid development of partisan, principled politics after 1832, yet the picture of 
mid-Victorian electoral politics that emerges from this study is one in which such 
phenomena competed - particularly in larger boroughs - with older expressions of 
political mobilization. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Chapter I 
I 
Some of the Conservative workmen in Carmarthen felt sorely 
aggrieved by the treatment they received at the hands of the Radical 
mob on the previous Tuesday ... and accordingly expressed their firm 
determination not to permit a repetition of such conduct. .. About two in 
the afternoon there were signs of a general melee ... Several small 
skirmishes occurred, but we are happy to say that nothing serious 
transpired ... The scene, however, afforded a strong argument on the 
question of democracy, proving that it is dangerous, that its weapon is 
violence, and that intellect is scorned by a certain section of the people. 
Carmarthen Borough Election, November 1868.1 
2 
In many ways the above quote, from the. Carmarthen Journal, represents a typical 
contemporary press report of mid-nineteenth century English election violence: 
conflict is described, here between conservative and radical partisans; the incident 
gave rise to that most Victorian of fears, the threat of demos; and violence is blamed 
on less educated sections of the populace. Such characteristics were recurring 
elements in Victorian accounts of violent electioneering- to which most mid-century 
English and Welsh citizens were well, if not equally, accustomed. Yet to what extent 
does this isolated anecdote reflect the wider realities of Victorian election violence? 
The Carmarthen example is in fact relatively atypical: it refers to a small Welsh 
county town, whereas the majority of this type of violence occurred in large English 
industrial towns; and although in this instance the scale of violence reached only that 
of a 'small skirmish', most episodes of mid-Victorian election disorder were serious 
outbursts of crowd violence. 
The character of English electoral violence has been the focus of a number of 
historical studies since the 1960s, yet few reach a consensus regarding the scale, 
1 Carmarthen Journal, 27 November 1868, p.3. 
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Chapter I 3 
frequency and nature of the phenomenon, and fewer still are based on any degree of 
quantitative research. The lack of a detailed statistical study of this subject has meant 
that some of the characteristics attributed to electoral violence have been misplaced. 
These include issues of origin (where did violence occur), scale (the severity of 
violence) and relevance (what such episodes represented within the context of 
electoral politics). It is therefore the goal of this thesis, through a quantitative analysis 
of episodes of violence, to examine and critically reas~ess the ambiguities that 
characterise contemporary historical understanding of English and Welsh electoral 
disorder. Furthermore, by arguing that this phenomenon reflected the priorities of an 
older electoral culture, this study will use violence as a method of assessing the pace 
of political modernisation in England and Wales during the mid-Victorian period. 
An important characteristic of this period was that while some elements of the 
political system heralded a new age of modem, democratic mass politics, others 
remained fixed to an older style of politics that was more traditional and exclusive. In 
the introduction to her doctoral thesis on the 1857 and 1859 British general elections, 
Caroline Jackson writes of the relationship between these 'old' and 'new' elements of 
politics: 
This study ... reflects the transitional character of the politics of the late 
1850s; and it illuminates the paradoxes which flowed from the 
presence, side by side in the political system, of practices and attitudes 
some of which looked back to the past, others of which looked forward 
to the politics of the future.2 
Thus in Britain during the mid-Victorian period there emerged a dichotomy between 
two competing forms of politics. Alongside the development of constituency party 
organisation, the growth of voter partisanship and the evolution of the modem two-
2 Caroline Jackson, "The British General Elections of 1857 and 1859", unpublished PhD thesis, Oxford 
University, 1980, p.2. 
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party system there existed a continued recourse to an older form of politics. That 
dichotomy is reflected in the title of this thesis, 'Democracy and Disorder'; terms that 
describe the relationship between nascent modem features of a democratic system, 
and the lingering elements of traditional pre-reform politics. Within the context of 
this study 'democracy' describes the modern features of the British political system: 
an expanded and more inclusive franchise; the growth of efficient and centralised 
party organisations; rational political debate; party discipline and the gradual 
subversion of local, idiosyncratic issues by national party platforms increasingly 
disseminated by a popular press. The term 'disorder' correspondingly describes the 
pre-modem or pre-reform features of the system including the politics of deference 
and influence, consensus politics, local forms of political identity and organisation, 
the attachment by a portion of the electorate, to corrupt inducements to vote such as 
money and beer, and the presence of electoral violence. The co-existence of old and 
new forms of politics reflected a somewhat disjointed process of political 
modernisation. It is this aspect of nineteenth-century British politics that this study 
will also explore. 
To begin with, however, it is necessary to outline precisely what is being discussed 
here. The terms election violence and election disorder are used interchangeably 
throughout the thesis to describe episodes of crowd violence that occurred during the 
period set aside for the contesting of a parliamentary election.3 More specifically, 
election violence is defmed here as a wilful disruption to the procedures of an election 
campaign, through the use of collective violence, whether physical or material, 
implicit or explicit. The term 'violence' is defmed as physical damage to persons or 
3 Violence also occurred at by-elections during the period and a number of these are included in the 
sample. 
""' 
I 
I 
I 
f I I 
I 
I 
I 
~ 
* ~ 
.% 
l 
t 
J 
t 
Chapter I 5 
property, or the threat thereof. Instances of election violence are distinguished from 
criminal activity and other forms of popular disturbance (such as food, military, 
labour or political riots), not merely by their occurrence during an election campaign, 
but also by a direct relationship to the events, personalities and issues that comprised 
specific electoral contests. This distinction is an important one, as it relates each 
instance of violence to the electoral/political process. Upon such a predication rests 
the argument that an analysis of such events can be used to assess the pace of political 
change. 
Episodes of election disorder were often complicated events that owed as 
much to long-term, localised, political grievances as to short-term provocations. 
Violence could occur when an unpopular candidate defeated a local favourite, when . 
liberal distributions of free alcohol exacerbated partisan enthusiasm, when organised 
gangs were hired to intimidate voters, when bands of party supporters encountered 
each other in the streets, or when campaign events - such as speeches, meetings and 
processions- ran out of control in an age when public policing was still in its infancy. 
Election violence was not normally the product of direct political protest, nor did it 
represent a challenge to the established political system. Rather, it grew out of the 
fabric of local electoral conflict, either as the product of corrupt practices, violent 
partisan enthusiasm or as a loss of control by campaign managers of the ritualistic 
processes that characterised Victorian electioneering. Furthermore, election violence 
differed from other types of popular disturbance in that it was largely predictable - it 
only occurred during an election campaign - and in a great many constituencies it 
formed an expected (though not generally accepted) part of electoral proceedings. 
Much of the evidence of disorder examined in this thesis is drawn from sustained 
episodes of violence, however some attention has also been given to the 'cooping', or 
Chapter I 6 
kidnapping, of voters prior to the polling day. Though not strictly episodes of crowd 
violence, such actions are of interest because they represented the use of physical 
force to pervert the electoral process. Furthermore, in many cases the forcible capture 
of electors was accompanied by, or initiated, more serious outbursts of disorder. 
The quantification and analysis of election violence is based on an important 
assumption: that within the generally tumultuous atmosphere that accompanied 
Victorian campaigning, instances of violence can be identified as events that exceeded 
contemporary expectations of acceptable behaviour. Victorian contested elections 
were often exciting, colourful and rowdy occasions, celebrated more as carnival than 
as a serious mechanism of electoral politics. Campaign proceedings were infused 
with strong ritualised elements that emphasised widespread public participation. 
Furthermore, the established rituals of electoral ceremony (candidates' entry to the 
constituency, the canvass, the nomination, speeches and processions, the declaration 
of the poll and, in some cases, the chairing of the member) were not merely about the 
mechanics of electing an official representative of the constituency. Indeed John 
Vincent describes how, "Elections were for the England of 1860 what drama, sport 
and liturgy have been for earlier and later times; there was nothing else which brought 
an entire population together and demanded they determine their relation to each 
other".4 Elections thus fulfilled more than just a political function. Frank O'Gorman 
writes that election rituals delivered specific messages to both voters and non-voters, 
relating to matters of community welfare and local hierarchies of leadership.5 And 
James Vemon argues that the symbolic practices of official politics were used by 
4 John Vincent, The Formation of the Liberal Party, 1857-1868 (London, 1966), p.xv. 
5 Frank O'Gorman, "Campaign Rituals and Ceremonies: The social meaning of elections in England, 
1760 -1860" Past and Present, 135 (1992), p.81. 
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Chapter I 7 
political elites, and the disenfranchised (those without the right to vote), to contest 
"exclusive official definitions of the political arena". 6 Campaigns were thus highly 
anticipated events in which an entire community became involved. 
Amid the 'licenced saturnalia' of a Victorian election, customary expectations 
of social behaviour were suspended in favour of the values of an electoral culture 
which encouraged mass participation, enthusiasm and social inversion. During a 
campaign candidates were often obliged to court the attentions of both voters and 
non-voters, so that as a result even those normally excluded from the official political 
arena found themselves, "free of the normal social restraints ... [and] able to treat their 
superiors with scant respect; to interrupt, ,heckle and insult them".7 Within such an 
atmosphere of excitement, ritual and spectacle the opportunities for, and likelihood of . 
violence were high. In July 1865 the dissenting journal Nonconformist commented on 
the excesses of the recent general election: "Much allowance is to be made at such a 
time of popular excitement for the vagaries and licence of an English crowd". 8 By the 
middle of the nineteenth-century British elections were well-established as popular, 
noisy, demonstrative events, during which normal standards of social conduct did not 
apply. 
However, amidst the commotion that could attend an electoral contest there 
were still boundaries that governed the limits of acceptable behaviour. Besides 
causing serious injury and destruction of property, violence could potentially 
invalidate an election result and trigger a parliamentary inquiry into the constituency. 
English election law provided for the setting aside of an election result if, "voters 
were deterred from voting by a prevailing terror, even without violence or a threat 
6 James Vemon, Politics and the People: A study in English political culture, c.l815 -1867 
(Cambridge, 1993), p.49. 
7 O'Gorman, "Campaign Rituals", p.85. 
8 Nonconformist, 26 July 1865, p.603. 
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Chapter I 8 
thereof being brought to bear upon them personally".9 Therefore while a certain 
degree of license was afforded to election crowds, the outbreak of physical damage to 
persons or property represented a breach of accepted electoral conduct. Local 
magistrates were quick to respond to such events, and many constituencies took active 
preparations to minimise the risk of violence. Such actions - which included the 
bolstering of local police forces, the swearing in of special constables or the 
requisitioning of a military presence - reflected the willingness of contemporary 
authorities to maintain acceptable standards of social behaviour during election 
campaigns. The outbreak of actual and serious violence - defmed as physical damage 
to persons or property - represented an obvious transgression of electoral licence. It 
is events falling into this category that are the focus of this study. 
IT 
The mid-Victorian period has been chosen for the study of election violence because 
those years witnessed considerable, and momentous, political change. During this 
period the second great instalment of parliamentary reform was passed (Reform Act, 
1867) and secret voting introduced (Ballot Act, 1872). The franchise was widened 
and efforts were made to combat electoral corruption (Corrupt Practices Acts 1854, 
1883 and Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868). The machinery and growing influence 
of party organization accelerated and the outline of the modem two-party system was 
established. In The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill Robert Blake describes 
the years between 1866 and 1881 as being, "one of the most fascinating periods of 
modem British political history. The fifteen years in question cover a major extension 
9 William Leader, The Franchise: A manual of registration and election law and practice (London, 
1879), p.ll3. 
\ 
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of the franchise, the creation of the institutional framework of the modern state, and 
the great duel between Disraeli and Gladstone".10 Yet despite the obvious 
significance of the mid-Victorian years they have received comparatively little 
historical attention. Blake himself bemoaned this fact in 1970: "This period [1846-
1865] has been less closely studied than the years immediately before and 
after ... There is no book on the period comparable to the studies of Professor Gash for 
the 1830s and 1840s, or of Professor Hanham for the period 1867- 1885".11 Indeed, 
as recently as 1996 John Davis and Duncan Tanner wrote in Historical Research that, 
The electoral system after 1884 has attracted considerable attention. 
The system and the electorate before and immediately after 1832 are 
also much-debated issues. The mid-Victorian period remains in the 
shadow of the earlier and later periods, although it was in the eighteen 
seventies and eighties that the legal framework of the Edwardian 
franchise was established, the party caucus developed and the 
implications of democracy became clear.12 
Mid nineteenth-century Britain has not, of course, remained totally devoid of 
historical attention, and Davis and Tanner highlight the pioneering works of 
J.R.Vincent, H.J.Hanham, I.G.Jones and K.T.Hoppen in this areaY Indeed since the 
1970s a number of studies have been published that have shone light onto various 
aspects of mid-Victorian politics, albeit to differing degrees and across disparate time 
periods.14 Some of the more recent contributions to the period include: Jonathan 
10 Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill (London, 1970), p.97. 
11 Ibid., p.284. 
12 John Davis and Duncan Tanner, "The Borough Franchise After 1867" Historical Research, 69 
(1996), p.306. 
13 Davis and Tanner highlight the following: H.J.Hanham, Elections and Party Management (2nd edn, 
Harvester, 1978); J.R.Vincent, The Formation of the Liberal Party, 1857- 1868 (Constable, 1966); 
I.G.Jones, Explorations and Explanations: Essays in the Social History of Victorian Wales (Llandysul, 
1981) and K.T.Hoppen, "The Franchise and Electoral Politics in England and Ireland, 1832 -1885", 
History, lxx (1985) and idem, Elections, Politics and Society in Ireland, 1832 -1885 (Oxford, 1984). 
14 A survey of these includes: Derek Fraser, Urban Politics in Victorian England (Leicester, 1976); 
D.C.Moore, The Politics of Deference: A study of the mid-nineteenth century English political system 
(Hassocks, 1976); Angus Hawkins, "Parliamentary Government and Victorian Political Parties, 1830-
1880" English Historical Review, 104 (July 1989); Richard Shannon, The Age ofDisraeli, 1868-1881 
Chapter I 10 
Pan'Y, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain (Yale, 1993); 
Matthew Cragoe, An Anglican Aristocracy: The Moral Economy of the Landed Estate 
in Carmarthenshire, 1832- 1895 (Clarendon, 1996); Angus Hawkins, British Party 
Politics, 1852 - 1886 (Macmillan, 1998) and K.T.Hoppen's recent survey of mid-
century politics and society, The Mid- Victorian Generation, 1846 - 1886 (Oxford, 
1998). 
Despite these works nineteenth-century electoral disturbances have not before 
been the sole subject of sustained analysis, though numerous studies of British 
political history have discussed them: Cornelius O'Leary and Charles Seymour 
examine violence within the context of parliamentary and electoral reform/5 Norman 
Gash and H.J.Hanham include violence within their discussions of electoral 
corruption/6 Donald Richter and John Stevenson incorporate violent electioneering 
within their studies of popular disturbance;17 K.T.Hoppen employs violence to 
compare the electoral cultures of England and Ireland/8 and James Vernon and Jon 
Lawrence both discuss violence within their post-modern interpretations of Victorian 
political culture.19 However, the lack of a comprehensive study of this phenomenon 
has resulted in a degree of uncertainty about the exact nature of nineteenth-century 
(London, 1992); K.T.Hoppen, "Roads to Democracy: Electioneering and corruption in nineteenth-
century England and Ireland" History, vol.81, 2 (64) 1996; E.Jaggard, "Small Boroughs and Political 
Modernisation, 1832 -1868" Albion, vol.29, 4 (Winter 1996); Vemon, Politics and the People and Jon 
Lawrence, Speaking for the People: Party, language and popular politics in England, 1867-1914 
(Cambridge, 1998). 
15 Comelius O'Leary, The Elimination of Corrupt Practices in British Elections, 1868 -1911 (Oxford, 
1962). Charles Seymour, Electoral Reform in England and Wales: The development and operation of 
the parliamentary franchise, 1832 -1885 (Newton Abbot, 1970). 
16 Norman Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel: A study in the technique of parliamentary representation, 
1830-1850 (2nd edition, Hassocks, 1977). Hanham, Elections and Party Management (1978) 
17 Donald Richter, "Public Order and Popular Disturbances in Great Britain, 1865 -1914", unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of Maryland, 1965. John Stevenson, Popular Disturbances in England, 1700-
1870 (New York, 1979). See also John Stevenson and Roland Quinalt (eds), Popular Protest and 
Public Order: Six studies in British history, 1790-1820 (London, 1974). · 
18 K.T.Hoppen, "Grammars of Electoral Violence in Nineteenth Century England and Ireland", English 
Historical Review, 109 (June 1994), pp.597- 620 . 
. 
19 Vemon, Politics and the Peo,ple; Lawrence, Speaking for the People. 
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electoral disorder: Donald Richter and H.J .Hanham suggest that English election 
violence was a feature of small rural towns/0 yet my evidence points to the larger 
urban boroughs; John Stevenson argues that electoral rioting on the polling day 
declined after the introduction of secret voting- "an obvious comment on the open 
hustings and centralized voting as a cause for disorder"21 - however violence 
continued after 1872 and remained a feature of the polling day; and Roland Quinalt, 
in Popular Protest and Public Order, describes how parliamentary reform reduced the 
incidence of violence and that the Second Reform Act "contributed directly to more 
peaceful electoral conditions"22 - yet the general election of 1868 was the most 
violent of the period and disorder continued to characterize electioneering in 1874 and 
1880. 
A survey of several notable contributions to this subject reveals some of the 
ambiguities involved in developing an understanding of the nature of mid-century 
election violence. Donald Richter presents such disorder as a combination of 
electoral corruption and public enthusiasm. In "Public Order and Popular 
Disturbances in Great Britain, 1865- 1914" and "The Role of Mob Riot in Victorian 
Elections, 1865- 1885", Richter stresses the continuity of election violence into the 
mid and late Victorian period. He argues that "All forms of illegal and corrupt 
practices seemed to increase in direct proportion to the larger number of contested 
elections and a wider franchise".23 Richter acknowledges Norman Gash's work as 
20 Donald Richter, "The Role of Mob Riot in Victorian Elections, 1865- 1885", Victorian Studies 15, 1 
(Sept 1971), p.23; Hanham, Elections and Party Management, p.264n. 
21 Stevenson, Popular Disturbances, p.288. 
22 R.Quinalt, "The Warwickshire County Magistracy and Public Order, c.1830 -1870", in Stevenson 
and Quinalt (eds), Popular Protest, p.201- 202. 
23 Richter, "Public Order", p.170. 
Chapter I 12 
having "delineated the rowdy and violent character of politics in the age of Peel"/4 
and sets out to examine the implications of election violence between 1865 and 1885. 
He found that throughout the nineteenth-century election riots formed, "an 
acknowledged though routinely deplored aspect of British life",25 despite the 
enactment of reform legislation in 1867, 1872 and 1883. He argues that it was in the 
small towns and rural areas that much of the violence occurred, as it was in such 
places that effective policing had yet to be established. He suggests that the 
persistence of election violence, in the face of reform measures, was an indication that 
"the phenomenon was far less related to the malfunctioning of electoral machinery 
than were other forms of corruption".26 Richter thus concedes that "many of the most 
serious disorders seem entirely extraneous to the campaign and the polling, and were 
spontaneous outbursts of sheer ebullience" .Z7 He focuses on election disorder as an 
expression of the violence of Victorian society: one that he regards as defying easy 
categorisation because of the spontaneity of its occurrence and the manner of its 
provocation. In a period starved of mass public amusements Richter suggests that 
violence represented a form of entertainment, and that it would be wrong to discount 
"the magnetic attraction of excitement for its own sak:e".28 He thus offers a "simple 
love of disorder" as one reason for the frequency of election violence, and argues that 
it was, "only one manifestation of that violent society that deserves further 
attention". 29 
In "Grammars of Electoral Violence in Nineteenth Century England and 
Ireland" K.T.Hoppen stresses an almost umbilical relationship between corrupt 
24 Richter, "The Role of Mob Riot", p.19. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p.25. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., p.28. 
Chapter I 13 
practices and violence, and argues for the decline of electoral rioting by the mid-
1870s. His emphasis on the scale of Irish disorder does much to marginalize the scale 
and frequency of English election violence. Hoppen presents disorder (in England) as 
sporadic and insignificant, and electoral rioters as either venal, reactive or bored, thus 
election crowds became violent only when they failed to get what they wanted (bribes 
or treats), when they were paid to do so, or when they were shrugging off the daily 
boredom that pervaded their lives. Increased urbanization after 1832 distanced the 
population from traditional forms of communal protest, consequently rioting "lost its 
former edge" as it became isolated from its origins in "agrarian patterns of violence". 
Thus, in the place of a "driving, self-ge~erated popular participation in rioting", 30 
there was left only an artificial inducement to violence provided by bribery and 
treating. In addition Hoppen stresses the importance of mass public events in 
generating scenes of disorder, typified by his introduction to English electoral 
violence: 
Whereas election rioting had once constituted a sub-department, so to 
speak, of communal violence in general, with the decline of the latter it 
became isolated and marooned, not perhaps at ftrst shorn of all its 
ferocity, but in the end little more than an anachronistic and irrelevant 
aspect of public life. Having lost their violent contextual anchorage, 
English elections after 1832, when violent at all, tended to fall into 
disorder chiefly when candidates failed to deliver promised 
rewards ... or when campaign managers lost control of those mass 
displays of popular participation which, for a time, continued to be part 
of the public choreography of electoral life. 31 
Hoppen stresses the declining intensity of election violence after 1832, a process he 
argues was almost complete by 1874 when, "what remained in the way of disorder 
became more sporadic than ever".32 He goes on to present election violence as often 
30 Hoppen, "Grammars", p.606. 
31 Ibid., p.605. 
32 Ibid., p.610. 
I 
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simply a matter of "general disorder", rarely degenerating into serious rioting, while 
also pointing out that 'much' of the violence of the period was little more than over-
enthusiastic campaign excitement, sometimes sponsored by the illegal exertions of 
wealthy candidates. Yet he concludes by echoing Richter's suggestion that "letting 
off steam" might be, "the most accurate description of what went on at the majority of 
English elections between the First and Second Reform Acts". 33 Hoppen thus 
sustains a degree of ambiguity regarding the nature of electoral violence by presenting 
it as variously: the product of corruption; the outcome of a failure to provide promised 
rewards; the result of a loss of control during large public displays of popular 
participation; and as a form of social release. 
Jon Lawrence, in Speaking for the People, examines late-century election 
violence within a discussion of the rise of party after 1867. He stresses the 
importance of understanding the mechanics of control behind the mobilisation of 
popular enthusiasm, and the ways in which this control helped shape the form and 
content of party politics in the constituencies. Lawrence argues a 'purposeful' use of 
violence during elections, and he discounts Richter's "simple love of disorder" and 
Hoppen' s "irrecoverable personal antagonisms" as explanations for electoral violence. 
Instead he discusses "the politics of disruption" in which election disorder becomes a 
"highly controlled and purposive use of physical force",34 presenting the phenomenon 
within the context of attempts, "to establish a party's claim to political legitimacy in a 
constituency".35 In his view open public meetings and the physical control of civic 
space "remained central to the symbolism of political legitimacy for politicians, as 
33 Ibid., p.607. 
34 Lawrence, Speaking for the People, p.185. 
35 Ibid., p.182. 
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much as for their supporters".36 Lawrence rejects Hoppen's suggestion that violence 
became "an anachronistic and irrelevant aspect of public life", arguing instead that it 
was, "a stylised repertoire ... [that] could be used to legitimate genuinely radical and 
subversive forms of popular politics". 37 In response to Hoppen' s article he writes, 
Rather than dismiss British electoral violence as a 'collusive - even 
conservative - activity', because of its strong partisanship, and its 
failure to challenge an elite-dominated political system, we need to 
understand how politicians were able to mobilise popular enthusiasm 
at particular moments, and how the demands of popular mobilisation in 
turn helped to shape both the form and the content of party politics in 
the constituencies.38 
Lawrence's argument that electoral disturbances can be treated as "phenomena which 
embody the ambiguities inherent in the relationship between 'leaders' and 'led' in the 
Victorian polity",39 suggests a symbiotic connection between political elites and 
electoral rioters, in which violence provided the former with a representation of 
political legitimacy, and the latter with an opportunity to influence the form and 
content of party politics. 
These brief outlines indicate some of the uncertainties that characterise the 
historiography of English election violence. Hoppen argues that the severity and 
frequency of electoral disorder began to decline after the First Reform Act, yet John 
Stevenson, in Popular Disturbances in England 1700 - 1870, writes that "elections 
[remained] as one of the most common sources of popular disturbance in late 
Victorian England".40 Richter locates the majority of election violence in small rural 
36 Ibid., p.181. 
37 Ibid., p.187. 
38 Ibid., p.l85. 
39 Ibid., p.183. 
40 John Stevenson, Popular Disturbances, p.289. 
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towns, and Hoppen suggests that a population shift away from such places contributed 
to the decline of electoral rioting. Both Hoppen and Richter stress the importance of 
corruption in the outbreak of violence, yet point to boredom as a possible motive for 
participation in such events. By contrast Jon Lawrence presents electoral disturbances 
as a pre-meditated use of physical force - more related to the symbolism of political 
legitimacy than to outbursts of "sheer ebullience". 
Though Hoppen and Lawrence have recently revisited the subject of Victorian 
electoral violence, much of the work in this field was completed some thirty years 
ago. And yet with the exception of Richter's 1965 doctoral thesis, and to a lesser 
extent Roland Quinalt's chapter in Popular Protest and Public Order, none include 
any serious attempt to quantify electoral disorder. Comparisons between these limited 
statistical analyses and the present research are complicated by differences in focus 
and terminology. For example, Richter records 71 separate incidents of "serious 
violence" at British elections between 1865 and 1885, whereas Quinalt discusses 
"serious" and "less serious" riots in the Black Country between 1835 and 1860. The 
lack of statistical data, and a considerable reliance on anecdotal evidence within the 
historiography of election violence, brings into question the validity of statements 
regarding the frequency with which Victorian elections were disrupted by outbreaks 
of disorder. The quantification of crowd violence poses certain methodological 
problems (these are examined in Chapter Two), yet it must be undertaken in order for 
a more meaningful picture of this phenomenon to emerge. 
' 
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This study also questions the extent to which English and Welsh electoral politics 
reflected the values and characteristics of a modem political system during the mid to 
late nineteenth-century. It will be argued here that the study of election disorder can 
provide a means of assessing the pace of political modernisation, because within the 
context of Victorian electioneering violence represented the visible expression of an 
older style of politics. Whether disorder was the product of corruption, elite 
manipulation or partisan enthusiasm the picture of mid-century electioneering that 
emerges is the same; techniques of manipulation and influence still found expression 
in a system increasingly turning to modem forms of politics. If violence occurred 
because of corruption, it represented the politics of persuasion rather than principle. 
And if violence was the outcome of a 'politics of disruption' it reflected a continued 
willingness by candidates, agents and partisans to resort to symbolism and ritual in 
place of organization. 
Election violence could erupt due to public excitement or excessive partisan 
enthusiasm. Yet even then such outbursts were informed by a traditional expectation 
of what was permissible during an election. Mid-Victorian campaigns, like those of 
the eighteenth-century, were infused with a degree of spectacle and ritual- elements 
that promoted public involvement and which heightened the intensity of both partisan 
activity and popular excitement. Election violence that grew out of popular 
enthusiasm can thus be viewed as a reflection of older electoral priorities, because the 
continued importance of symbolism and ritual promoted a degree of disorder. It is 
therefore argued that mid-Victorian election violence represented much that belonged 
' 
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to an older political milieu - and that as such its study can be used to draw 
conclusions about the pace of change in mid to late century England and Wales. 
In order to understand how election rioting can help us to assess the pace of political 
change we must first defme the term 'political modernisation'. The concept of 
'modernisation' has been employed in a number of ways within the historiography of 
British electoral politics, yet it is possible to identify certain features that are common 
to interpretations of the evolution of the British political system. The concern here is 
not to delineate the historical debate concerning the timing and nature of British 
political development. Rather this section seeks to identify those features of electoral 
politics that can be described as recognisably 'modem'. 
In a 1995 article in the American Historical Review John Phillips and Charles 
Wetherell broadly defme 'modem' political behaviour as featuring allegiance to 
parties, grounded in national as well as local issues and characterized by rational 
political debate.41 Phillips and Wetherell argue that the First Reform Act of 1832 
unleashed a wave of political modernisation that "quickly [my emphasis] destroyed 
the political system that had prevailed during the long reign ofGeorge III".42 In their 
view this radical transformation of English politics created "an essentially modem 
electoral system". Thus, they contend, in the post-reform era political parties raised 
national issues, appealed to broad political principles and provoked rational debate. 
They argue for the modernizing influence of the Great Reform Act because in its 
wake, "political principle defmed in national terms by the parties at Westminster took 
41 John Phillips and Charles W etherell, "The Great Reform Act of 1832 and the Political Modernisation 
of England" American Historical Review, 100, 2 (April1995), p.412. 
42 Ibid. 
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the place of the local, factional and idiosyncratic concerns that had dominated 
England's unreformed political system".43 
Angus Hawkins, in British Party Politics, believes that the emergence of a 
recognisably 'modem' political framework in Britain was a feature of the period 
between 1867 and 1886. Prior to the Second Reform Act, he writes that "parliament's 
relations with the constituencies, extra-parliamentary organisations, electors and the 
nation beyond were loose, sporadic and informal. Parliamentary elections and the 
rituals of constituency contests were more a function of local dynamics and provincial 
allegiances than national imperatives" .44 However, he argues, in the years after 1867 
political parties developed extensive constituency organisations, centralised 
bureaucracies and, "through professional agents, local party-sponsored clubs and 
formal constituency associations, national parties enlisted a mass membership from 
among a popular electorate".45 
Both Hawkins and Phillips and Wetherell interpret 'modernisation' as a 
process of change whereby traditional forms of politics, characterised by localism and 
factionalism, were replaced by a new, modem style of politics organised nationally 
and based on the emergence of party allegiance. The modernisation of British politics 
- they suggest - was characterised by the growth of professional party associations 
whose structure and national scope supplanted older methods of political 
mobilisation. A corollary of this process was that the informal and parochial nature of 
constituency politics gave way to the strictures of national politics as directed by 
central party organs. Phillips and Wetherell argue that this process was a feature of 
the period after the First Reform Act, and they stress the development of a "new view 
43 Ibid. 
44 Hawkins, British Party Politics, p.3. 
45 Ibid., p.l. 
' ,· 
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of principle and principled behaviour that the parties in Westminster imposed on local 
politics after 1832".46 By contrast Hawkins locates the point of change much later in 
the century. He argues that "by the 1880s there was emerging a recognisably modem 
national political framework: the basis of what would be a much-vaunted British party 
t "47 sys em. 
Use of the term 'modernisation' has not, however, gone unchallenged. In 
"The Dynamics of Urban Politics, 1867 - 1914" Jon Lawrence questions its use to 
describe long-term changes in political behaviour and political culture. He writes that 
traditional narratives of the emergence of Labour politics after 1867 embrace, "an 
essentially sociological model of urban popular politics [that] ... assumed a strong 
causal relationship between structural changes in society and economy, and changes 
in political partisanship (and in political culture more generally)".48 In those 
accounts, he stresses, the terms 'modernisation', 'secularisation' or 'centralisation' 
have been used to describe, 
A series of overlapping societal changes ... said to have transformed 
political culture, replacing 'traditional', and essentially local, patterns 
of political allegiance (forged by shared religious affiliations, a sense 
of shared economic interests, and perhaps by social deference), with 
new or 'modem', patterns of allegiance shaped by class interest, and 
hence loyalty to class-based, national political parties.49 
Lawrence challenges such an approach: "Historians are increasingly rejecting grand 
explanatory frameworks based on problematic concepts such as the 
'modernisation' ... ofpolitics".50 He questions the assumption that local political elites 
played a critical role in the development of political allegiance amongst the new 
46 Phillips and Wetherell, "The Great Reform Act", p.425. 
47 Hawkins, British Party Politics, p.7. 
48 Jon Lawrence, "The Dynamics of Urban Politics, 1867 -1914" in Jon Lawrence and Miles Taylor 
(eds) Party, State and Society: Electoral behaviour in Britain since 1920 (Aldershot, 1997), p.80. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., p.96. 
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electors, that the 'triumph of party' eroded older, more independent traditions of 
popular participation, and that the rise of class was a central factor in shaping urban 
popular politics after 1867.51 
However, the concept of 'political modernisation' is not used here to interpret 
long-term shifts in social or political behaviour. This study is concerned with gauging 
the extent to which mid-Victorian politics reflected the characteristics of a modern 
electoral system. Between the end of the eighteenth-century and the beginning of the 
twentieth-century, the British political system moved inexorably towards its present 
form: the modem two-party system and with voting rights freed from property 
qualifications. That process was broadly characterised - as noted above - by the 
decline of local, factional and idiosyncratic politics dominated by the strength of 
traditional influences and interests, and the emergence of a more national-oriented, 
partisan-based politics, characterised by relatively static party allegiances, grounded 
in an appreciation of national as well as local issues, and the development of centrally 
organised and nationally-focused party organisations. 
The concept of 'political modernisation' is thus used within a broad 
sociological context to describe, "the development of key institutions - political 
parties, parliaments, franchise and secret ballots - which support participatory 
decision making".52 Within such a context the outbreak of violence will be presented 
as evidence of a slowed pace of modernisation. The continued presence of violence 
in the system - and what it represented by way of corruption, ritual or partisan 
enthusiasm - reflected a set of assumptions about the operation of electoral politics 
that appear distinctly parochial, factional and pre-modem. It will be argued that the 
51 Ibid., pp.80- 81. 
52 N.Abercombie, S.Hill and B.S.Turner, Penguin Dictionary of Sociology (Harmondsworth, 1988, 2nd 
edn), p.158. 
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persistence of violence into the post-reform era demonstrated an awareness, amongst 
candidates, party agents, campaign managers and even election crowds that notions of 
partisanship, principle and organisation, however far developed, could still be 
supplemented by a reliance on the bully and the bribe. 
This study, then, aims to contribute to a discussion about the pace of political change 
in nineteenth-century England and Wales. Since the 1950s there has been 
considerable historical debate concerning the nature and timing of British political 
development. The emergence and influence of party organisation, the extent and 
basis of political allegiance, the continuity and relevance of pre-reform electoral 
behaviour: these have been much-debated issues. As noted earlier, Phillips and 
Wetherell contend that the intense debate and two-year agitation over reform in 1832, 
as well as the structural changes of the Act, created a new electoral environment in 
which voters became consistent partisans. This new political consistency was also the 
product of a new sense of political principle directed from Westminster and adopted 
at the local level by party organisations that "suddenly existed in almost every 
constituency virtually all year round".53 Phillips and Wetherell focus on the political 
realities that emerged after 1832 and they discount negative interpretations of reform 
that emphasise the continuity of electoral behaviour. They write that, 
Admittedly, it is easy enough to discover in some places older forms of 
electioneering that had little to do with political parties, much less 
political principles. It is also possible to uncover outright corruption 
after 1832. Yet persistent flaws should not obscure the new political 
realities that emerged in that year (my emphasis). Not mistaking form 
for substance, this analysis uses new data and techniques to create an 
improved perspective that reveals the reform's fundamental 
reorientation of English politics. 54 
53 Phillips and Wetherell, "The Great Reform Act", p.426. 
54 Ibid., p.415. 
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In broad terms of England's gradual evolution towards a modem democratic electoral 
system Phillips and Wetherell's argument is undoubtedly accurate. Debate over the 
popular and participatory nature of Hanoverian politics notwithstanding, the Great 
Reform Act undoubtedly altered the electoral landscape. However, their view that the 
post-1832 political system, recently imbued with a sense of political principle and 
aided by the sudden flowering of constituency party organisation, rapidly developed 
recognisably modem political characteristics, fmds . challengers within the 
historiography of British electoral politics. 
In "Roads to Democracy" Hoppen suggests that the weakening of proprietorial 
control in the boroughs after 1832 created a political vacuum that was filled, not by a 
new politics of principle, but by "another traditional feature of English and Irish 
electioneering, namely, corruption".55 Hoppen stresses that while the First Reform 
Act undoubtedly created a changed electoral world, it was one that continued to 
reflect "many traditional priorities". In a challenge to Phillips and Wetherell's model 
of political modernisation he argues that in England's small to medium sized 
boroughs, which dominated the political system between 1832 and 1867, elections did 
not, "suddenly begin to turn upon general principles and high moral argument". 
Rather, he suggests, by weakening the importance of proprietorial control through 
changes to the franchise, reform in 1832 created a situation whereby smaller 
constituencies were at once more amenable and open to the influence of electoral 
corruption. He writes that in a system still weighted against large, urban centres -
where a form of independent politics had a chance to flourish - elections in the 
smaller constituencies became an obvious target for those candidates willing to 
ss The following paragraph quotes from K. T.Hoppen, "Roads to Democracy", p.558. 
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purchase a seat in parliament. The result, Hoppen argues, "was a spreading intensity 
of corruption in post-reform electioneering". 
Phillips and Wetherell contend that political parties became 'permanent 
fixtures' in the constituencies after 1832, yet other historians have questioned the 
development of party organisation so early in the century. Indeed traditional 
narratives of the rise of party in modem British history have focussed on the period 
between the First and Second Reform Acts. In Elections and Party Management 
H.J.Hanham highlights the lack of organised and disciplined party representation in 
the counties as late as 1868. He writes that in 1874 there were, "Conservative 
associations in only forty-four of the eighty-two English county divisions".56 
Likewise John Vincent's study of the Liberal Party between 1857 and 1868 found 
little evidence of widespread political organisation much before the middle of the 
nineteenth-century. Vincent writes that "in the 1860s there was political life 
everywhere, adequate political organisation in very few places". 57 He stresses that the 
development of party loyalties preceded the emergence of party organisation by . 
almost a generation and that it was in the 1860s that "a rapid and massive 
development of party loyalties"58 emerged. Vincent contends that several factors 
conspired to impede the spread of constituency party organisation: despite advances 
in organisational techniques, the growth of the electorate and changes in election 
procedure meant that "the electorate in general never became any more organised"; 
local and voluntary associations could not maintain the level of 'constant 
administrative activity' of the central party offices; and a widespread antipathy 
56 Hanham, Elections and Party Management, p.20. 
57 Vincent, Formation of the Liberal Party, p.92. 
1 ss Ibid., p.86. 
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towards the concept of party politics obstructed the creation of a national 
organisational framework. 59 
According to Frank O'Gorman the emergence of a· culture of political parties 
was a feature of the mid-nineteenth century. It was then, he contends, that the British 
political system, "began to fashion itself on the ideals of democracy, liberty and 
reform".60 An outcome of this process, he argues, was the weakening of traditional 
electoral cultures in the face of improvements in literacy, the growth of party 
organisation and the "increasing respectability of the 1832 electorate".61 O'Gorman 
stresses the decline of a vibrant, popular and inclusive electoral culture after 1860 as 
party organisations rapidly developed new means of generating mass support in the 
constituencies. Whereas traditional election rituals had been at the heart of 
constituency politics before the mid-nineteenth century, the emergent forms of 
national party politics thereafter began to replace the use of local symbols to defme 
and express political loyalties. The new political and religious organs of Liberalism 
and Conservatism thus subverted the functions of traditional electoral culture. 
O'Gorman concludes that after 1860, "the loyalty of voters and non-voters alike could 
be won and maintained by more purely political methods, not least by election 
manifestos and by promises of executive action at local as well as parliamentary 
level".62 
In a recent post-structuralist interpretation of English political culture James 
Vemon challenges the significance of party in the popular experience of electoral 
politics between 1832 and 1867. He concludes that despite the presence of party 
organisation in the five constituencies he studies, "national party politics were often 
59 Ibid., p.82. 
60 O'Gorman, "Campaign Rituals", p.115. 
61 Ibid., p.114. 
62 Ibid., p.115 
{;_hapter I 26 
undercut or mediated by local political allegiances and identities".63 Vemon argues 
the disabling effect of modernisation and contends that English politics between the 
First and Second Reform Acts became "progressively less democratic ... as political 
subjectivities and the public political sphere were defmed in increasingly restrictive 
and exclusive fashions". 64 He contests the orthodox assumption that the period 
between the first two reform acts witnessed the birth of the modem party system, and 
points instead to the weakness of Westminster's national party identities in the 
experience of popular politics. In contrast to Phillips and Wetherell' s contention that 
after 1832, "local affairs, even those of long standing, gave way to national issues and 
a politics of principle", 65 V emon argues a popular antipathy towards party expressed 
through the continued importance of local colours, symbols and identities to "define 
local political cleavages". He stresses that reform in 1832 led to an increasing 
restriction of the popular experience of politics, and he echoes Frank O'Gorman in 
arguing that a culture of national party politics was a feature of the 1860s. 66 
In Speaking for the People Jon Lawrence challenges conventional accounts of 
the 'triumph of party' in British politics by questioning the completeness of party 
control in the years after 1867. Whereas Frank O'Gorman argues the decline of a 
traditional English electoral culture in the 1860s, Lawrence suggests that the 
weakness of party reflected the continued strength of a popular political culture. He 
writes that "throughout this period party elites were obliged to engage with, and adapt 
to, aspects of popular culture but dimly understood, and in some measure feared". 67 
Lawrence argues that the political parties were unable to manage popular politics to 
63 Vemon, Politics and the People, p.181. 
64 /bid., p.9. 
65 Phillips and Wetherell, "The Great Reform Act", p.434. 
66 Vemon, Politics and the People, p.l81. 
67 Lawrence, Speaking for the People, p.l78. 
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the extent attributed to them because of the ambiguities inherent in their relations with 
the electorate and the wider community. As a result, he argues "the relationship 
between 'party' and 'public' remained highly ambiguous down to 1914, and that 
partly in consequence democracy remained widely mistrusted and even feared". 68 
Miles Taylor similarly questions the centrality of 'party' in the experience of 
constituency politics before the Second Reform Act. In "Interests, Parties and the 
State"69 he argues that the work of pollbook analysis needs to be balanced by an 
account of electoral behaviour more sensitive to contemporary perceptions of 'party'. 
He challenges the conclusions of O'Gorman and Phillips, who use pollbook evidence 
to argue a growing tendency towards partisan voting in the decades after 1832,70 
pointing out that their conclusions stand at odds with several studies of political 
parties during that period.71 He argues that in the years following the First Reform 
Act local party associations were largely dormant between elections, and that it was 
not until after 1867 that "the main parties [could] offer a nationally coordinated 
message".72 Taylor writes that O'Gorman and Phillips' reinterpretation of electoral 
behaviour followed the work of historians like T.J.Nossiter and John Vincent. They 
argue that Victorian elections were dominated by parochial issues, and that before the 
turn of the century, "there was little evidence that Westminster based parties or 
68 Ibid., p.164. 
69 Miles Taylor, "Interests, Parties and the State: The urban electorate in England, c.1820 - 1872" in 
Lawrence and Taylor (eds), Party State and Society, pp.50- 78 
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national, regional or class based political issues had penetrated into 'small-town 
l •t• ,, 73 po IlCS · 
In a synthesis of recent research Angus Hawkins locates the profound change 
in British politics much later in the century than Phillips and Wetherell. He argues 
instead that it was between 1852 and 1886 that the framework of the modern party 
system superseded the structure of mid-Victorian parliamentary government. 
Hawkins writes that it was between the Second and Third Reform Acts that political 
parties developed the "extensive constituency organisation and centralised party 
bureaucracies"74 that enabled them to cultivate a mass membership from within a 
popular electorate. He locates the emergence of a recognisably modern national 
political framework in the 1880s. The development of a modem system, he writes, 
was characterised by an increasingly inclusive franchise, the development of party 
organisations promising "strong and stable government defmed by principle or 
programme", and the transferral of political legitimacy from parliament to the parties, 
and ultimately to the constituencies.75 
In a 1996 study of Cornish small borough politics Ed Jaggard challenges 
Phillips and Wetherell's conclusions about the modernisation of English politics after 
1832. Jaggard attempts to reconcile Phillips and Wetherell's statements regarding the 
emergence of a new politics of principle after 1832, with the historiography of 
electoral politics and the realities of electioneering in Cornwall's small boroughs. He 
cautions against their over-reliance on evidence drawn from England's large industrial 
centres as these constituted the least numerous category of boroughs between the First 
and Second Reform Acts. Thus between 1832 and 1868 only 72 boroughs in England 
73 Ibid., p.51. 
74 Hawkins, British Party Politics, p.3. 
75 Ibid., pp.l - 8 
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and Wales could boast more than 1,000 voters, compared with 131 boroughs with less 
than that number.76 Furthermore, evidence from Cornwall's small boroughs suggests 
the importance of factors other than party-induced principle in the formation of voter 
preferences. Jaggard concludes that the continuing influence of "electoral history, the 
power of patrons and local circumstances"77 exercised a retarding influence upon the 
pace of political change in England after 1832. 
The goal of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of the nature of mid-
Victorian electioneering. In "Campaign Rituals and Ceremonies" Frank O'Gorman 
writes, "The substance of election rituals and, if sensitively interpreted, their symbolic 
meanings and social implications, can extend our conception of electoral politics".78 
In his study of English electoral culture he questions the extent, spontaneity and 
subversive nature of popular participation in electoral events and contends that "Such 
questions take us down to the very street corner of the political and electoral processes 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries".79 Likewise a close study of the causes 
and processes of election violence allows a grass roots view of Victorian electoral 
culture, and provides a window into the operation of politics at the constituency level. 
It will be argued here that electoral violence provides evidence of a slow pace of 
English political change after 1832: that the frequency of disorder between 1857 and 
1880 reflected the persistence ofpre-reform electoral traditions that properly belonged 
to an older electoral culture. 
76 Ed Jaggard, "Small Boroughs and Political Modernisation, 1832-1868: A Cornwall case study" 
Albion, 29, 4 (Winter 1997), p.625. 
77 Ibid., p.642. 
78 O'Gorman, "Campaign Rituals", p.81 
79 Ibid., p.82 
Q_hapter I 30 
IV 
The methodology to be employed involves the following: the quantification of crowd 
violence at English and Welsh elections between 1857 and 1880; an analysis of the 
nature and frequency of violence and of any changes in the pattern of its occurrence; 
and an assessment of the operation of electoral politics during the period as an 
outcome of the evidence uncovered. The chapters that follow provide an explanation 
of the terms and concepts used in studying election violence, necessary for a 
discussion of mid-century electioneering, a detailed and statistically-based analysis of 
the phenomenon of electoral disorder, four case studies of elections and electoral 
violence; and a concluding analysis of both the nature and instance of violence, and 
modernisation, during the period. 
Chapter II (Elements of Disorder) introduces the terms and concepts employed 
in the thesis. This will include an explanation of the terminology employed in 
referring to instances of electoral disorder, as well as an outline of the historiography 
of popular disturbance (to contextualise the analysis of crowd violence). Chapter Ill 
(The Structure of Politics, 1857- 1880) establishes the contextual framework of 
election violence through an examination of the structures and processes of Victorian 
electioneering. The chapter will outline the changing fabric of electoral politics, with 
a particular focus on the constituencies, the electorate, elections and electoral 
procedure, party politics and electoral contests. Chapter IV (Mid-Victorian Electoral 
Disorder) incorporates a statistical analysis of the subject, including a study of 
violence during each general election of the period. This chapter includes 
explanations of the pattern of violence including its timing, distribution, participants 
and origins. Chapter V (Constituency Case Studies) provides four detailed analyses 
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of electoral violence from a local perspective. The constituency case-studies include 
Kidderminster (1857), Lincoln (1862, 1865 and 1868), Bradford (1867 and 1868) and 
Carmarthenshire (1868). Finally, Chapter VI (Electoral Violence and Political 
Modernisation) will draw on the evidence presented in Chapter V to make judgements 
about the nature of mid-century electoral violence, and the pace of political 
modernisation in the post-reform era. 
The 23 years between 1857 and 1880 have been chosen because, not only do 
they cover the passage of two major pieces of electoral legislation (Second Reform 
Act, Secret Ballot), but the six general elections that occurred during that period are 
separated equally by the passage of the Second Reform Act of 1867. This division 
allows comparisons to be drawn between the character of elections and electoral 
politics in the post-1832 and post-1867 periods. The period thus overlaps the 
extensive franchise and constituency redistribution changes wrought by the Second 
Reform Act of 1867, and the significant alteration to electoral procedure that was 
introduced with secret voting in 1872. The general election of 1857 provides an 
appropriate starting point for the study - the elections of the late 1850s, Caroline 
Jackson argues, reflected the character of a system that accommodated both modem 
political features and the continued practices ofpre-reform politics.80 The study ends 
with a focus on the general election of 1880, the last general election before the 
reforms of 1883 - 1885 restructured the appearance and operation of the political 
system. 
80 Jackson, "General Elections", p.i 
Chapter 11 32 
Chapterll 
Understanding Election Violence: Theory and Terminology 
I 
Chapter II 
I 
In the frrst place, English election mobs tended more and more to 
consist in whole or part of toughs hired for the day at so much an hour 
- a kind of induced violence. 
K.T.Hoppen, 19941 
It is clear that the use of physical force remained a central, and widely 
tolerated, element of popular politics down to the First World 
War ... The physical control of civic space - of public squares, meeting 
halls, factory gates or polling day crowds - remained central to the 
symbolism of political legitimacy for politicians, as much as for their 
supporters. 
Jon Lawrence, 19982 
33 
It is an aim of this thesis to analyse mid-Victorian English and Welsh electoral 
violence within the context of a discussion of the pace of political change. As noted 
in Chapter I conclusions about the scale and frequency of violence can be 
qualitatively linked to the progress of political modernization: when interpreted as the 
physical manifestation of efforts to influence the electoral process (or as the end result 
of attempts to manipulate popular politics), the nature and frequency of violence can 
be employed as a barometer of the strength of traditional or pre-modem electoral 
practices. This study therefore relies upon the assumption that moments of election 
violence can be quantified. This chapter will explore the theoretical basis for studying 
instances of crowd violence, and will defme the terminology employed in the 
classification of disorder. 
The study of election disorder falls within the field of popular disturbance and 
draws on a long tradition of enquiry into episodes of crowd violence. As a major 
1 Hoppen, "Grammars", p.604. 
2 Lawrence, Speaking for the People, p.181. 
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strand of social history the study of disturbances has provided a means for 
understanding the nature of popular movements and for unlocking the voice of 
'inarticulate' sections of society. E.P.Thompson viewed crowd violence as revealing 
the underlying assumptions of what he described as 'plebeian culture' .3 And in his 
introduction to Rioting in America Paul A.Gilje suggests, "Riots are moments when 
people in the street -le menu people ('the little people')- make themselves heard and 
reveal how they interact with others in society".4 Indeed moments of collective 
violence have been shown to embody popular social and political aspirations and were 
"far from being the negative, instinctive and anarchic reactions of the 'rude multitude' 
or 'many headed monster"'.5 Thus John Stevenson writes in Popular Disturbances in 
England, 1700-1832, "historians have increasingly been making sense of what have 
often been regarded as aimless incidents".6 In particular the study of popular 
disturbances has formed part of a "fundamental revision of the assumptions that 
underlie traditional accounts of the development of modem Britain" .7 This approach 
has stressed the variety of public order disturbances in Britain since the industrial 
revolution, and by interpreting such events as more than mere mindless outburst, has 
brought violent protest out from the shadows of historical condescension. 
In the 1950s and 1960s a number of studies traced the role of violent protest in 
the evolution of British social and political institutions. These include works by 
G.Rude, E.J.Hobsbawm and E.P.Thompson.8 Their work, and that of others, 
contributed to a reassessment of British political history in which violent protest 
3 John Stevenson, Popular Disturbances in England, 1700-1832 (2nd edn, New York, 1992), p.3. 
4 Paul A.Gilje, Rioting in America (Bloomington, 1996), p.6. 
5 Paul Slack (ed), Rebellion, Popular Protest and the Social Order in Early Modern England 
~Cambridge, 1984), p.6. 
Stevenson, Popular Disturbances, p.3. 
7 Stevenson and Quinault (eds), Popular Protest, p.15. 
8 G.Rude, The Crowd in History (New York, 1964); E.J.Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: studies in 
archaic forms of social movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Manchester, 1959); 
E.P.Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London, 1963). 
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formed a constituent element in the process of change. In addition they established a 
basis for interpreting instances of crowd violence as more than formless social 
outbursts devoid of any meaning. Rather they presented popular disturbances within 
a framework of communal protest and as the organised, disciplined and often highly 
ritualised expression of social and political grievances. Thus by analysing riots and 
assigning them significance within a model of political change I am drawing on a 
historical tradition that stretches from Lefebvre and Le Bon to Thompson, Stevenson 
and beyond. 
The first attempts to understand the nature of crowd psychology were 
pioneered by sociologists at the beginning of the twentieth-century. These included 
Gustave Le Bon (Psychologie des Joules, 189 5), G. Tarde (L 'opinion et la Joule, 190 1) 
and R.E.Park (Masse and Publikim, 1904).9 However it was in the period between 
1930 and 1960 that a number of studies focusing on 'mob' violence, particularly 
during the French Revolution, advanced the study of crowd violence and of the role of 
riots within a social and political context. These included G.Lefebvre's Foules 
Revolutionnaires (1934), E.J.Hobsbawm's Primitive Rebels (1959) and G.Rude's The 
Crowd in the French Revolution (1959). These studies suggested a greater degree of 
purpose than had previously been attributed to episodes of popular riot. Hobsbawm 
placed protest movements in pre-industrial Italy within the context of "traditional 
concepts about the 'just King"', and the violence of the English Luddites as part of a 
process of"collective bargaining by riot".10 Rude's work established the 'mob' as an 
9 In the introduction to Popular Disturbances John Stevenson provides a comprehensive historiography 
of the study of crowd violence, popular protest and public order, pp.l-4. 
10 Stevenson, Popular Disturbances, p.3 See E.J.Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels and "The Machine 
Breakers" in Labouring Men: Studies in the history of labour (London, 1968), pp.5- 22. 
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agent of political agitation and showed the French crowds to be "something more than 
spasmodic and irrational phenomena" .11 
During the 1960s and 1970s a number of influential studies of popular 
movements were completed. Among others C.S.L.Davies and M.E.James, who 
examine popular risings in Tudor England, raised important questions about the origin 
and purpose of such movements. 12 In his seminal article "The Moral Economy of the 
English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century" E.P. Thompson showed how popular 
protest revealed patterns of popular belief and custom.13 His work on food riots, and 
that of Natalie Zemon Davis on French religious riots, focused "attention first to 
popular ideology and to the profound sense of legitimacy which motivated protesters, 
and secondly to the structures, customs and rituals which shaped the actions of a 
crowd".14 In the 1970s the study of popular disturbance broadened to include an 
analysis of 'order' and 'disorder' and the processes by which these are negotiated, 
this predominantly sociological approach including works by Victor Bailey (The 
Dangerous Classes in Late Victorian England, 1975), D.Hay (Property, Authority 
and the Criminal Law, 1975) and R.S.Storch (The Policeman as Domestic 
Missionary, 1976)_15 
Thus the historiography of popular protest establishes a basis for analysing 
episodes of collective violence within the context of social and political change. The 
danger in such studies, however, lies in assigning moments of violent crowd action 
greater importance than perhaps they warrant. John Stevenson cautions against 
11 Ibid., p.2. 
12 C.S.L.Davies, "The Pilgrimage of Grace Reconsidered", Past and Present, 41 (December 1968); and 
M.E.James, "Obedience and Dissent in Henrican England: The Lincolnshire Rebellion, 1536", Past 
and Present, 48 (August 1970). See Paul Slack ( ed), Rebellion, Popular Protest (Cambridge 1984) for 
a discussion of their contribution to the study of popular protest. 
13 E.P.Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth-Century", Past and 
Present, 50 (1971) pp.76 -136. 
14 Slack, Rebellion, Popular Protest, p.1. 
15 Stevenson, Popular Disturbances, p.5. 
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"investing incidents with too much significance"16 and highlights the inadequacies of 
many source documents in shedding light on the causes of popular disturbances. 
Episodes of popu1ar violence often had myriad causes and those who participated in 
them a corresponding variety of motivations. In addition such events frequently 
provided an opportunity for entertainment as much as they offered a chance to agitate 
for social or political change. Paul Slack writes that riots and disturbances permitted 
"the ventilation of high spirits, often in malicious, sometimes in comic form" .17 Care 
is therefore required in assessing the causes and relevant significance of crowd 
violence, hence the first step in such a direction is an adequate defmition of this 
important phenomenon. 
Few historians of nineteenth-century British disturbances provide an explicit 
defmition of 'election violence', a fact that reflects the subject's position as a subset 
of the broader topic of popular protest. In his chapter on election violence in Politics 
in the Age of Peel Norman Gash describes only "forcible means to help ensure 
success".
18 D.Philips discusses election riots in his study of public order in the Black 
Country between 1835 and 1860. R.Quinault in "The Warwickshire County 
Magistracy and Public Order, 1830 - 1870" describes "riots during parliamentary 
elections" .19 And in his 1994 article, "Grammars of Electoral Violence", K. T .Hoppen 
provides no defmition of his subject matter beyond the use of broad terms such as 
'violence' and 'rioting'.20 To a large extent this has been because the subject has 
normally formed a sub-section of broader studies of popular disturbance. 
16 Ibid., p.4. 
17 Slack, Rebellion, Popular Protest, p.ll. 
18 Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, p.l37. 
19 Quinault, "The Warwickshire County Magistracy", pp.181- 214. 
2oH oppen, "Grammars", pp.597- 620. 
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Furthermore, where quantification of violence has not been attempted less importance 
is likely to have been placed on the precise defmition of terms. However this 
ambiguity is also related to the confusion surrounding the nature of election violence. 
Modem studies of English popular disturbance have largely struggled to 
reconcile two views of election disorder: as a product of electoral malpractice, or as 
part of a wider Victorian tendency to indulge in violent behaviour. Norman Gash 
establishes violent electioneering as a form of coercion or intimidation and details the 
various forms of each. However, he goes on to stress that violence was "endemic 
among the lower classes and election time provided merely the provocation and the 
opportunity".21 Likewise Comelius O'Leary describes election violence as a common 
law offence and refers to it as a fonn of undue influence. Yet he also writes that 
physical violence and intimidation "tended to be accepted as part of the normal 
behaviour of a rude and inhuman age" .22 Donald Richter writes that physical violence 
during an election was a legal offence and yet was "expected and commonly accepted 
as an inalienable heritage of British electorallife".23 He goes on to stress that "many 
of the most serious disorders seem entirely extraneous to the campaign and the 
polling, and were spontaneous outbursts of sheer ebullience". 24 More recently 
Hoppen has presented English election violence as both a product of "direct bribery" 
and as "participation in enjoyable circuses" .zs These views suggest a blurring of the 
line between election disorder as a culturally tolerated phenomenon - and therefore of 
limited political significance - and as the product of illegal attempts to influence an 
21 Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, p.152. 
22 O'Leary, The Elimination of Corrupt Practices, p.3. 
23 Richter, "Public Order", p.l69. 
24 Richter, "The Role of Mob Riot", p.25. 
2sH oppen, "Grammars", p.607. 
Chapter 11 39 
election result. Yet if we are to employ violence as a measure of political change this 
line needs to be brought into focus. 
To begin with it is clear that in discussing 'election· disorder' we are focussing 
on events that represented a degree of disruption to the peace during an election 
campaign. After all the term 'disorder' can refer variously to confusion, an absence 
of 'order' or a disturbance. However given that mid-century English elections 
routinely displayed any or all of these symptoms some further explanation is 
necessary. What, for example, distinguishes the kind of events described in this thesis 
from the types of popular protest examined by Hobsbawm, Thompson and Rude? 
Electoral riots were qualitatively different from other forms of popular disturbance in 
that they were, in a sense, both predictable and artificial. Violence during an election 
was predictable because it occurred within an established time frame and at a specific 
location. Furthermore the potential for disorder during an election was a well-
established fact and the authorities often took precautions against its occurrence. This 
is not to argue that there was no element of spontaneity involved in the outbreak of 
election violence. But as the product of tensions and aspirations generated within a 
proscribed period of time, election riots were more readily anticipated than, for 
example, food or labour riots. 
In Riots and Community Politics John Bohstedt recognises a difference 
between political violence - under which he classifies 'Church and King' riots, 
illuminations and election riots - and food, labour and military disturbances. He 
writes of the former that "rather than mobilizing a community against an external 
threat, they typically split a community internally along vertical fissures".26 Bohstedt 
thus suggests that political riots were different from food, labour or military riots 
26 Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics, p.24. 
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because they generally did not involve community opposition to an external threat. 
However he concedes that election violence could involve "defence of local interests 
against outsiders".27 Rude, in The Crowd in History, also distinguishes between 
election violence and other forms of popular protest. In describing the 'raising of a 
mob' during a Middlesex contest in 1768 he writes, "it has nothing to do with the sort 
of popular movement we are here discussing". 28 
Election violence has been described as more contrived than other forms of 
public disorder. Philips presents election riots as "'artificial' and less directly 
connected with social and industrial conditions".29 Likewise Hoppen writes that 
violent electioneering was "quite artificial, paid for by cash on the nail and, as such, 
part of the great business of electoral corruption".30 Election disorder that grew out of 
corrupt practices could be regarded as artificial in the sense that it did not reflect 
popular dissent. Yet not all election violence was generated through the payment of 
bribes. Party enthusiasm alone was a potent source of disorder, as was the militant 
parochialism that many boroughs displayed throughout the period: in many cases 
strangers were targeted by election crowds, particularly if the former had been vocal 
in their support of an unpopular party or candidate. Electoral riots were certainly less 
related to social, economic or industrial conditions than either food or labour 
disturbances, although such factors could contribute to a general atmosphere of 
disorder during a campaign. Election violence did not usually represent a challenge to 
the official structure of the political system: these were not events designed to 
achieve, for example, greater political participation for the unenfranchised. Electoral 
27 /bid 
28 G.Rude, The Crowd in History: A study of popular disturbances in France and England, 1730-
1848(NewYork, 1964),p.217. 
29 D .Philips, "Riots and Public Order in the Black Country, 183 5 - 1860" in Stevenson and Quinault 
(eds) Popular Protest, p.149. 
30 Hoppen, The Mid-Victorian Generation, p.257. 
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riots did not generally embody attempts to voice communal grievances, they were 
more 'popular outburst' than 'popular protest'. 
Given that election riots were structurally different from other forms of popular 
disturbance it follows that general defmitions of the latter will be inadequate in 
describing the former. However there are obviously features common to both. In 
Popular Disturbances in England John Stevenson discards the general defmition of 
'disturbance' as "any interruption of tranquillity by tumult or uproar''31 in favour of a 
more specific approach that stresses the importance of numbers and violence. He 
borrows elements from the law of riotous offences which defmed the basic offence of 
unlawful assembly as, 
Any gathering of three or more persons, on public or private 
property, with common intent to commit either a lawful or unlawful 
act in such a way as to give any person of reasonable courage and 
firmness fear of a breach of the peace. 32 
Thus the law recognised three elements in the definition of public order offences: 
alarm, mutual intent, and numbers. The first involved at least one person of normal 
courage fearing a breach of the peace. The second established that the crowd was 
united in its pursuit of some common goal or purpose. Finally, by common law the 
involvement of three or more people constituted a disturbance whereas by statute the 
Riot Act required the involvement of 12 or more persons. Stevenson writes that the 
social sciences have largely discredited the notion that rioters share a common goal, 
31 Stevenson, Popular Disturbances, p.5. 
32 Ibid., p.6. 
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or that they even intend participating in such events before they begin. 33 As such he 
discards the concept of 'mutual intent'. Stevenson thus defines 'disturbance' as an 
event involving three or more persons and violence, which he classifies as "physical 
damage to persons or property". 34 In addition he allows for those incidents that 
"bordered upon explicit violence".35 
In his 1965 thesis "Public Order and Popular Disturbances in Great Britain, 
1865 - 1914" Donald Richter provides a rare defmition .of election violence. He 
describes "public disorder at elections" as "mob action of a terrorist nature aimed at 
the voters and supporters of an opposite political faction". 36 His defmition fmds 
parallels in Stevenson's approach and establishes several key concepts: that election 
violence involved mob action; that it was of a terrorist nature; that it was aimed, 
suggesting a degree of purpose; and that it was directed towards an opposite political 
faction. Richter thus presents election disorder as an event involving a large number 
of people, creating a degree of public terror and organised for the purpose of 
intimidating political opponents. By law public disturbances were recognised as 
offences that could invalidate an election result. Electoral law established that "when 
stones are thrown and shots fired among the persons going to record their votes, they 
are not bound again to imperil their lives, but may claim that the election be declared 
void".37 The requirements for such a case were that voters were prevented from 
exercising their franchise by intimidation or a fear of violence, "even without violence 
or a threat thereof being brought to bear upon them personally".38 
33 Ibid., p.9 Stevenson refers to E.L.Faris ( ed), The Handbook of Modem Sociology (Chicago, 1966) 
and R.H.Tumer and L.M.Killian, Collective Behaviour (Englewood Cliffs, 1987). 
34 Ibid., p.l2. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Richter, "Public Order", p.171. 
37 Leader, The Franchise, p.ll3. 
38 Ibid. 
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The definition to be adopted in this thesis will be a synthesis of the above 
approaches. As a form of popular disturbance the focus must be on episodes of 
violence involving groups of people who commit acts, or threaten acts, of physical 
damage to persons or property. And, as a study of electioneering, the focus must be 
broadened to encompass events that interfered with the electoral process. As such the 
term 'electoral disorder' will refer to the wilful disruption of the procedures of an 
election campaign through the use of collective violence, whether physical or 
material, implicit or explicit. This definition establishes several important points: 
firstly that 'disorder' describes episodes of violence; secondly that such episodes 
often represented wilful or purposeful attempts to interfere with the electoral process, 
either as the product of corruption or as part of the symbolism of mass participation; 
and thirdly that the study is limited to cases of violence that could be directly linked to 
the events, personalities and issues of specific election campaigns. A discussion of 
the terminology used in describing electoral disorder will follow later. Firstly we 
must explore the distinction between 'normal' expectations of election excess and the 
outbreak of 'disorder'. 
This study recognises that while popular participation and exuberance were well 
established features of English electioneering, the outbreak of violence represented an 
extracurricular event that exceeded the accepted bounds of electoral behaviour. The 
former constituted part of the ritualistic fabric of constituency politics, while the latter 
represented a breach of electoral law and public order. Throughout the period English 
elections, as a matter of course, generated a degree of popular 'disorder'. In part this 
was because the formal and informal rituals of Victorian electioneering invited a 
measure of social disruption. Peter Bailey writes that mid-Victorian elections were 
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"celebrated as popular holidays cum licensed brawls". 39 Election rituals contributed 
to an element of disorder because they put people on the streets in large numbers, 
encouraged partisan enthusiasm and indulged a tradition ·of social inversion. Thus 
traditional expectations of political courtship, bribery and treating meant that voters 
and non-voters could look forward to elections as a period of unregulated revelry and 
social inversion. Indeed Frank O'Gorman describes a contemporary fascination with 
election rituals in which participation, "must primarily have been experienced by 
those involved as a form of entertainment".40 Within such an atmosphere loud, 
effusive and ebullient behaviour was not only accepted, it was even encouraged. 
There is no doubt that within the 'licensed saturnalia' of a contested election a 
certain degree of disorder was expected. Setjeant Cox, a contemporary election 
observer, urged campaign managers to prepare their candidates for what awaited them 
during a contest. 
The motley crowd at the hustings is either funny or furious. It must 
at all events be noisy. If you are popular it will cheer you as much 
as you please; if unpopular it will hoot you .. .If your candidate is a 
novice in elections, prepare him for this sort of reception. Tell him 
not to be angry or frightened, but to fall in, as it were, with the fun of 
the moment.41 
Displays of popular participation were, however, tolerated only in so far as they 
served a particular purpose. O'Gorman argues that election rituals were designed to 
encourage mass participation and to deliver certain messages to the community. 
These messages were aimed at voters and non-voters and related to issues such as 
local welfare and leadership. James Vemon writes that the symbolic practices of 
39 Peter Bailey, Leisure and Class in Victorian England: Rational Recreation and the Contest for 
Control (London, 1978), p.87. 
40 O'Gorman, "Campaign Rituals", p.79. 
41 H.J.Hanham (Ed), Charles R.Dod: Electoral Facts from 1832 to 1853 Impartially Stated (Hassocks, 
1972), p.xli. 
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'official politics' represented an attempt by authorities to, "convey and reaffrrm the 
legitimacy of governing in thousands of unspoken ways".42 Thus election ritual was 
designed to promote participation in a controlled and regulated manner. Within such 
a context violence represented a loss of control and a challenge to authority. Ritual 
did not promote riot, instead violence was an unwelcome by-product of attempts to 
direct mass participation. Electoral rituals reinforced notions of community, power 
and legitimacy not subversion, disorder and mayhem. As a result O'Gorman writes 
that the challenge for electoral managers was to "promote lavish displays of popular 
participation in the election campaign, while containing and controlling the 
sentiments thus excited". 43 
Contemporary educated opinion recognised election disorder as an undesirable 
and unacceptable feature of the political system. Indeed Richter writes that election 
rioting was an acknowledged and "routinely deplored aspect of British life".44 The 
turbulence of English electioneering was criticised in newspapers and journals and 
lampooned in fiction by writers such as Dickens, Disraeli, Trollope and Eliot. In 
Dickens' Pickwick Papers the title character, Samuel Pickwick, fmds himself caught 
up in a campaign disturbance during a 'spirited contest' for the borough ofEatanswill. 
Mr Pickwick's hat was knocked over his eyes, nose and mouth, by 
one poke of a Buff flag-staff, very early in the proceedings. He 
describes himself as being surrounded on every side, when he could 
catch a glimpse of the scene, by angry and ferocious countenances, 
by a vast cloud of dust, and by a dense crowd of combatants. He 
represents himself as being forced from the carriage by some unseen 
power, and being personally engaged in a pugilistic encounter.45 
42 Vemon, Politics and the People, p.48. 
43 O'Gorman, "Campaign Rituals", p.103. 
44 Richter, "The Role of Mob Riot", p.19. 
45 Charles Dickens, Pickwick Papers (London, 1907), p.173. 
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Dickens' fictional account differs little from many newspaper reports of election riots. 
The contemporary press treated such scenes as sensational, though deplorable, events. 
Editorial comments, however, were surprisingly rare during the period. In most cases 
journalists confined themselves to reporting the fact of violence and little else. So in 
November 1868 the Manchester Guardian reported of the borough election in York, 
"After the declaration of the poll ... several disgraceful disturbances took place in 
various parts of the city".46 And in Stafford during the same general election, "A 
great number of Liberals disgraced themselves by acts of personal violence".47 A 
journal like the Nonconformist, with its evangelistic creed, was more likely to adopt a 
high moral tone in describing electoral disturbances, particularly when a political 
point could be made. In July 1865 it commented, "The great triumph of Liberal 
opinion at the General Election as been greatly tarnished by the senseless and 
disgraceful scenes which have been witnessed in various parts of the United 
Kingdom ... the appeal to the people ought not' to be turned into a saturnalia of 
rowdyism".48 Indeed the tone of editorial comments often revealed the none-too-
subtle sympathies of the newspaper involved. For example the Liberal Bristol Daily 
Post reported in November 1868, 
If any evidence could have been required to show the evil of 
introducing that always dangerous element, mob violence, into our 
election contests, it has been afforded, we should say, by the 
proceedings at our police court during the week. When in April last 
the Tories supplemented the ruffianism of Bristol by the hiring of a 
regular army ... to spread terror amongst the peaceably disposed 
citizens, we ventured to prophesy that the seed they had sown would, 
if nurtured, bring forth bitter fruits, and so it has proved. 49 
46 
Manchester Guardian, 20 November 1868, p.3. 
47 Ibid., 18 November 1868, p.5. 
48 Nonconformist, 26 July 1865, p.603. 
49 Bristol Daily Post, 24 November 1868, p.2. 
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Within parliament electoral disorder was condemned as a product of corruption and as 
a stumbling block to the 'tranquillity, purity and freedom' of elections. Electoral 
reforms during the period were routinely directed towards achieving more peaceful 
and orderly elections. In his motion for a parliamentary inquiry into electoral 
procedure in March 1869 H.A.Bruce, the Home Secretary, referred the Commons to, 
"those scenes of rioting and violence which so frequently characterise a contested 
election".50 The inquiry that was established sat for 12 months, collected 500 pages 
of evidence on parliamentary and municipal elections and led to the tabling of the 
Parliamentary Elections Bill in May 1870. 
During the first reading of that abortive legislation the inquiry's chairman, 
Lord Hartington, described the disorder that attended public nominations as tending 
to, "disgust the most peaceable and intelligent portion of the constituency with 
everything connected with elections".51 Arguments in favour of the Ballot often 
referred to the peace it would bring to electioneering . Thus when W.E.Forster, the 
Liberal minister for education, tabled a revised Elections (Parliamentary and 
Municipal) Bill in February 1871 he informed the House that "the advantages of 
order and quietness in voting are much in favour of the Ballot, and this is an 
argument that applies with greater force as we increase the number of electors."52 
Ultimately secret voting was not introduced until 1872, five years after the Second 
Reform Act had expanded the size of the electorate. The massive increase in the 
number of voters after 1867 led to the realization that open voting was no longer 
:o Hansard 3, Vol.194, 4 March 1869, p.653 (Motion for a select committee inquiry). 
s 
1 Ibid., Vol.201, 9 May 1870, p.432 (First reading of Parliamentary Elections Bill). 
2 Ibid., Vol.204, 20 February 1871, p.530 (First Reading of Elections [Parliamentary and Municipal] 
Bill). 
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practical, and that many of the new voters were proving, "highly vulnerable to the 
temptations ofbribery and [the] victimization of coercion".53 
The willingness of local authorities to take steps to prevent or limit violence 
reveals it to have been a little tolerated aspect of electioneering. Throughout the 
period election preparations routinely included the bolstering of constituency police 
forces with county reinforcements, the swearing-in of 'special' constables and, if 
necessary, requests for a military presence. In February 1862 the 29 officers of the 
Lincoln City police were joined by 100 men from the county force in anticipation of a 
contested by-election in the borough. Given Lincoln's history of violent contests it is 
little wonder that the Mayor petitioned the Home Office for, "the attendance of a 
detachment of the Military or of an efficient body of Police Constables ... to preserve 
order on the day appointed for the Election".54 The popular attraction of campaign 
events ensured that election crowds frequently outnumbered local police forces. The 
swearing-in of 'specials' was therefore common. Their effectiveness, though, was 
questionable. Quinault writes that "in most cases of serious disorder special 
constables - however numerous - were insufficiently trained and equipped to quell a 
riot although they might retard its growth".55 In Nottingham during the 1865 election 
several hundred 'specials' and the borough force were unable to maintain order and 
the military were required to attend. 56 
The use of soldiers to restore order was in most cases a last resort. More 
commonly troops were quartered nearby to be called on by the magistrates if they 
were needed. In November 1857 the Chief Constable of Staffordshire informed the 
53 B.L.Kinzer, The Ballot Question in Nineteenth Century English Politics (New York, 1982), p.lOl. 
54 Home Office Disturbance Papers, [P]ublic [R]ecord [O]ffce Class HO 45/7319, "Letter from John 
Torry, Mayor of Lincoln to Home Office, 9 February 1862". 
55 Quinault, "The Warwickshire County Magistracy'', p.202. 
56 The Times, 13 July 1865, p.9. 
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Home Office that "the excitement in the locality is such as to require precautionary 
measures ... The Officers commanding the Pensioners and Y oemanry and the Chief 
Constables of Wolverhampton are on the alert".57 And iii Dorset as late as 1880 the 
military were requested to be present during an election. The Salisbury and 
Winchester Journal reported that during the Dorchester election, "So serious was the 
aspect of affairs that the Mayor summoned a detachment of the 39th Regiment, under 
Colonel Henning, CB, and also the aid of the Royal Horse Artillery, both of which 
bodies were stationed on Cornhill with drawn bayonets".58 Such precautionary 
measures highlight the seriousness with which local authorities viewed election 
violence. There were, therefore, recognised limits to what was acceptable during the 
chaos and excitement of a constituency election. This is an important distinction: 
election disorder as described here constituted an event beyond the normally tolerated 
excesses of campaigning. 
Beyond the boundaries of what constituted 'accepted' electoral excess, disorder often 
represented the outworking of corrupt attempts to influence the polling. Election 
violence was recognised by law as a form of intimidation. The 1854 Corrupt 
Practices Act made 'undue influence' a statutory offence and thus punishable as a 
misdemeanour. The Act regarded, "Personal violence [as] ... clearly an infraction of 
the law, and if done by or with the consent or authority of a candidate, or his agent, 
with a view of influencing the vote for or against, would render the election void".59 
In addition the Act provided penalties for those found guilty of such acts. Offenders 
could face a £50 fme, be struck from the voting register and rendered incapable of 
57 Home Office Disturbance Papers, PRO Class HO 45/6378, "Letter from Gilbert Hogg, Chief 
Constable of Staffordshire to Home Office, 18 November 1857". 
::Salisbury and Winc~ester Journal, 3 April1880, p.6. 
Leader, The Franch1se, p.127. 
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holding public office for seven years. Three kinds of undue influence were defmed in 
the Act and they included, 
(1) Any force, violence, restraint or threat thereof, (2) Any injury, 
damage, harm or loss inflicted, or threat thereof, or other 
intimidation, (3) Any abduction, duress, or any fraudulent device or 
contrivance which might impede the proper enjoyment of the 
franchise. 60 
The use of such means to influence an election result had become, by the middle of 
the nineteenth century, an established feature of electoral malpractice. Indeed this 
aspect of English electioneering had increased since the eighteenth-century, driven by 
@.greater frequency of contests and a growing electorate. Thomson writes that after 
the First Reform Act, "elections consequently became often more disorderly than 
before, for larger numbers of voters were involved".61 In addition, as party conflict 
intensified so too did corrupt efforts to manipulate election results. Indeed John 
Stevenson suggests that "it was the increasing bitterness of party strife after 1689 
which underlay the frequency of election riots". 62 The intimidation of voters could 
take non-violent forms such as threats to employment, tenancy or patronage. Yet as 
Norman Gash writes, "with so much, financially as well as politically, at stake in 
elections, parties and politicians in many constituencies were apt to use more forcible 
means to help ensure success".63 These 'forcible means' included personal assault, 
crowd violence and even kidnapping. A survey of contemporary sources provides 
numerous examples of corruptly engineered electoral violence. 
The kidnapping or 'cooping' of electors continued well into the late Victorian 
period. Voters could be kidnapped to prevent them from voting, or to keep them in a 
60 Ibid. 
:
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2 Stevenson, Popular Disturbances, p.25. 
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state of pacific inebriation prior to casting a controlled vote. Dickens satirised this 
element of electioneering in Pickwick Papers. On the eve of the poll in Eatanswill. 
Mr.Pickwick was informed by Samuel Slumkey's agent that 33 voters had been 
locked up in the White Hart. 
'They keep 'em locked up there till they want 'em,' resumed the 
little man. 'The effect of that is, you see, to prevent our getting at 
them; and even if we could, it would be of no use, for they keep 
them very drunk on purpose. Smart fellow Fizkin's agent- very 
.smart fellow indeed'. 6 
Elections in Carlisle in Cumberland frequently witnessed such scenes: in 1865 a 
number of Blue (Liberal) and Yellow (Conservatives) partisans fought in the street 
when the former caught the latter attempting to kidnap several voters65; and during the 
1868 borough election, "a lengthened siege was laid to public houses [by a 
Conservative crowd] in which 'bottled' electors were supposed to have been stored 
away".66 In 1880 a petition against the return of Richard Dyott (Conservative) for 
Lichfield concluded that "his election and return were and are wholly null and void, 
on the grounds of abduction by the Respondent's agents of voters, whereby they were 
prevented from voting at such election". 67 The hiring of crowds to intimidate voters 
or to disrupt an opponent's political meetings was also commonplace. Comelius 
O'Leary writes that in the decades after 1832, "in most of the large urban 
constituencies the more genteel electors were sometimes terrorized on polling day by 
gangs of hired bullies and deterred from voting". 68 
64 Dickens, Pickwick Papers, p.163. 
65 Carlisle Examiner, 11 July 1865, p.l. 
66 !bid (Supplement), 15 July 1868 (not numbered). 
67 [H]ouse of[L]ords [R]ecord [O]ffice, Journals of the House of Commons, 1880 (Vol.135), Lichfield 
Borough Petition, p.313. 
68 O'Leary, The Elimination of Corrupt Practices, p.15 -16. 
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Election petitions frequently cited undue influence as a grievance. An investigation 
into a Dudley election petition of May 1874 declared the contest void, "in 
consequence of large tumultuous assemblages of persons armed, of serious riots, and 
grave assaults upon individuals, a large number of voters were intimidated, and 
deterred from exercising the franchise". 69 The Nottingham borough election of 1865 
was similarly set aside after, "men armed with sticks, and others on behalf of Sir 
Robert Jukes Clifton (Liberal-Conservative), by committing serious outrages on the 
property and persons of the inhabitants, created an alarm which was not without its 
influence on the result of the election".70 The Bristol election of 1868 witnessed the 
organisation of a virtual army of Liberal working men to protect themselves against 
the threats of a Tory 'mob'. At a Liberal election meeting days before the polling a 
body of"true-blues and drunken roughs" -said to number almost 1,000- attempted 
to disrupt the proceedings. The meeting continued despite fighting at the doors and 
ftreworks being thrown at the windows. 71 
A further cause of disorder was provided by clashes between rival groups of 
partisans. During the excitement and tension of a contest the practice of parading 
party colours, accompanied by bands of music, was a ready provocation to crowds of 
enthusiastic supporters. At Dukinfield in 1868, during the Stalybridge borough 
election, a serious riot followed an encounter between Liberal and Conservative 
'roughs'. The Manchester Guardian reported that "A large body of Liberals, wearing 
red ribbons, came into collision in Oxford Road with a large body of Conservatives. 
A free fight, in which sticks and clogs were used with the utmost freedom ensued". 72 
In the Forest of Dean during the Gloucestershire county election of 1868 the 
69 HLRO, Journals of the House of Commons, 1874 (129), Dudley Borough Petition, p.123. 
70 Ibid., Journals of the House of Commons, 1866-1878-9, Nottingham Borough Petition, p.591. 
71 Bristol Daily Post, 6 November 1868, p.3. 
72 Manchester Guardian, 5 February 1874, p.8. 
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Conservatives were accused of promoting such violence. The Gloucester Journal 
commented that they had "injudiciously introduced a number of fighting men from 
Monmouth ... who obtruded their political colours often iti a very offensive manner 
upon the Yellow Foresters ... [and] blows were freely exchanged by the contending 
mobs".73 In some cases crowd violence was paid for in cash, and in others alcohol 
provided both the incentive and the impetus to riot. In Monmouth during the 1868 
election rioting was blamed on 'tory hirelings' who were alleged to have been paid 7s 
6d a day fortheir services.74 And in Shanklin on the Isle ofWight a Liberal election 
meeting in 1880 was disrupted after, "a gang of about forty navvies ... most of them 
the worse for drink ... smashed the furniture and fittings, and a fight between them and 
the townspeople took place".75 
The liberal distribution of free alcohol was often the cause of election riots, 
though it is often difficult to discern where traditional expectations of largesse gave 
way to corrupt payments. The customary practice of opening public houses on the 
polling day merely contributed to the potential for disorder. Candidates were 
expected to be generous towards their constituents during a campaign and violence 
might reflect the voters' sense of grievance at being ignored. Thus Hoppen writes 
that election riots could occur, "when candidates failed to deliver promised rewards 
(bribes, free drinks, and the like)".76 More often candidates went out of their way to 
ensure that their supporters were adequately 'refreshed'. At Bradford in 1868 Henry 
Ripley spent more than £7,000 at 115 public houses for "any who enrolled themselves 
as 'committee men'".77 Similarly, Dickens' fictional agent Perker described his 
73 Gloucester Journal, 28 November 1868, p.6. 
~4 Bristol Daily Post, 17 November 1868, p.3. 
/Manchester Guardian, 5 Aprill880, p.6. 1~ K.T.Hoppen, "?rammars", p.605. 
Hanham, Electwns and Party Management, p.263. 
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electoral strategy in Eatanswill, "We have opened all the public-houses in the place, 
and left our adversary nothing but the beer-shops- masterly stroke of policy that".78 
A clear distinction can therefore be drawn between 'disorder', defmed here as a 
violent interruption to the electoral process, and the normally tolerated excesses of 
Victorian electioneering. There was an established limit to what authorities would 
allow during a campaign, and the occasion of violence - defmed as physical damage 
to persons or property - normally formed the point at which tolerance gave way to 
suppression. Philips quotes an article from the Staffordshire Advertiser in July 1835 
in which counsel prosecuting a number of election rioters described their actions as 
going beyond, "the normally tolerated excesses of a contested election, and [they] so 
far forgot themselves as to injure people and destroy property" ?9 Likewise during the 
Lewes nomination in 1865 the borough police did not act against a disturbance, ''until 
a few ruffians so far forgot themselves [my emphasis] as to throw rotten eggs at the 
ladies seated on the balcony of the hotel opposite the hustings". 80 While the second 
incident perhaps better illustrates an intolerance for attacks on gentlewomen, the 
wording of both reports suggests a known limit to electoral excess. 
I have argued here that disorder was frequently motivated by a corrupt desire 
to influence an election result. However we must be careful not to lose sight of the 
fact that violence could occur in the absence of corruption. Politics constituted a 
popular pastime for Victorians and disorder could reflect the over-enthusiastic 
outburst of an excited populace. According to John Vincent, "there was a popular 
political culture as there was a popular musical culture ... very high polls, very strict 
78 Dickens, Pickwick Papers, p.163. 
79 Staffordshire Advertiser, 4 July 1865, footnote in Philips, "Riots and Public Order", p.175. 
80 The Times, 13 July 1865, p.9. 
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voting ... and broken windows bear witness to the consciously political intent of the 
electorate".81 The generations-old political struggle between Whig and Tory could 
generate partisan enthusiasm that was independent of pecuniary considerations and 
the highly charged ritualistic atmosphere of a contested election. Norman Gash writes 
that England was often able to provide, "the dissolute, the lawless, the unemployed, 
the professional bully to carry out the will of anyone with money and influence in the 
licensed saturnalia of the parliamentary election".82 It was also undoubtedly able to 
provide the loyal Tory, the fervent Whig, the energetic Liberal and the zealous 
Radical, who could be relied upon to take a hands-on approach to electioneering for 
no other incentive than party enthusiasm and a sense of being part of a great political 
struggle. 
IT 
Throughout the mid-Victorian period campaign violence remained a destructive and 
highly visible reminder of an older era of electioneering. Certainly the scenes of 
... violence that accompanied elections in the 1860s differed little in substance from 
those of a century earlier. William Hogarth's famous illustrations of the saturnalia 
that attended the Oxfordshire election of 1754 could as equally apply to contests in 
·· the 1850s and 1870s. And when Joseph Grego introduced his book A History of 
Parliamentary Elections and Electioneering in the Old Days - published in 1886 - he 
wrote: "With the modifying influence of progress ... the time may come when the 
narrative of the robustious (sic) scenes of canvassing, polling, chairing, and election-
feasting, with their attendant incidents of all-prevailing bribery, turbulence and 
:~John Vincent, Pal/books: How Victorians Voted (London, 1967), p.12. 
Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, p.142. 
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intrigue, may be regarded with incredulity as fictions of an impossible age",83 he was 
obviously conscious of writing at a time when such scenes were still familiar to his 
readers. 
The continuation of violence and corruption into the post-reform era has long 
been acknowledged. In The Making of Modem British Politics Martin Pugh writes 
that "Victorian reformers who hoped that judicious expansion of the electorate would 
foster a mature and informed debate on political issues in place of corruption and 
influence invariably lived to be disillusioned".84 The general elections of 1868 and 
1885 were characterised by violence and intimidation, and both took place 
immediately after the introduction of reform acts that greatly increased the size of the 
electorate. Similarly the advent of secret voting in 1872 failed to remove the factor of 
violence from elections- as evidenced by the scale of disorder that attended the 1880 
General Election. 
Indeed two of the seminal studies of British political history highlight the 
presence of such practices beyond both the First and Second Reform Acts. In Politics 
in the Age of Peel Norman Gash stresses the failure of reform in 1832 to eradicate 
electoral intimidation and violence from English electioneering. He argues the 
continued influence of corrupt practices over the electoral process and writes that "it 
is not easy to judge among the illicit influences brought to bear upon the electorate 
whether bribery or coercion was the major factor in impelling it towards a decision".85 
Gash distinguishes between two forms of electoral coercion: "familiar and genteel 
tactics" included threats of dismissal from employment, eviction, loss of patronage 
and exclusive dealing; while "more direct and forcible methods" incorporated the 
83 
Joseph Grego, A History of Parliamentary Elections and Electioneering in the Old Days (London, 
!886), p.vi. 
8;MartinPugh, The Making of Modern British Politics, 1867-1939 (Oxford, 1982), p.ll. 
Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, p.137. 
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'cooping' or kidnapping of voters, and the threat or employment of personal 
violence.86 In Elections and Party Management H.J.Hanham highlights a continuity 
of electoral behaviour across the reform period. He argues that the elimination of 
violence and electoral corruption was a process still incomplete by the end of the 
nineteenth-century. Hanham identifies at least 64 English boroughs at which 
"undoubted cases of corruption occurred" between 1865 and 1884, and writes that, 
Whatever figure one accepts as accurate it is certain that corrupt 
practices occurred in between one-third and one-half of the English 
boroughs on sufficient scale for them to be noticed ... Bribery could 
take place in the market place without a finger being lifted to prevent 
it, while riots often occurred simply because there was no one to stop 
them[ my emphasis]. 87 
Historians from Gash and Hanham to Richter and Hoppen have written of the nature 
of election violence during the mid-Victorian generation. Yet few of those studies 
provide a sustained quantitative analysis of disorder. In addition, those who have 
described the scale of the phenomenon have largely done so without reference to a 
detailed statistical survey. The absence of such an analysis is particularly noticeable 
in discussions of trends in the pattern of violence. For example Thomson argues that 
elections became more disorderly after the First Reform Act88, and Hoppen argues 
that English election violence declined after 1832 and by 1874 was, "more sporadic 
than ever". 89 However there is little attempt by either to quantify such conclusions. 
Furthermore where some degree of analysis has been completed comparisons are 
often hampered by statistics that utilise different terminology and cover disparate time 
periods. Bohstedt records 617 riots between 1790 and 1810, of which 63 or 10% 
86 Ibid., p.l38. 
s1H . 
88 
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were classed as 'politica1'.90 Richter's sample of English disturbances between 1865 
,, 
and 1885 includes 253 riots, of which 71 or 30% occurred during elections.91 Yet 
drawing comparisons between these figures is difficult even considering the 
differences in time periods. As previously noted Bohstedt's sample of political 
violence incorporates more than just election violence, and though Richter's sample 
focuses exclusively on electoral disorder he fails to defme 'riot' and how he classifies 
disturbances as 'serious'. The student of electoral disturbance is thus left with little 
understanding of the actual scope of disorder during the mid to late Victorian era. 
Given the considerable statistical vacuum in which previous discussions of 
election violence have been conducted, a quantitative analysis of rioting must precede 
any assessment of the operation of electoral politics. Bohstedt highlights the 
importance of such an approach. He challenges the prevailing myth of the feminine 
food riot, "on the basis of a more complete analysis of some statistical profiles of 
protest" .92 His argument that female leadership of food riots has been exaggerated 
due to the rarity of their appearance in other forms of protest, is based on a large 
sample of English riots. He writes that "the traditional method of analysing riots by 
compiling anecdotes may simply confirm preconceived assumptions. Since even a 
dozen incidents are fewer than 2 per cent of riots in this period, impressionistic 
selection is no substitute for counting [my emphasis]".93 Conclusions about the pace 
of political modernisation will therefore be made within the context of a careful study 
of the nature and frequency of disorder. In his study of Black Country disturbances 
between 1835 and 1860 D.Philips establishes the general methodological problems 
9oB 
ohstedt, "Gender, Household", p.91. 
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associated with studying riots, namely definition and quantification.94 The first refers 
to the problem of labelling episodes of disorder, while the second concerns the 
classification of violence according to size, seriousness and relative importance. The 
following discussion will outline the methodology used to defme incidents of crowd 
violence, and the terminology employed to describe incidents of varying size and 
severity. 
Stevenson and Quinault argue that "the words 'protest', 'riot' and 'disturbance' are 
not always very easy to defme precisely, but they must be defined if quantification is 
to be undertaken" .95 The basic model for defming and quantifying moments of 
collective violence is provided by the law of public order offences. We have already 
noted in section I that the law distinguished between popular protest and individual 
assault on the basis of numbers (at least 3 persons), mutual intent (united in pursuit of 
some common goal), violence (physical damage to persons or property) and public 
alarm (at least one person of reasonable courage feared a breach of the peace). Thus 
the basic offence of unlawful assembly described an event in which 3 persons or more 
a degree of public alarm. The more serious offence of riot was defmed as, 
A tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three persons or more, 
who assemble together of their own authority, with an intent 
mutually to assist one another against anyone who shall oppose them 
in the execution of an enterprise of a private nature, and afterwards 
actually to execute the enterprise, in a violent and turbulent manner, 
to the terror of the people, whether the act intended were lawful or 
unlawful.96 
:: Philips, "Riots and Public Order in the Black Country", p.145. 
96 Stevenson and Quinault (eds), Popular Protest, p.29. 
Stevenson, Popular Disturbances, p.6. 
['he criteria established by the law for determining the severity of a disturbance w~s 
thus an increase in the number of participants. At common law a riot was regarded as 
cooperative action involving 3 or more persons, was a misdemeanour and could be 
<u•.u.u·~ .... ~·~ by a fme or imprisonment. In such a case the authorities were allowed to 
'reasonable means' to effect the restoration of order. However by statute a state 
of riot existed if 12 or more persons remained riotously assembled one hour after the 
reading of the Riot Act proclamation. Those who ignored the warning were guilty of 
a felony and the authorities were legally justified in the use of deadly force to restore 
The legal definition of riot therefore established both the severity of the 
inc:ideJlt and proscribed the degree of response permitted to the authorities. 
However the use of this legal model of definition presents difficulties to the 
historian. Acceptance of contemporary labels of violence is dangerous given the 
subjective nature of the classification process. The degree of seriousness attributed to 
a disturbance, and therefore the label employed to describe it, depended on the 
attitudes and perceptions of the authorities who were present at the time. An essential 
element in the legal definition of disorder was therefore the subjective test of how the 
authorities, present at the time, perceived the threat in front of them. Philips writes 
that the crucial factor in defming a riot was, "the attitude and reaction of the 
authorities to the assembled crowd; and the test the law applied was the essentially 
subjective one of what the peace officer on the spot at the time, felt the situation to 
be".97 Therefore the potential exists for variations across the country and over time as 
to what constituted a recognisable threat to public order. And if, as Stevenson 
suggests, Victorians were becoming less sensitive to the threat of disorder during the 
97 Phllips, "Riots in the Black Country", p.145. 
:mtoOJliJ decades of the nineteenth-century, then inconsistencies in the classification of 
violence would undoubtedly have occurred. 
The historian is also faced with an evidential problem. Primary and secondary 
"'"'""'''""'"' materials largely fail to provide the necessary details with which to classify 
' rather than to estimates of the number of participants. Indeed, crowd sizes 
often only provided when an incident achieved some considerable notoriety or 
Uiltl~ ..... , .. '" in a specific number of indictments. Therefore, any attempt to categorise 
while John Stevenson provides a comprehensive analysis of the issues relating to 
definition, he ultimately relies on a catholic approach which allows him to, "embrace 
a broader field than that covered by the legal term 'riot'".98 
Neither Hoppen nor Richter provide a framework for establishing the severity 
of electoral violence. Bohstedt does, however, provide some direction. He cites 
physical attack, damage or coercion as distinguishing riot from mere protest. 
Bohstedt defmes 'riot' as, "an incident in which a crowd of fifty or more people 
damaged or seized property, assaulted someone or forced a victim to perform some 
action".99 He discards the legal use of the term 'riot' in favour of an interpretation 
based on, "the way contemporaries routinely used the word". In contrast Philips 
relies on the official legal definition of riot, and restricts his focus to those incidents in 
98 Stevenson, Popular Disturbances, p.12. 
99 
Bohstedt, "Gender, Household", p.90. 
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which the authorities clashed with rioters and prosecutions resulted. He argues that 
the official reaction to disorder played a critical role in the development of riotous 
situations. Therefore his categorisation of violence is bas.ed on how the authorities 
labelled each incident, and the level of response it generated. In categorising the scale 
of violence Philips resorts to what he describes as a crude and simple distinction: he 
recognises both serious, and less serious, episodes of disturbance. 
is clear that considerable variation in terminology (and focus) exists within the 
of popular protest. What then is an appropriate starting point for 
(i(~finmg the types of violence examined here? Within the context of this study 
precise distinctions between gradations of violence are less important than the fact of 
disorder itself. The sample of election disturbances has been compiled to inform our 
J.lnderstanding of the operation of constituency politics. As such a restrictive 
defmitional approach may obscure more than it reveals of mid-century electioneering. 
Quinault writes that "exclusive attention on major disturbances gives us an 
exaggerated view of the involvement of the national government in the maintenance 
of public order" .100 Likewise too rigid an approach to defming disorder may 
eliminate from view a considerable amount of disorderly activity. Furthermore the 
categorisation of violence according to precise limits of size and severity is 
problematic given the limitations of the source material available. The number of 
participants involved in disturbances was rarely given and legal terms such as riot 
were often employed by contemporary observers to describe incidents of varying 
scale and seriousness. For these reasons I have discounted a narrow and exclusive 
approach to the classification of violence in favour of an approach that will develop a 
, 
100 Quinault, "The Warwickshl,re County Magistracy", p.183. 
cumulative picture of disorder across the period. This is not to argue for a catch-all 
approach to classification in which every incident involving a harsh word or thrown 
stone is included in the sample. Rather it is a recognition of the dangers of limiting 
the sample to episodes of violence that meet exacting standards of qualification. 
Given the limits of the available evidence a sample proscribed by precise limits of 
" narttCI1JaltUII and destruction could produce a pattern of sporadic outbursts of serious 
mob violence, separated by periods of relative calm, order and civility. 
The classifications of disturbance employed in this study are therefore based 
on an appreciation of the complexities involved in studying moments of collective 
I have avoided any categorisation based on the number of people involved, 
as a more workable distinction lies in the character of an event and the scale of the 
official response to its outbreak. The inconsistencies of contemporary reporting have 
been taken into consideration, and where a lack of detail prevents easy categorisation 
of an episode of violence it has been discarded or downgraded in terms of severity. 
The sample relies on a three-tier approach to the quantification of violence. The 
terms 'riot' and 'disturbance' are used to describe the more serious types of disorder: 
.. with the former more severe than the latter. The term 'incident' has been chosen to 
describe those disturbances that, while not serious enough to warrant a substantial 
magisterial response, represented an interruption to normal expectations of electoral 
A 'riot' is thus defined as a serious and sustained outbreak of collective 
violence, involving the implicit or explicit use of force, intimidation or coercion, and 
which resulted in physical damage to persons or property - or the immediate fear that 
such would occur. Riots commonly evoked a magisterial response such as the reading 
of the Riot Act proclamation and/or the forcible restoration of the peace by police 
officers or the military. A report of the Bristol borough election of 1868 provides an 
example of a mid-century electoral riot: 
The destruction of property was very great. The windows of chapels, 
schools, and private residences were smashed without respect to party. 
Public houses were. forced open, and the mob helped themselves to 
wine, spirits and beer, cigars, biscuits ... Mr.Morley [Liberal] was ... an 
object of attack, but his assailants did not succeed in their attempts. A 
boy was dangerously injured, and nine persons were taken to the 
Hospital to have their wounds dressed. 101 
'disturbance' is classified as a less serious breach of the peace than a riot, and 
involved episodic outbursts of crowd violence rather than the type of sustained 
.. elicited some measure of official response. In July 1865 the Hull and Lincolnshire 
Times reported various cases of disturbance in connection with elections in 
I-eicestershire: 
Disturbances broke out on Monday ... so serious in their character that 
the polling had to be completed on Tuesday. At Ashby-de-la-Zouch a 
scene of wild uproar ensued which resulted seriously, and threatened 
more disaster than actually occurred. About nine or ten of the 
constables were severely wounded, generally in the head by stones.102 
An 'incident' is defmed as a noisy or demonstrative action by a crowd of people that 
interferes with, or disrupts, the proceedings of an election campaign. An incident was 
a relatively short lived event that involved little overt violence, and invoked a limited 
official response. Though less serious than a riot or a disturbance, an incident 
nevertheless represented an interruption to electoral procedure. The distinction 
between the above classifications is thus made on the basis of duration and scale of 
response, and by the fact that all three disrupted campaign proceedings. 
101 Gloucester Journal, 21 November 1868, p.7. 
102 Hull and Lincolnshire Times, 29 July 1865, p.3. 
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study conclusions about mid-Victorian electioneering are based on a 
sample of election violence. Evidence of disorder has been gathered from a variety of 
sources and quantified according to the above definitions. Episodes of electoral 
violence were collated from a survey of newspaper and journal reports, election 
petition fmdings, official government correspondence and parliamentary reports. 
Contemporary newspapers and journals provided the richest source of material. A 
total of 35 provincial newspapers, one national journal . (Nonconformist) and one 
national newspaper (The Times) were surveyed across the general election years of 
1857, 1859, 1865, 1868, 1874 and 1880. There are obvious dangers in an over-
reliance on one source type. However, the lack of material found in other sources 
necessitated a dependence on newspaper articles. 
Election petitions provided some evidence of disorder but were more useful in 
providing additional details to accounts already furnished in newspaper reports. 
Official correspondence between local authorities and central government offices 
proved to be of limited use. During the period the Home Office encouraged 
provincial authorities to deal with matters of public order themselves; in Quinault's 
words, "in most cases local disorders were controlled by the local justices ... the 
maintenance of public order was largely a local responsibility". 103 As such, requests 
to the Home Office for military assistance during elections are relatively sparse. 
Parliamentary reports, particularly those dealing with corrupt practices or reform of 
electoral procedure, contained some evidence of disorder. In addition, examples of 
violence were drawn from a number of secondary sources including works by Richter, 
Gash, Hanham, O'Leary, Quinault, and J.F.Hi11.104 
103 Quinault, "The Warwickshire County Magistracy", p.l83. 
104 J.W.F.Hill, Victorian Lincoln (Cambridge, 1974). Episodes of disorder that were collated from 
secondary sources have been referenced accordingly in Appendix I. 
Reports of electoral violence have been included in the sample (Appendix I) 
where the following could be ascertained: county of origin; town or borough in 
the event occurred; date of incident; type of election it related to (county or 
"'"'"n'''ah parliamentary or municipal); scale of the event; timing (during the canvass, 
seven criteria ensured that only those incidents that could be properly 
criteria. In cases where the location of an episode of violence was 
the event was discarded. Examples of by-election violence are included on 
included in the sample they reflect the occurrence of violence at different stages 
a particular campaign - for example if violence broke out during an election 
meeting and then again several days later during the polling day. Duplicate entries 
are included because they reveal the extent to which disorder was part of the general 
temper of Victorian electioneering.105 The sample of violence provides the statistical 
~basis for conclusions about the character of mid-Victorian politics. However, an 
analysis of the mid-Victorian political system will precede a discussion of the sample 
of violence. 
105 Duplicate entries are not, however, included in some of the statistical data related to the sample. 
The reasons for this are explained in Chapter N. 
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Chapter Ill 
The Structure ofEnglish and Welsh Electoral Politics, 1857- 1880 
Chapter Ill 
I 
I shall say exactly what I think .. .If you want venality; if you want 
drunkenness, and facility for being intimidated; or if, on the other 
hand, you want impulsive, unreflecting, and violent people, where do 
you look for them? ... Do you go to the top or to the bottom? ... The 
effect [of the bill] will manifestly be to add a large number of persons 
to our constituencies of the class from which if there is to be anything 
wrong going on we may naturally expect to find it. 
Robert Lowe, March 18661 
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When Robert Lowe delivered these often-quoted words to the Commons in relation to 
Gladstone's Reform Bill of 1866 he was Iio doubt voicing the concerns of many on 
both sides of the House. However he was also speaking directly from his own 
personal experience. He held the unhappy honour of having been at the centre of two 
serious election riots at consecutive general elections.2 In 1857 his re-election for the 
borough of Kidderminster precipitated a riot that almost claimed his life. He was 
forced to spend a week convalescing in the town after stones thrown during a violent 
post-election riot fractured his skull. Two years later Lowe abandoned Kidderminster 
after a canvass there revealed he had lost crucial Conservative support. In 1859, with 
the support of his patron the Marquess ofLandsdowne, he stood for the small borough 
of Calne in Wiltshire. However his victory there over a popular local candidate so 
infuriated the local mob that they smashed his agent's windows, attacked the police 
and "kept the town in terror until a very late hour at night". 3 Lowe 's comments in 
1866 reflected his fear that an extension of the franchise 'downwards' would 
inevitably lead to a rise in both venality and violence. Yet to what extent were his 
1 Hansard, clxxxii, 13 March 1866, p.147- 8. 
2 Perhaps even three! Comelius 0 'Leary provides an account of "a violent physical attack" made on 
Lowe during his canvass at Kidderminster in 1859. See O'Leary, The Elimination of Corrupt 
Practices, p.68. 
3 
The Bridling/on Free Press, 7 May 1859, p.3. 
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concerns based on the realities of contemporary electioneering, and to what extent 
were they exaggerated by his own, painful, experiences? Did electoral reform, either 
in 1832 or 1867, increase the frequency of election violence? 
It is crucial to an understanding of the nature of election violence that the context 
within which it occurred is first explored. Accordingly, this chapter will outline the 
electoral framework of British politics between the years 1857 and 1880. This is not, 
however, merely an attempt to contextualise the discussion of disorderly 
electioneering. Rather, the changing pattern of electoral violence is explicable only in 
the light of those changes to the electoral system that took place at various times 
before and during the Victorian period. The English and Welsh electoral landscape 
not remain static during these years. Instead it was continually altered by reform 
acts and various anti-corruption measures. As such the structures and procedures that 
invited or prevented election disorder underwent both profound and subtle changes. It 
is the task of this chapter to delineate those changes and to assess their impact on the 
nature and frequency of electoral violence. 
During the mid-Victorian period the basic outline of the British electoral system 
remained essentially unaltered. In the House of Commons at Westminster 658 
members represented a little over 400 constituencies across England, Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales. Political representation was divided between county, borough 
and university constituencies. In addition the franchise - or the right to vote -
continued to be restricted to a fraction of the adult male population. However this 
structural continuity masks a significant period of transition. It was during the middle 
decades of the nineteenth-century, against a wider background of social and economic 
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change, that the fabric of British politics was profoundly altered. During this period 
the apparatus of a modem political system was established. The growth of the 
electorate, in 1832 and 1867, heralded the approach of a new style of politics in which 
party organization assumed increasing significance. The growth of local party 
associations and pressure groups, and of their links to central party organs, signalled 
the development of a national political framework. Constituency elections 
increasingly began to bear the imprint of national rather than local issues, and the 
formation of governments became less a product of parliamentary influence and more 
the outcome of electoral mandate. It was also during this period that politics became 
increasingly delineated along class lines rather than those of interest and religion. 
There were changes, too, in electoral procedure: the duration of the poll was reduced, 
public nominations were eventually abolished, and whereas at the beginning of the 
period electors stood in the open to exercise their franchise, at its close they cast their 
votes in camera - shielded by the Ballot Act of 1872. 
However, this process of modernization was neither uniform nor monolithic: 
not only did various elements of modem and pre-modem politics continue to coexist 
throughout the period, but the pace of change also varied across the system due to the 
myriad constituency types - and thus electoral cultures - that existed in England and 
Wales. New political realities were undoubtedly emerging between 1857 and 1880, 
yet they did so in the shadow of older political traditions. As noted in Chapter I it is 
possible to characterise the British political system during this period as being 
positioned on a fault line between two competing forms of politics. James Vemon 
describes this dichotomy in his study of English political culture between 1815 and 
1867, 
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As we shall see, it is difficult to talk of one, singular, exclusive official 
definition of a male propertied political arena. The official political 
structure was a curious mixture of the old and the new, the local and 
the national, combining the remnants of a medieval political system 
with that created by nineteenth-century reforms.4 
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The coexistence of old and new features of politics owed much to the atomisation of 
the system into individual electoral units - each with their own distinct cultures and 
political heritage. According to Hoppen, Victorian constituencies, "ranged along a 
lengthy continuum from comparatively straightforward deference communities to 
provincial capitals sustaining something close to the free exercise of political 
judgment". 5 Comparatively similar traditions of influence and patronage existed in 
the agricultural counties and the small boroughs. In the former loyalty to the Church 
of England and to aristocratic influence sustained a tradition of predominantly 
Conservative politics. In the latter the strength of electoral tradition and patron 
influence stifled the development of democratic politics. In the larger urban boroughs 
a measure of political freedom was possible and the ftrst stirrings of a modem style of 
politics were to be found. There a tradition of nonconformity and opposition to 
privilege in church and state gave Liberalism and Radicalism the ascendancy. The 
pace of political change across these constituencies varied according to the strength of 
local electoral traditions and the extent of social and economic changes brought about 
by industrial and urban growth. 
The mid-Victorian political system was characterized by the simultaneous 
operation of both progressive features of modem politics and the retardant elements of 
a more traditional, pre-reform outlook.. Thus the development of centrally directed 
Party organization was hampered by a leadership lack of faith, and a continuing 
recourse to private correspondence rather than the emerging channels of official party 
; Vemon, Politics and the People, p.15. 
Hoppen, The Mid-Victorian Generation, p.254. 
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machinery. Elections continued to be influenced by local concerns and provincial 
allegiances, and campaigning remained infused with a strong sense of carnival and 
ritual. And despite the formalization ofpolitics after 1867, which further limited the 
participation of the unenfranchised and attempted to make the process of constituency 
politics more respectable, the machinery of electioneering continued to provide 
opportunities for the exercise of corruption and the outbreak of violence. 
Violent electioneering in Britain may date from the late Middle Ages6 but it was not 
until the end ofthe seventeenth-century, during the 'rage of party', that the 'great age 
of electoral rioting' began.7 It was then that an expanded electorate and greater 
frequency of contested elections - a product of the Triennial Act of 1694 - contributed 
to the strength of political activity and to the potential for conflict. The 20 years 
between 1695 and 1715 experienced no fewer than 1 0 general elections, 8 during 
which between one-third and one-half of all elections were contested.9 Ian Gilmour 
writes of elections during this period, 
Polling was concentrated in space and extended in time. A 
constituency usually had only one polling place, and polling went on 
for days, sometimes weeks. Excitement inevitably grew, as did the 
consumption of drink. In addition, to ensure the freedom of elections 
soldiers were removed from the towns where they were held. Their 
presence would probably have provoked violence; their absence did 
nothing to prevent it.10 
English and Welsh elections continued to occasion sporadic violence throughout the 
eighteenth century, yet fewer contests meant fewer opportunities for disorder. Frank 
6 See Derek Hirst, Authority and Conflict: England 1603 -1658 (London, 1986). 
7 Ian Gilmour, Riot, Risings and Revolution (London, 1992), p.207. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Frank O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties: The Unreformed Electoral System ofHanoverian 
England, 1734-1832 (Oxford, 1989), p.l 07. 
10 Gilmour, Riot, Risings, p.208- 209. 
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O'Gorman's table of contests between 1701 and 1831 illustrates the decline in 
electoral activity: between 1701 and 1734 the average percentage of English and 
Welsh elections that were contested was 40.2%; whereas between 1741 and 1831 this 
percentage dropped to 27%.11 The frequency of electoral violence declined after 1715 
as the Septennial Act reduced the opportunity for disorder by increasing the time 
between elections. In addition, a corresponding decline in the number of electoral 
contests sapped the source of violence. By 1747 just 7.5% of English counties went 
to the polls compared to 65% in 1705.12 William Hogarth's satiric print of the corrupt 
Oxfordshire election of 1754, Chairing the Member (1758), presents a picture of 
undoubted bacchanalian chaos and disorder. Yet by the middle of the eighteenth-
century the frequency of electoral rioting had largely begun to decline. John 
Stevenson writes that "with the growing security of the Hanoverian succession and 
the increasingly oligarchic tendency of electoral control, the occasions of open 
political violence became more limited" .13 
Comparing the frequency of violence in the eighteenth-century with that of the 
nineteenth-century is difficult given the absence of quantitative surveys for the latter. 
Where figures of electoral riots are available, comparisons are hampered by disparate 
emphases and contrasting terminology. Bohstedt records a total of 617 riots in 
England between 1790 and 1810 - of which he classes 63 as 'political' .14 By contrast 
Richter records 452 riots in England, Wales and Scotland between 1865 and 1885, of 
which 71 occurred at elections.15 As a crude indication of the gradual 'transition to 
order' of British society these figures are enlightening: Richter found less violence in 
11 O'Gorman, Voters, p.l08. 
12 Stevenson, Popular Disturbances (1 '1 edn, 1979), p.27. 
13 Stevenson, Popular Disturbances (2nd edn, 1992), p.30. 
14B ohstedt, "Gender, Household", p.91. 
15 Richter, "Public Order'', p.275 and 172. 
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the later nineteenth-century despite a wider frame of reference than Bohstedt. 
However it is difficult to use such figures to trace the pattern of electoral disorder 
between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Bohstedt's sample of political 
violence also includes 'Church and King' riots and illumination disorders: neither of 
which are the focus of this study. In addition he provides no distribution figures to 
indicate when the riots occurred. Likewise Richter includes no details as to the timing 
of disorder. Bohstedt defmes a 'riot' as, "an incident in which a crowd of fifty or 
more people damaged or seized property, assaulted someone or forced a victim to 
perform some action".16 For his part Richter describes only, "separate instances of 
serious electoral rioting" _I? However, given that Bohstedt's figure of 63 'political' 
riots included other categories of disturbance, and Richter's sample of 71 riots 
included only election violence, it seems likely that the later period (1865 - 1885) 
included slightly more cases of electoral disorder. Such a conclusion fits comfortably 
with my own evidence, which suggests that Richter's figures underestimate the scale 
of mid-century electoral violence. 
Yet what of the period between 1810 and 1857? The lack of any statistical 
evidence on electoral violence during that period ensures that conclusions about post-
1832 disorder are necessarily speculative. Elections undoubtedly continued to be 
marred by violence in the early nineteenth-century, and John Stevenson suggests that 
"there was little evidence either immediately before or after 1832 that the more 
tumultuous traditions of the eighteenth century had been left behind".18 Given the 
strong correlation between election contests and the frequency of violence some 
conclusions can, however, be drawn. It seems likely that the phenomenon of electoral 
16 Bohstedt, "Gender, Household"., p.90. 
17 Richter, "Public Order"., p.172. 
18 Stevenson, Popular Disturbances (1'1 edn), p.286. 
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violence peaked in the years immediately after the First Reform Act of 1832. During 
that period the growth of the electorate, a greater number of contested elections and 
increased partisanship - all products of reform - would have contributed to the 
frequency of violence. Thereafter the scale of disorder declined as the rate of contests 
diminished. The dislocation of party politics in the 1840s contributed to a decline in 
electoral activity, further reducing the likelihood of contested elections and thus the 
opportunities for disorder. Hoppen argues a post-1832 decrease in electoral violence 
and suggests, "Bloody electioneering had been common in the period before the First 
Reform Act of 1832. Thereafter it declined, at frrst slowly and then rapidly".19 By 
1874, he writes, ''the press was reporting that in England 'mobs, processions, favours, 
free fights and punch drinking have become for the most part things of the past"'.20 
Hoppen's contention that the frequency of electoral rioting was decreasing after 1832 
is undoubtedly accurate. Yet his argument about the pace at which that decline 
occurred during the mid-nineteenth century is likely over-estimated. The sample of 
evidence presented here suggests a steady increase in instances of violence from 1857 
to 1868. 
For the period between 1857 and 1880, including general and by-elections, I 
have identified a total of 191 episodes of election violence. This figure includes 25 
duplicate cases of disorder - where more than one separate instance of violence 
occurred in a constituency during a single campaign. The sample of 194 instances of 
violence compares with Bohstedt's figure of 63 riots and Richter's 71 riots.21 A 
detailed analysis of the sample of violence is provided in Chapter IV. However I have 
t9H oppen, "Grammars", p.605. 
20 !bid 
21 The figures quoted for Bohstedt and Richter include only those riots they identified as occurring 
during elections. The sample of 191 includes three classifications of disorder including riots, 
disturbances and incidents. 
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included a brief survey of the figures here to provide some context to the present 
discussion. Table I below reveals the distribution, timing and location of election 
violence during the period. Undoubtedly more than 13 cases of these occurred during 
the period. Yet an attempt to identify all such instances would require an exhaustive 
search of newspaper archives. 
Table 1.Figures of Election Violence in England andWales, 1857-1880 
Total Cases of Violence- 191 
General By Total orough Scale of Timing of 
Elections Elections Violence Violence Violence 
1857- 12 1860-2 
1859-11 1861 - 1 132 Riot- 63 Pre-poll- 43 
1865-29 1862-2 
1868-71 1867-2 Total County Disturbance - 77 Polling day - 96 
1874-32 1869- 1 Violence 
1880-26 1871- 1 Incident- 51 Post-poll - 27 
1877- 1 59 
Unknown- 25 
181 10 
Table I demonstrates the steady increase in electoral violence between 1857 and 
1868.22 Thereafter reported cases of disorder decreased, yet remained higher than the 
pre-1867 period. This weakens any argument that after the introduction of secret 
voting in 1872 the potential for violence largely disappeared. The definitions 
employed to describe the scale of electoral violence are outlined in Chapter 3. Given 
that both 'riots' and 'disturbances' are classed as serious cases of violence, Table 1 
illustrates the overwhelmingly serious nature of mid-century disorder. Electoral 
violence is shown to have occurred predominantly on the polling day; a feature that 
continued even after the introduction of secret voting. A considerable amount of 
disorder also took place prior to the polling day, with much of that occurring during 
22 This table, which includes duplicate entries, collates data from several tables which may be found in 
Chapter N. 
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the nomination ceremony. 'Post-poll' violence records those episodes of disorder that 
took place during the declaration of the result - itself a potent source of violence. The 
pattern and distribution of electoral violence revealed in Table 1 can be understood 
through an analysis of the structure and operation of the political system. 
11 
The structure of British politics between 1857 and 1880 may be divided by the 
Second Reform Act of 1867. In that year the extension of the franchise and a 
substantial redistribution of constituencies refashioned the electoral landscape created 
35 years previously. And whereas in the decade after the Second Reform Act the 
character of politics was determined by the alterations of Disraeli's 'leap in the dark', 
the electoral system prior to 1867 operated under the provisions of the First Reform 
Act of 1832. The latter Act addressed some of the most obvious imbalances of the 
unreformed electoral system. As well as extending the franchise to a portion of the 
middle class, the distribution of seats attempted to rectify the over-representation of 
the south by increasing the representation of the new centres of economic and 
population growth. Many smaller boroughs, those with few voters and characterized 
as habitually corrupt, were either partially disfranchised or totally removed from the 
system. By introducing a system of voter registration, and thereby stimulating - in 
the long-term - the growth of party organisation and partisan conflict, the First 
Reform Act contributed indirectly to the frequency of mid-Victorian electoral 
disorder. This is not to argue that violence increased inexorably after 1832, yet the 
evidence reveals a defmite rise in the incidence of electoral disorder during the mid-
Victorian period. In the years between 1857 and 1867 I have recorded 59 episodes of 
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election violence, compared to a total of 132 between 1868 and 1880.23 As already 
noted the lack of disorder in the earlier period reflected the relative weakness of party 
conflict and a low incidence of electoral contests. 
One of the more recent accounts of the passage of the Great Reform Act comments 
that ''when the dust had settled, the political landscape looked much as it had done 
before."24 Structurally speaking, at least, this was largely true. Notwithstanding the 
long-term effects of Reform on the development of the British political system, the 
Act of 1832 left the outline of electoral politics only slightly altered. In the final 
count the overall size of the electoral system increased from 379 to 401 
constituencies, though the number of members returned to the Commons remained at 
658. Through disfranchisement, enfranchisement and redistribution the boroughs 
experienced a net loss of 7 constituencies and 66 members, compared to a net gain for 
the counties of 24 constituencies and 65 members. In the unreformed system a total 
of 114 counties had returned 188 members to parliament, 262 boroughs had returned 
465 members and the universities of Oxford, Cambridge and Dublin provided the 
remaining 5 members. After 1832 university representation was increased to six, with 
Dublin gaining an extra member. A total of 143 counties returned 253 members and 
255 boroughs returned 399 members. 
The redistribution of seats in 1832 abolished or partially disfranchised a 
number of small boroughs- generally those with fewer than 500 voters. English 
boroughs accounted for 61% of the total number of seats in the unreformed House of 
23 These figures include duplicate entries and 10 episodes of disorder that occurred at by-elections. For 
more detail on the statistics of disorder during the period see Chapter IV. 
24 E.A.Smith, Reform or Revolution? A Diary of Reform in England, 1830-2 (Stroud, 1992), p.141. 
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Commons, of which 55% had fewer than 300 voters.25 Indeed in 1830 only 43 
English boroughs could claim an electorate of more than 1,000. In 1832, in an attack 
on nomination and patronage boroughs, a large number of these small constituencies 
were completely disfranchised. Schedule A of the Act abolished 56 of the smallest 
and most corrupt boroughs including such colourful and decayed constituencies as 
Wooton Basset, Old Sarum and Gatton, which by 1832 had just 2 voters! A further 
30 boroughs listed in Schedule B lost a single member each. In England and Wales 
the redistribution of seats saw 22 large towns gain 2 members each, and an additional 
21 medium-sized towns gain a single member. 
These changes increased the representation of the industrial north at the 
expense of the over-represented south. From a total of 22 new boroughs each 
returning 2 members each, 14 were industrial towns of the north and midlands. These 
new constituencies, each with a population in excess of 40,000, included such cotton 
and fabric manufacturing towns as Bolton, Stockport, Manchester and Bradford.26 In 
England 26 counties were divided: 7 were granted a single member; Yorkshire gained 
an extra 2 seats and the Isle of Wight gained a single member. In Wales the 
representation of the counties was increased by 3, the district of Swansea was 
established and the iron-manufacturing town ofMerthyr Tydfil was granted separate 
representation. Scotland gained 8 new seats in the burghs and in Ireland 4 large towns 
gained an extra member.27 The table below outlines the structure of British politics 
between the First and Second Reform Acts. 
2SM. h 
2 tc ael Brock, The Great Reform Act (London, 1973), p.l9- 20. 2~ Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, p.65. Charles Seymour, Electoral Reform, p.538. 
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Table 2.United Kingdom Electoral System, 1832-1867 
England MP's Wales MP's Scotland MP's Ireland MP's Total Total 
Constituenc MP's 
68 142 13 17 30 30 32 64 143 253 
186 322 15 15 21 23 33 39 255 399 
2 4 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 6 
256 468 28 32 51 53 66 105 401 658 
England and Wales remained the electoral powerhouse of the system. Between them 
they provided the House of Commons with 500, or 75%, of its members. In contrast 
Scotland returned 53 members and Ireland provided 105 members. England 
dominated the partnership with a total of 256 constituencies and 468 members. 
Boroughs continued to outnumber county constituencies in the post-reform period. 
After 1832 a total of 255 boroughs across the United Kingdom returned a total of 399 
members, whereas 143 counties provided Parliament with 253 members. 
Despite the reallocation of seats in 1832 anomalies in the scale of representation 
continued to characterise the system. Borough representation was concentrated in the 
south and south-west of England, where 100 boroughs returned 176 members, 
compared to the 144 members drawn from 84 northern boroughs.28 Structurally the 
small boroughs retained their electoral dominance and the industrial districts of 
England remained inadequately represented. The scale of the inequity was in some 
cases quite glaring. Before the Second Reform Act the small rural borough of 
Thetford with 224 voters, the sprawling county seat of East Suffolk with 6,679 voters, 
and the large industrial borough of Manchester with 21,542 voters, each returned two 
members to parliament. Indeed on the eve of the Second Reform Act a total of 60 
28 These figures were derived by sorting the English boroughs into 10 categories (Northern, North 
Western, York, North Midland, West Midland and South Western, SouthEastern, South Midland, 
Eastern and London). These divisions were employed in the 1871 British census and are used 
extensively in Chapter IV (See p.l68 [fn.121] for details of the counties in each division). 
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English and Welsh boroughs had fewer than 500 voters yet returned 87 members to 
the Commons. Table 2 below demonstrates the continued, though diminishing, 
presence of small boroughs in England and Wales during the period.29 
Table 3.English and Welsh Borough Sizes, 1857-1880 
1857 MP's 1859 MP's 1865 MP's 1868 MP's 1874 MP's 1880 MP's 
43 86 44 88 51 97 116 200 119 205 129 221 
41 70 41 70 42 70 50 67 52 65 45 52 
53 86 55 89 47 80 34 34 27 27 24 24 
62 92 59 86 60 87 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Prior to the Second Reform Act the term 'small' refers to those boroughs with fewer 
than 1,000 voters and a population ofless than 10,000. After 1867, when the size of 
the electorate was greatly increased, the term describes boroughs with less than 2,000 
voters and fewer than 20,000 inhabitants. Conversely the term 'large' borough refers 
to those with more than 1,000 voters before 1867, and with more than 2,000 voters 
after 1867. Table 2 reveals the relative significance of the smaller boroughs 
throughout the period. Before 1867 more than half of all English and Welsh boroughs 
had fewer than 1,000 voters, with between 59 and 62 having fewer than 500 voters. 
Between 1857 and 1867 the small boroughs accounted for about 50% of the total 
English and Welsh borough membership- returning between 167 and 178 members 
to the Commons. Therefore just prior to the Second Reform Act more than one-
quarter of Commons members represented a small English or Welsh borough. 
The continued electoral importance of the smaller boroughs reflected an early 
Victorian ideal that members should represent a wide variety of influences, and not 
merely appeal to the 'mercenary' wishes of a mass electorate. The small boroughs 
29 Figures for Table 2 drawn from J.Vincent and M.Stcnton (eds), McCalmont's Parliamentary Poll 
Book of All Elections, 1832 -1918 (Brighton, 1971) and F.W.S.Craig, British Parliamentary Election 
Results, 1832-1885 (London, 1977). 
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were thus viewed as a safeguard against the tyranny of numbers. During the framing 
of the Second Reform Act, the Conservative Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli, based 
his opposition to equalising electoral distribution, ''upon· the traditional dislike and 
fear of granting power to the numerical majority".30 Due to their size, however, such 
constituencies were also perceived as being able to provide a relatively easy entry to 
the Commons for a candidate willing to spend a little money in bribes and treats. 
Consequently the small boroughs have often been characterised as tidal pools left in 
the wake of a receding sea of electoral tradition, corruption and influence. An 
editorial comment in the Nonconformist in April 1859 reflected contemporary opinion 
of the politics of the small boroughs, 
In the large towns for the most part, the arts of corruption will avail but 
little. Public opinion, and the vigilance of non-electors, will do much 
to thwart the 'gentlemen in green spectacles and dark wigs'. But in the 
small constituencies ofless than 500 voters, corruption, drunkenness 
and vice of every hue will during the next few days hold their 
carnival.31 
However, despite their colourful reputation as reservoirs of electoral malpractice, the 
small boroughs proved largely free of election violence throughout the mid-Victorian 
period. This fmding runs contrary to that of Donald Richter, who writes that "It was 
in the small towns and rural areas that the great majority of election disturbances 
occurred, and it was there that the absence as yet of any effective policing was most 
conspicuous".32 Yet my evidence from England and Wales reveals that it was in the 
larger urban boroughs that most of the violence occurred - a factor both of the 
increasing number of larger boroughs in the system (see Table 2), and of the low 
30 Seymour, Electoral Reform, p.330. 
31 Nonconformist, 27 April1859, p.331. 
32 Richter, "The Role of Mob Riot, p.23. 
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number of contested elections in the smaller boroughs.33 Electoral violence was a 
feature of the large urban constituencies because it was there that a measure of 
political freedom encouraged the development of party conflict - and thus of the root 
causes of disorder: partisan enthusiasm and electoral malpractice. 
The absence of contests in the small boroughs, and thus of violence, was 
related to the stability of politics there. Such constituencies tended to be controlled 
either by a patron or family, and were places where electoral traditions were likely to 
survive for generations. Jaggard writes of these constituencies, "Because of their long 
history and slowly growing populations, many small boroughs were also towns where 
in some instances political traditions comfortably spanned the first and sometimes the 
second Reform Acts". 34 The strength of such traditions, whether motivated by patron 
control, party allegiance or bribery, weakened the likelihood of sustained partisan 
rivalry - an essential ingredient of contested elections and of violence. Jaggard 
highlights more than 100 small patronage, corporation, venal or proprietary boroughs 
identified by O'Gorman in Voters, Patrons and Parties and comments, "Political 
activity was absent in almost all". 35 My own analysis confirms the stability of politics 
in the small boroughs. I have identified 69 English and Welsh boroughs with 
consistently small electorates throughout the period 1857 to 1880.36 31 of those 
boroughs returned the same party preferences at 4 or more successive elections - 19 
of which returned same-party candidates at all 6 general elections of the period.37 A 
33 For a detailed analysis of election violence in small and large boroughs see Chapter IV. 
34 J aggard, "Small Boroughs", p.626. 
35 Ibid. 
36 These are boroughs with electorates below 1,000 before 1867, and below 2,000 for the entire period 
1857-1880. 
37 By 'same party preference' I am referring to the choice of party: in single member constituencies this 
meant the same party was successful at successive elections; in double member constituencies the same 
pattern of choice was consistent, whether that be the same party or a split between the two parties. For 
example both the Welsh borough ofRadnor (which elected a single Liberal at all elections during the 
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further 26 boroughs returned same-party candidates for at least 3 successive elections. 
Thus 57 of 69 small boroughs showed a considerable degree of continuity in their 
politics throughout the period. Party strengths in these boroughs were evenly 
matched. Of the 19 boroughs that returned the same preference at all elections of the 
period, 10 were safe Liberal seats and 9 were safe Conservative seats. Of the 31 
boroughs that returned the same preference at four or more elections, 15 were Liberal, 
14 were Conservative and 2 split between the parties. In such an environment the 
likelihood of violence was quite remote. Not only were contests quite infrequent in 
such constituencies, but also the degree of partisan rivalry required for the outbreak of 
disorder was equally absent. 
The First Reform Act greatly increased the total size of the British electorate. After 
1832 a total of 813,726 individuals were enfranchised, a figure that represented just 1 
in 7 adult males in the United Kingdom.38 Debate continues over the precise extent of 
the increase in 1832 due to the difficulty of estimating the size of the unreformed 
electorate. The issue is further clouded by arguments over the extent to which the 
potential, as opposed to the actual, electorate should be taken into account: the former 
being those who were qualified to vote but failed to do so; the latter being those who 
actually registered and exercised their franchise. 39 Indeed one recent account has 
suggested that "Attempts at careful calculation of the size of the qualified electorate 
before 1832 have no great value. Most of the electorate was a stage army, never or 
period) and the borough of Warwick (which elected a Conservative and a Liberal at all elections from 
1865 to 1880) are included in the initial figure of 31 boroughs mentioned above. 
38 E.A.Smith, Reform or Revolution, p.141. 
39 See Derek Beales, "The Electorate Before and After 1832: The right to vote, and the opportunity" 
Parliamentary History, 11, 1 (1992), pp.139 -150 and Frank O'Gorman, "The Electorate Before and 
After 1832 [Reply]," Parliamentary History, 12,2 (1993), pp.171-183. 
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rarely voting".40 In "The Electorate Before and After 1832" Derek Beales draws a 
distinction between those who were entitled to vote and those who actually voted. He 
suggests that whereas the Act increased the number of enfranchised voters in the 
United Kingdom from 495,200 to 813,726, the number who actually voted rose rather 
more impressively from 91,092 to 482,022- an increase of 81%.41 In England and 
Wales alone the franchise alterations increased the eligible electorate from about 
440,000 to 650,000, while the number who actually voted leapt from 74,638 to 
390,700.42 
The figures of the actual voting population, as opposed to the potential 
electorate, have important implications for the study of electoral violence. The First 
Reform Act obviously increased the size of the United Kingdom electorate. Yet 
Beales' figures suggest that not only were more people enfranchised after 1832, but 
the number who actually voted was also substantially increased. Indeed Beales 
records that between 1831 and 1832 the percentage of the United Kingdom electorate 
who actually voted rose from 18.4% to 59.2%. As Phillips and Wetherell write, "The 
reformed electorate not only outnumbered its predecessor, it also tended to vote more 
often and in greater proportion".43 The more active post-1832 electorate reflected the 
increasing number of contested elections - the natural precursor to electoral violence. 
This trend did not, however, continue exponentially. Beales is careful to point out 
that in 1835 the percentage of the population who voted dropped to 42.1%.44 This 
decrease reflected the steady decline in contested elections that continued from 1835 
40 Beales, "The Electorate", p.149. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., pp.147- 8 (Beales records that between 1831 and 1832 the number of people voting in English 
and Welsh boroughs rose from 42,254 to 188,738 - compared to an increase in the number of county 
voters from 30,934 to 201,962). 
43 
Phillips and W etherell, "The Great Reform Act", p.414. 
44 Beales, "The Electorate", p.149. 
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until 1859 (with the exception of 1837 when contests increased)45, and which 
contributed to the relatively few cases of electoral violence in the early Victorian 
. d46 peno. 
The new franchises of the First Reform Act not only increased the size of the 
electorate, they also altered its composition. In the counties this transformation was 
less pronounced than in the boroughs, where a new franchise and residence 
requirement· disfranchised large portions of the unreformed electorate. The county 
electorate remained largely unchanged as a result of the 1832 Act. County seats were 
viewed as more prestigious than borough seats and separate franchise requirements 
between the two were designed to ensure their social distinctiveness. In the counties 
the Act added the £10 copyhold, and the £10 and £50 leasehold qualifications to the 
long enfranchised 40s freeholders. The Act also introduced a new occupancy 
qualification in the counties. This new rental franchise was available to tenants who 
paid a yearly rent of not less than £50. 
The new borough franchise in 1832 was the £10 occupancy qualification. 
This conferred the right to vote on anyone who occupied property worth an annual 
sum of not less than £10 for more than 12 months as owner or occupier. After 1832 
this franchise qualified the majority of the borough electorate, and the newly 
introduced residence requirement, "wiped out nearly half of the old voters".47 Indeed 
between half and two-thirds of the reformed borough electorate were enfranchised by 
the new £10 qualification.48 The loss of many older voters tended only to improve the 
moral condition of some boroughs. Ancient right franchises qualified voters under a 
45 See Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, Appendix E, pp.440 - 441. 
46 More detail on election contests and violence can be found below and in Chapter IV. 
47 Seymour, Electoral Reform, p.87. 
48 Ibid., p.83. 
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variety of arcane conditions, few of which were based on ownership of property or the 
payment of rates. Seymour writes that "In many cases the electors qualified by these 
franchises came from the lowest class".49 These franchises included scot and lot 
voters, burgage voters, potwalloper's, the voting rights of some municipal 
corporations and freeman voters. Scot and lot voters were occupiers of property who 
paid the poor rate; the burgage franchise depended upon the ownership of particular 
pieces of property to which the right to vote was attached; a potwalloper could be a 
householder or a lodger, and was enfranchised through his ability to cook a meal in a 
room that he had sole control over; the freeman franchise could be conferred by the 
municipal corporation, inherited from a relative, obtained through marriage or by 
apprenticeship to another freeman for seven years. 5° 
Those voters enfranchised under these ancient rights were allowed to continue 
voting for the remainder of their lifetime. And in the case of the freeman voters, the 
largest category of ancient right voters, they could be found in significant numbers in 
some boroughs after 1832.51 Indeed as late as 1865 they could be found in large 
numbers in 91 English and Welsh boroughs and in 25 they held the balance of 
power.52 The freeman voters were notorious for their willingness to accept bribes 
during elections, and such habits did not disappear after 1832. Following the 
Barnstaple election of 1857 allegations of bribery were proven against a number of 
freemen, 
There is a petty squabble in this corrupt borough amongst the freemen, 
some being highly offended that they only received £2, while others 
were favoured with £5 for their independent votes for the successful 
49 Ibid., p.29. 
so Ibid., pp.25- 27 and also O'Gorman, Voters, pp.28-32. 
SI After 1832 ancient right voters in the boroughs numbered 108,000 (Seymour, Electoral Refonn, 
p.84n). 
52Ibid, p.86. 
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candidates. No doubt existed at two o'clock on the day of the election 
as to the system being pursued - although some difficulty was felt as to 
legal evidence to establish the fact. This now no longer exists. Several 
dissatisfied freemen have volunteered to prove bribery.53 
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The venality of these electors may be an acknowledged fact but their involvement in 
electoral violence is much harder to determine. Indeed it is difficult to ascertain the 
degree to which the changed social or economic composition of the reformed 
electorate influenced the nature or frequency of election violence. Certainly neither 
those who were newly enfranchised, nor the ancient right voters, proved to be 
immune to the electoral abuses that continued to occur in the reformed system. Those 
who had grown accustomed to receiving payments during a contest were unlikely to 
change their habits overnight. And there were those who, though new to the game of 
politics, were quick to realise that the franchise entrusted to them could bring more 
than the mere satisfaction of returning a member to parliament. 
It is important, however, to remember that electoral violence was not always 
the product of corruption. Riots broke out at British elections for a variety of reasons 
and direct interference with the voters was only one of them. Indeed the electorate is 
not the only place to be looking for answers: those who remained outside the sphere 
of official politics were just as likely, if not more so, to be involved in election 
disorder. For them a boisterous and physical campaign was their only means of 
participating in the political arena. Ultimately the limited source material available 
restricts any meaningful analysis of riotous crowds. What evidence there is, however, 
suggests that a wide cross-section of society were involved in such incidents. 54 
Neither the newly enfranchised voters, nor their older counterparts, were more likely 
to participate in violence. 
53 Coventry Weekly Times, 8 Aprill857, p.2. 
54 A more detailed discussion of the composition of electoral 'mobs' can be found in Chapter IV. 
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Throughout the period the potential for disorder existed in the procedures that 
governed parliamentary electioneering. This is not to argue that election riots 
occurred entirely because the processes of electoral politics invited them - the failure 
of procedural changes to significantly alter the frequency of violence disproves such a 
theory. However the public and participatory characteristics of mid-century 
electioneering undoubtedly contributed to the likelihood of conflict. The most potent 
of these included the centralization of polling booths, the public nomination and open 
voting. The numerical restriction of polling booths focused partisan activity and 
public enthusiasm at specific locations thereby increasing the potential for crowd 
violence. Public nominations, in which prospective candidates addressed large 
audiences of voters and non-voters alike, provided an event of mass, popular 
participation that proved almost as violent as the polling day itself. And the system of 
open voting served to facilitate the practice of intimidation by exposing the voter, and 
his choice, to the wider community. 
However, prior to 1867 no legislation was passed in the Commons that dealt 
with these procedural inducements to riot. This was in large part due to the fact that 
for much of the century violent electioneering was viewed as a subsidiary feature of 
electoral corruption. Indeed Happen writes that "The aspects of nineteenth-century 
English electioneering most often condemned at the time were bribery and treating, 
rather than violence". 55 This is not to argue that the statutes ignored electoral 
disorder, far from it. Many of the reforms passed between 1857 and 1880 were aimed 
at producing more peaceful elections. However most were directed principally at 
discovering and penalizing corrupt practices, and the history of election disorder is 
only partly related to the matter of electoral malpractice. 
SSH oppen, "Grammars", p.609. 
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Before the Second Reform Act changes to the pattern of election disorder 
owed more to fluctuations in the frequency of contests, and to the particular 
characteristics of specific general elections, than to alterations in either election 
procedure or the law dealing with corruption. Between 1832 and 1867 there were few 
measures that dealt with electoral procedure. The First Reform Act reduced the 
period allowed for polling to two days in the counties and one day in the boroughs. 
The polling day proved in most cases to be the most violent part of the campaign. It 
was the culmination of weeks or months of party activity and provided a focal point 
for fmal, perhaps desperate, attempts to generate electoral support. The day also drew 
large and enthusiastic crowds determined to enjoy themselves in an atmosphere of 
excitement and suspense. My sample of violence shows that between 1857 and 1880 
50% of election disorder occurred on the polling day, compared to 22% prior to the 
poll.56 By restricting the duration of polling this measure was a significant step 
towards reducing the potential for violence. However the decline in electoral contests 
after 1832, and the subsequent reduction in violence, makes it difficult to assess the 
direct impact that this measure had on the frequency of disorder. Given that election 
violence continued to be a feature of the polling day throughout the period, it seems 
obvious that the measure had little real influence over the pattern of disorder. 
Throughout the period anti-corruption legislation was primarily aimed at 
eradicating the influence of bribery and treating. Both involved a transaction between 
electoral agent and voter in which some valuable, usually money or alcohol, was 
provided in return for consideration at the poll. And both could be responsible for the 
outbreak of violence: the bribery of election 'mobs' to terrorize voters and rival party 
56 The total sample included 191 episodes of violence. The timing for 166 episodes could be positively 
identified, leaving 25 unknown. 43 episodes of violence occurred prior to the poll and 96 on the 
polling day. For more details of the timing of election disorder, and of the sample of violence, see 
Chapter N. 
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supporters did occur; and the ubiquitous use of treating certainly raised the likelihood 
of violence by ensuring that significant portions of the electorate passed the campaign 
in a reasonable state of intoxication. However there were few measures passed that 
proved effective in limiting corrupt practices or in eradicating the disorder that 
accompanied them. Between 1839 and 1852 various bills were passed dealing with 
the matter of election petitions. These were designed to streamline the machinery 
dealing with the trial of controverted elections, and to increase the investigatory 
powers of the House in relation to evidence gathered during petition hearings. 57 In 
practice they led to an immediate decrease in petitions from 122 in 1852 to 72 in 
1857.58 Yet their influence in eradicating corruption was modest; their impact on the 
frequency of violence was non-existent. 
The Corrupt Practices Act of 1854 was an important step towards eradicating 
corrupt practices at elections. However it was significant largely because it was the 
ftrst step and not necessarily the most effective. The Act established the ftrst 
comprehensive defmition of bribery and treating. More importantly it defmed, for the 
ftrst time, undue influence (or intimidation). A person was guilty of this offence if 
they, "make use of, or threaten to make use of, any Force, Violence, or Restraint, or 
inflict or threaten the Infliction ... of any Injury, Damage, Harm or Loss, or in any 
other Manner practice Intimidation upon or against any person in order to induce or 
compel such Person to vote or refrain from voting".59 The Act thus established what 
undue influence was but provided no mechanism for preventing it. The inability of 
this type of legislation to influence the nature of electioneering was a fact 
acknowledged in the Commons by W.E.Forster, the Minister for Education. In 1871 
57 O'Leary, Elimination of Corrupt Practices, pp.21·- 23. 
58 F.W.S.Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, p.63l. 
59 Leader, The Franchise, p.3. 
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during the first reading of the Parliamentary and Municipal Elections Bill he 
commented, 
I have been in favour of the Ballot, on the ground that bribery and 
intimidation are two of the greatest evils we have to contend with in 
connection with our Parliamentary and representative system - and 
that the best way to prevent an evil is to stop the cause of it. .. On that 
ground I have always thought that we should be more successful by the 
Ballot than by Corrupt Practices Acts, or by penalties, however 
stringent. 60 
The Act also extended a provision of the Election Expenses Regulation Act (1827) 
banning the use of ribbons, flags, banners and bands of music during campaigns. 61 
These had long been a potent source of disorder. Victorian crowds took their political 
displays seriously and parades of colourfully bedecked partisans, often accompanied 
by bands of music, frequently led to violence. The borough of Blackburn in 
Lancashire was a frequent scene of disorder throughout the period, and during the 
General Election of 1868, 
A procession comprising some 4000 persons was formed, and party 
colours were freely carried ... When the procession reached that part of 
the town chiefly inhabited by the workpeople of the Conservative 
member, Mr.Hornby, several fights took place ... a lad riding on a pony 
down the street ... was set upon by a number of Irishmen because he 
displayed a little orange and blue riband on his pony. He and the pony 
were beaten with bludgeons ... and the lad was seriously injured. This 
was the sign for a general row. One man was picked up in the streets 
quite dead. 62 
And during the East Essex county election of 1880, 
60 Hansard 3, vol.l94, 20 February 1871, p.529- 530. 
61 Vernon, Politics and the People, p.111. 
62 Carmarthen Journal, 16 October 1868, p. 7. 
During the polling on Monday at Mannington, East Essex, free fights 
were of frequent occurrence. A body of roughs, wearing Conservative 
colours, attacked a Liberal banner, and nearly succeeded in capturing 
it. It was however rescued and borne in triwnph past the Conservative 
headquarters. A hand-to-hand fight ensued, in which the Conservative 
rough elements had the worst of it. 63 
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James V emon argues that attempts to restrict the use of such parades, colours and 
symbols reflected an official reaction against the development of 'an autonomous 
popular politics'. He writes that "Such was the paranoia that visual iconography 
aggravated, even created, divisions which disrupted the delicate social and political 
equilibrium of both the town and nation, that legislation was passed to outlaw their 
However such efforts were to, prove fruitless and Victorian campaigns 
continued to be characterised by such colourful, often provocative, displays. During 
the South Derbyshire county election of 1868 a serious riot erupted in Ripley 
following the introduction of a dog decorated with blue ribbons.65 And, continuing 
· with the canine theme, a retired publican in Ramsgate was sentenced to six weeks 
hard labour for causing the death of a dog during the 1880 General Election. The 
Salisbury and Winchester Journal reported that he had, "painted the dog all over with 
the Liberal and Conservative colours, and the animal was poisoned through licking 
the paint off'. 66 
The 1854 Act also established a system of election auditors whose task it was 
to inspect the accounts payable to candidates following an election. However their 
introduction helped to identify only the most obvious cases of bribery and treating. 
Their effectiveness was hampered by inefficiency and by the many ways available for 
election committees to hide corrupt expenditure. Ultimately the Act was not effective 
63 Manchester Guardian, 7 April1880, p.6. 
64 Vernon, Politics and the People, p.111 - 112. 
65 Bristol Daily Post, 23 November 1868, p.3. 
66 Salisbury and Winchester Journal, 10 April1880. 
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in reducing the incidence of bribery or treating, and Charles Seymour writes that "So 
far as intimidation was concerned the failure of the Act was generally 
acknowledged". 67 The factor of violence was not likely to be diminished from 
electioneering by such anti-corruption legislation. Besides being weak and ineffective 
it failed to address the structural inducements to riot such as open voting, public 
nominations and centralised polling. Bribery and treating continued to generate a 
measure of disorder because the procedures in place for preventing them were not 
effective as deterrents. The period of the greatest frequency of election violence was 
still ahead, and for 14 years after 1854 parliamentary interest in corrupt practices 
The nexus between electoral contests and disorder is one of the more salient features 
of mid-Victorian electioneering, so much so that it can be used as a crude barometer 
of the pattern of party activity. The causality being argued here is this: increased 
levels of party activity in the constituencies led to a greater frequency of contested 
elections, and thus to an increase in disorder.68 Therefore, the pattern of electoral 
violence between 1857 and 1880 may be understood through an analysis of the 
development of electoral activity. Throughout the period incidences of disorder 
increased as the rate of contested elections grew. Contests became more frequent as 
old political compromises were disturbed, the power of patrons weakened or as 
advances in local organization led the political parties to present candidates where 
previously they would not have bothered. The advent of mass electorates, particularly 
after 1867, increased the level of party activity in the constituencies. The registration, 
67 Seymour, Electoral Reform, p.385. 
68 A full discussion of the correlation between election contests and violence is provided in Chapter IV. 
Contests are discussed here within the context of increasing electoral activity and the consequences for 
the frequency of violence. 
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and subsequent defence, of supporters became a more consistent feature of electoral 
preparation. Candidates, too, were required to pay more attention to their 
constituencies. The frequency of election meetings during the period reflected the 
need for a candidate to cultivate his constituency. At such events candidates (if they 
were in touch with their supporters) addressed voters and non-voters alike on matters 
of local importance and, increasingly, party policy. The fact that between 1857 and 
1880 a total of 21 episodes of violence occurred prior to the nomination day - 19 of 
which occurred during election meetings - suggests the frequency of electoral activity 
before the official, procedural elements of the contest began. 69 Furthermore, this 
trend increased slightly during the period: a total of 8 episodes of violence occurred 
during meetings between 1857 and 1865, compared to 11 between 1868 and 1880. 
The growth of electoral activity during the period contributed directly to the increased 
frequency of violence. 
Uncontested elections were a regular, though diminishing feature of mid-
century politics. Indeed it was not uncommon during the 1850s and early 1860s for 
about half of all constituencies to go uncontested.70 In the 1850s weak party 
structures and the confused nature of parliamentary politics, both hangovers of Corn 
Law repeal in 1846 and the resulting Conservative party schism, contributed to the 
lack of election contests. The fluidity of politics was evident at Westminster where 
two Palmerstonian governments, in 1855 and 1857, were brought down by coalitions 
of Whigs, Liberals, Peelites, Radicals and Conservatives.71 And in 1866 Russell's 
ministry was defeated on a reform bill amendment after 48 Liberals voted with the 
69 Table 1 shows that pre-poll violence accounted for 43 cases of violence during the period: this 
includes 22 episodes on the nomination day. 
70 In 1857 47% of English and Welsh elections were contested; in 1859 44% and in 1865 56% were 
contested. See Table 8 in Chapter N. 
71 Hawkins, British Party Politics., p.62. 
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Conservatives.72 Indeed in the decade between 1857 and 1867 no fewer than 5 
ministries were formed and dissolved, yet there were just 3 occasions, in 1857, 1859 
and 1865, when a general election effected the change.· The dislocation of party 
politics during the period acted as a dampener on partisan conflict outside 
Westminster. Angus Hawkins writes that before the Second Reform Act there was 
only one occasion (1832) when more than one thousand candidates stood for election, 
whereas after 1867, "there were never less than a thousand candidates".73 
In the 1850s and early 1860s party organisation made little contribution to the 
frequency of electoral contests. Neither the Whig-Liberals nor the Conservatives had 
anything resembling a national party machine - though the latter were striving to 
improve their organisational infrastructure. Party organisation was undertaken by a 
limited number of local associations loosely affiliated to embryonic national organs, 
and by private correspondence between individual members and their constituencies. 
The development of central party administration dates from the early 1860s. The 
Liberal Registration Association was founded in 1860, however it had little local 
influence and John Vincent describes it as being, "overshadowed by the tendency of 
the Whip and the party leaders, particularly at election times, to organise the local 
parties through their massive private correspondence".74 In 1863 the National 
Conservative Registration Association was founded, yet it lacked support from the 
party leadership and played no part in the general election of 1865.75 Following that 
election an official Conservative registration office was established in 1866, however 
its significance lies in the period after the Second Reform Act. 
72 Ibid., p.l09. 
73 Angus Hawkins, "Parliamentary Government and Victorian Political Parties, c.1830- 1880", 
English Historical Review, 104 (1989), p.665. 
74 Vincent, Formation of the Liberal Party, p.86. 
15 Robert Stewart, The Foundation of the Conservative Party, 1830-1867 (London, 1978), p.337. 
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Throughout this period Liberal party leadership left much of the work of 
organisation to local solicitors, to local club movements in the wards and to 
registration societies. Indeed of greater importance to the Liberals in the mobilisation 
of supporters was the emergence of the new, nonconformist, press and the growth of 
militant Dissent. The former carried out the task of party propaganda, the latter 
marshalled volunteers for Liberal campaigns.76 Conservative organisation likewise 
owed much to local knowledge and personal efforts. The party did, however, work 
hard during the period to overhaul a seemingly unshakeable Liberal majority. To this 
end solicitors from the firm of Baxter, Rose, Norton and Co. were employed to 
coordinate the party's electoral management. The counties, however, jealously 
guarded their electoral independence from outside intervention, and the work ofPhilip 
Rose and Markham Spofforth was largely concentrated in the boroughs. Before 1865, 
however, there was little substantial improvement in the rate of contested elections. 
Indeed between 1852 and 1857 uncontested elections in England and Wales increased 
by more than 30% (see Table 4 below). Efforts to improve electoral organisation 
were not reflected in a substantial growth of contests much before 1865. Table 4 
below shows the number of uncontested constituencies at English and Welsh general 
elections between 1857 and 1880. 
Table 4.Uncontested Constituencies at English and Welsh general 
elections, 1852 -1880 (and the percentage difference between elections) 
Year Borou hs Counties %Change Total uncontested %Change 
1852 58 55 113 
1857 95 +63.8 56 +1.8 151 +33.6 
1859 90 -5.3 68 +21.4 158 +4.6 
1865 70 -22.3 55 -19.2 125 -20.9 
1868 33 -52.9 43 -21.9 76 -39.2 
1874 26 -21.3 60 +39.5 86 +13.1 
1880 16 -38.5 29 -51.7 45 -47.7 
76 Vincent, Formation of the Liberal Party., p.83. 
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To begin with, Table 4 reveals the lack of election contests in the counties during the 
ftrst half of the period. Indeed the number of counties that were uncontested 
increased at both the elections of 1857 and 1859, and it was not until 1865 that they 
experienced a significant increase in contests (represented above by a 19.2% decrease 
in uncontested constituencies). The general elections of 1857 and 1859 proved the 
high water mark of uncontested elections. The paucity of contests at these elections 
contributed to a relatively low incidence of electoral disorder. The two campaigns of 
1857 and 1859 generated a modest 22 instances of violence, compared to 83 at the 
next two elections of 1865 and 1868. In 1857 less than half of the total number of 
constituencies went to the polls. The campaign proved disastrous for the 
Conservatives who could no longer rely on protection as a unifying theme. In the 
counties they lost 23 seats. They fared no better in the small boroughs where they 
won only 68 compared to the Liberals who were successful in 109.77 The general 
election of 1859 witnessed a modest increase in uncontested elections, despite a 
concerted effort by the Conservatives in which an estimated £50,000 was spent out of 
the party's central fund.78 A small decrease in uncontested boroughs in 1859 (5.3%) 
reflects the increased attention paid to those constituencies by the Conservatives. 
This election provided the party with its best result between 1846 and 1874, with most 
successes coming from a recovery in the counties and the small boroughs. In the 
latter they won 11 more boroughs than in 1857.79 The result was, however, 
insufficient to provide the Conservatives with an absolute Commons majority. 
Following Derby's resignation on 10 June, Palmerston formed his second ministry. 
77 Ed Jaggard, "Small Town Politics in Mid-Victorian Britain", unpublished paper, Edith Cowan 
University, 2001, p.7. 
78 Stewart, The Foundation, p.331. 
79 Jaggard, "Small Town Politics"., p. 7. 
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Happen writes that the general election of 1865, "reflected the ambivalent 
nature of contemporary politics". 8° Certainly no particular question of policy 
dominated the campaign, yet Table 4 shows a modest increase in the number of 
contested elections between 1859 and 1865. During that period the boroughs 
experienced a 22.3% decrease in uncontested elections, and the counties a 19.2% 
decrease. In 1865 the Conservatives lost the gains they had made in the boroughs in 
1859; in England alone they lost 12 borough seats.81 For their part the Liberals were 
particularly successful in those English boroughs with more than 2,000 voters, where 
they captured 49 out of 59 seats.82 The increase in contests led to a jump in the 
incidence of disorder. The 1865 election generated 24 cases of violence, 14 more 
than in 1859. The rise of violence in 1865 owed much to the greater frequency of 
contested elections, in turn a reflection of the steady growth of electoral activity. The 
potential for violence grew as the political parties strove to disrupt the electoral 
somnolence of uncontested boroughs. Throughout the period county elections 
occasioned markedly less violence than the boroughs, a fact reflected in the lack of 
contests in the former and the concentration of party activity in the latter. It was not 
until after 1867, when greatly enlarged electorates led to rapid advances in party 
organisation, that electoral contests in England and Wales began to significantly 
increase. Coterminous with the growth in electoral activity was a marked increase in 
electoral violence. And whereas the incidence of violence peaked in 1868, it did not 
decline to pre-1865 levels during the elections of 1874 and 1880. 
80 Hoppen, Mid- Victorian Generation, p.245. 
81 Stewart, The Foundation., p.340. 
82 Hawkins, British Party Politics, p.105. 
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Throughout the nineteenth-century Britain was becoming· an increasingly urbanised 
and industrialised society. The technological advancements of the early century 
provided the basis for revolutions in transport, industry and communication which 
were gradually transforming the landscape, economy and society. In the 40 years 
after 1851 the British population rose by 65% to reach 33 million in 1891.83 An 
accelerating trend towards urbanisation concentrated this growing population in the 
expanding conurbations surrounding cities such as Manchester, Bradford and Leeds. 
Indeed between 1801 and 1891 the percentage of the population living outside towns 
of more than 2,500 people dropped from 66% to 25.5%.84 The relative importance of 
the agricultural sector contracted during the period as mining and industry generated 
an increasing share of economic growth. Between 1801 and 1871 the percentage of 
the British workforce employed in agriculture dropped from 35% to 15%.85 The 
social and political influence of institutionalised religion gradually weakened in the 
wake of these changes, a process aided by the growth of secularism and the emerging 
challenge of Nonconformism. By the end of the 1880s, writes Hawkins, "traditional 
communities were fmding themselves under growing economic and social pressure. 
Old ties of affiliation and obligation were being eroded ... Notions of social status, as 
much as being dependent upon region or religion, were becoming increasingly 
defined in terms of class". 86 Against this background the Second Reform Act of 1867 
marked a significant step towards the creation of a modem democratic electoral 
system. The redistribution of seats recognised the importance of the growing 
83 Hawkins, British Party Politics, p.4. 
84 Hoppen, Mid-Victorian Generation, p.14. 
85 Hawkins, British Party Politics, p.4. 
86 Ibid., p.5. 
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industrial centres, while franchise alterations added more than one million voters to 
the electoral system. The introduction of so many new voters to the system provided 
an important stimulus to the development of party organisation in the decades after 
1867. 
The Reform Act of 1867 refashioned the electoral landscape of England and Wales. 
The balance of electoral power shifted away from the smaller boroughs as 52 seats 
were taken from such constituencies and distributed to the counties, and in some 
cases, to the large urban boroughs. Through redistribution and disfranchisement 
between the 1865 and 1868 general elections 60 English and Welsh boroughs with 
fewer than 500 voters disappeared from the electoral system. Whereas in 1857 only 
18 boroughs could boast more than 5,000 electors, in 1868 64 boroughs could make 
that claim. Throughout the period electoral violence was a feature of the larger urban 
boroughs. In those constituencies the preconditions for disorder which existed in the 
system of open elections, centralised polling, and extended and ritualised 
campaigning, were combined with large and rapidly growing electorates. In such an 
environment increasingly sophisticated party organizations worked hard to register 
and mobilise their supporters, leading to an inevitable increase in party conflict, 
partisan enthusiasm and thus the likelihood of an election contest. An intensification 
of party feeling and an increase in contested elections were essential precursors to 
disorder. The consolidation of voters in the large boroughs after 1867 therefore 
contributed to the concentration of violence in those constituencies. In the smaller 
boroughs and counties an absence of contests, the persistence of political traditions 
and the lingering strength of patrons poured cold water on the intensity of partisan 
emotion and sapped the source of electoral violence. 
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In England and Wales the Second Reform Act resulted in an overall reduction 
of 33 boroughs as follows: 11 boroughs returning 17 members were totally 
disfranchised for corruption; 35 boroughs were stripped ofone seat; 11 new boroughs 
returning 13 members were created and 6 additional seats were allocated to the 
burgeoning metropolises of Birmingham, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Stafford and 
Merthyr. Eleven counties in England and Wales received an extra 2 members while 
Lancashire gained a further 3 members. In addition London University was granted a 
single seat. The changes to the rest of the system were more modest. In Scotland the 
new burgh of Hawick was granted a member and both Glasgow and Dundee gained 
an extra member each. The counties of Aberdeenshire, Ayrshire and Lanarkshire 
were each divided, and the universities of Aberdeen, Glasgow, Edinburgh and 
St.Andrews were granted a single member. There were no changes to the 
constituencies in Ireland. Table 4 below outlines the structure of British politics in 
the wake of the Second Reform Act. 
Table 5.United Kingdom Electoral System, 1867-1884 
England MP's Wales MP's Scotland MP's Ireland MP's Total Total 
Constituencies MP's 
82 170 13 17 32 32 32 64 159 283 
185 285 15 16 22 26 33 39 255 366 
3 5 0 0 2 2 1 2 6 9 
270 460 28 33 56 60 66 105 420 658 
England and Wales continued to dominate the electoral system after 1867. Together 
they accounted for more than 70% of the total membership of the House of Commons 
between 1857 and 1880. England was the electoral heavyweight of the partnership 
with almost half of the members at Westminster drawn from the English boroughs 
alone. After 1867 England returned 460 members to the Commons from 270 
constituencies. Wales, Scotland and Ireland together returned just 198 members from 
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150 constituencies. Within this framework the boroughs outnumbered the counties by 
more than 2 to 1 and consistently returned more than half of all members. Between 
1857 and 1880 the framework of the English and Welsh electoral system fluctuated 
with the ebb and flow of constituencies added and subtracted. The concentration of 
disorder in the boroughs reflected their numerical majority, and the fact that county 
constituencies were less frequently contested than their urban counterparts. The table 
below outlines the number of county and borough constituencies in England and 
Wales during each general election of the period. 
Table 6.England and Wales Electoral System 1857 ·1880 
Year Borou hs 
1857 184 
1859 184 
1865 185 
1868 185 
1874 183 
1880 183 
MP's 
319 
318 
319 
285 
281 
281 
England 
Counties MP's 
68 142 
68 142 
69 144 
82 170 
82 170 
82 170 
Universi 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
Wales 
MP's Counties 
15 13 
15 13 
15 13 
16 13 
16 13 
16 13 
MP's 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
The redistribution provisions of the Second Reform Act also eroded the numerical 
strength of the small boroughs. Thereafter the number of small boroughs in England 
and Wales (those with less than 2,000 voters) declined steadily- from 42% of the 
total number of boroughs in 1868, to 39% in 1874 and to 34% in 1880. After 1867 
the large boroughs accounted for an increasing percentage of the total Commons 
membership. In 1868 a total of 200 (or 66%) English and Welsh members were 
drawn from boroughs with more than 2,000 electors. The restructuring of the system 
eradicated all boroughs with fewer than 500 voters. In the House of Commons about 
30% of members were now drawn from the larger boroughs. However Table 3 (see 
page 78) reveals that the small boroughs remained a significant feature of electoral 
politics throughout the period. As late as 1880 fully one-third of all English and 
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Welsh boroughs had fewer than 2,000 voters. In 1868 these boroughs returned 101 
members to parliament, in 1874 92 members and in 1880 76 members. 
The franchise provisions of the Second Reform Act enfranchised almost 1.5 million 
new voters across the United Kingdom. 87 As such it was a more modest increase than 
that of the First Reform Act, which had resulted in a 492% increase in the number 
actually voting between 1831 and 1832, as opposed to the 172% increase between 
1866 and 1868.88 In the counties the occupation franchise was reduced from £15 to 
£12 and the suffrage was extended to those who owned land valued at more than £5. 
Liberal amendments in committee further reduced the copyhold and leasehold 
qualifications from £10 to £5.89 As a result of these changes the county electorate 
grew by a modest 248,620 voters to a total of 791,253. However it was in the urban 
areas ofEngland and Wales that the 1867 Act had its greatest impact. In the boroughs 
the introduction of household suffrage and the abolition of compounding increased 
the electorate from 514,026 to 1,225,042.90 The increase in the number of voters was 
impressive if not uniform. In some urban constituencies such as Finsbury, Lambeth 
and Tower Hamlets the increase was comparatively small, whereas many of the 
industrial centres witnessed spectacular rises. In Birmingham the number of voters 
was tripled and in Leeds the number increased four-fold. In Wales the electorate of 
Merthyr Tydfilleapt from 1,387 to 14,577. After 1867 1 in 3 adult males in England 
and Wales were enfranchised, with most of the new voters to be found in the largest 
towns. 
87 Craig, British Electoral Facts, pp.9-10. 854,572 voters in 1865 and 2,333,251 in 1868. 
88 Beales, "The Electorate", p.150. 
89 Ibid. 
90 
Hoppen, Mid Victorian Generation, p.253. 
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Disraeli's reform strategy ensured that those elements of the system 
traditionally supportive of the Tories were protected. Therefore the Act of 1867 did 
not equalise the suffrage between the counties and boroughs, though it did standardise 
the ratio of voters to population in each type of constituency.91 The gulf between 
county and borough franchises was maintained in an attempt to ensure the 
Conservative's continued domination in the former. In the boroughs the new 
household suffrage enfranchised for the first time a large proportion of the working 
class. However, despite the increase of about 700,000 new voters to the urban 
electorate, the Act effectively restricted the enfranchisement of les classes 
dangereuses by obstacles both planned and unforeseen. The one year residence 
qualification and abolition of compounding directly affected the working classes - for 
whom short-term shared rental accommodation was not uncommon. Furthermore the 
poor law overseers proved inadequately prepared to deal with the massive task of 
registration that faced them, particularly in the large cities like London or Manchester. 
The formal obstacles to enfranchisement were, however, removed by Goschen's Act 
of 1868- which restored compounding- and Dilke's Act of 1878 which allowed the 
registration of multiple occupiers.92 Consequently, by 1881-2 the borough electorate 
reached a total of 1,629,373 voters. 
Neither the Second Reform Act nor the legislation of 1872 and 1883 proved effective 
in limiting the potential for violence, though the Ballot Act did alter the pattern of 
disorder. Certainly beyond an increase in the number of county polling places the Act 
made no direct alteration to electoral procedure. After 1867 the counties were free to 
"enable each Voter, so far as is practicable, to have a Polling Place within a 
91 B.L.Kinzer, The Ballot Question in Nineteenth Century English Politics (New York, 1982), p.115. 
92 Davis and Tanner, "The Borough Franchise After 1867", p.308. 
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convenient Distance of his Residence" .93 However the same was not to be extended 
to the boroughs until 1872. This provision had no effect on the pattern of disorder 
because more than half the cases of mid-century election disorder occurred in the 
boroughs and not the counties. Furthermore, given that contests were less frequent in 
the counties, the multiplication of polling districts there was unlikely to greatly 
influence the overall pattern of disorder. Likewise the 1868 Parliamentary Elections 
Act, which transferred the trial of election petitions from the Commons to the 
constituencies in which they were presented, made no impact on violent 
electioneering. 
Indeed election disorder increased in the years immediately following the 
Second Reform Act. Several factors contributed to the rise in disorder. The Act 
greatly expanded the size of the electorate in those constituencies that traditionally 
experienced the most disturbances: the large urban and industrial towns. This new 
electorate included many working class voters whose economic position exposed 
them to the pressures of intimidation and coercion. The need to mobilize and register 
the new electorate after 1867 gave added impetus to the growth of local party 
organizations, registration associations and national organs of party control. Hawkins 
points to the years between 1867 and 1886 as the period when political parties 
developed "extensive constituency organization and centralized party 
bureaucracies".94 This is not to argue that party organization emerged rapidly after 
the Second Reform Act, or that its influence and efficiency was either widespread or 
established. Rather it is to stress that the demands of an enlarged electorate impressed 
upon the political parties the need for greater organizational efforts. This realization 
contributed to the intensification of electoral activity and to a rise in the number of 
93 
94 Leader, The Franchise, p.29. Hawkins, British Party Politics, p.3. 
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contested elections. Between 1865 and 1868 the number of contests in England and 
Wales jumped from 158 to 223. The result was an increase in the frequency of 
violence. The General Election of 1868 followed hot on the heels of the Reform Act 
and proved to be the most disorderly, corrupt and petitioned campaign of the period. 
Indeed there were more cases of electoral violence in 1868 than during the 1857, 1859 
and 1865 elections combined. 
The rioting and flood of petitions that followed the general election of 1868 
formed the background to a recommendation for a select committee inquiry into the 
subject of elections and electioneering. H.A.Bruce, the Home Secretary who 
presented the motion for a select committee on 4 March 1869, admitted that "For 
years past Parliament has been struggling in a vain endeavour to give to our elections 
the dignity that should preside over ceremonies of such great importance".95 In his 
speech Bruce mentioned the 'national taint' of corruption, the 'injurious expense' of 
electioneering, the 'evils' of bribery and intimidation, the 'annoyance and trouble' of 
paid canvassers, and added that "There is one other feature connected with our system 
of election which I think will be generally condemned; I refer to those scenes of 
rioting and violence which so frequently characterise a contested election".96 The 
Committee gained bipartisan support despite Conservative concerns that an agenda 
regarding secret ballot was at its core. It was subsequently appointed to inquire into 
all modes of procedure connected to both parliamentary and municipal elections, "in 
order to provide further guarantees for their tranquillity, purity and freedom". 97 The 
Select Committee, headed by Lord Hartington, examined 80 witnesses during 5 
months of deliberation and produced over 500 pages of evidence pertaining to 
95 Hansard 3, vol.194, 4 March 1869, p.648- 649. 
96 Ibid., p.653. 
97 Ibid., p.663. 
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electoral procedure. Among the issues addressed by the Committee were public 
nominations and declarations, the use of rooms in public houses during elections, the 
multiplication of polling places, the subject of voting papers, the law relating to the 
recovery of expenses for damages committed by rioters, election expenses and the 
introduction of secret voting. 
The inquiry's fmal report was tabled in the Commons on 15 March 1870. 
However recommendations were made regarding only a few of the issues that were 
investigated. A resolution to prohibit the use of paid agents and canvassers was 
rejected because of doubts about the possibility of policing such a measure. In 
addition the Committee concluded, "an election cannot always be conducted without 
paid agents of some kind" .98 The multiplication of polling places was recommended 
though there were questions as to the effectiveness of such a measure. A resolution 
on the use of voting papers, a system in use at university constituencies, was not 
passed on the grounds that it would tend to increase, rather than decrease, corruption. 
A considerable portion of the Committee's time was spent investigating the issue of 
secret voting. In the final report the inquiry concluded that "the weight of evidence 
leads to the conclusion that this change in the mode of voting would not only promote 
the tranquillity both of Municipal and Parliamentary Elections, but will also protect 
voters from undue influence and intimidation".99 This recommendation was 
ultimately carried into existence with the passage of the Secret Ballot Act of 1872. 
The effect of that legislation on the pattern of electoral violence will be discussed 
below. 
98 
'Report from the Select Committee on Parliamentary and Municipal Elections', Parliamentary 
Papers, 1870, VI, p.7. 
99 Ibid., p.8. 
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The Committee made no recommendation to abolish the public nomination, 
despite a wealth of evidence describing the event as a meaningless farce and a potent 
source of disorder. The fmal report did, however, conclude that "the addresses which 
are delivered are rendered inaudible by noise, tumult, and wilful interruption, and 
occasionally, serious disturbances begun on the nomination day are continued through 
the election" .100 A resolution in favour of abolishing the ceremony was defeated by a 
single vote on the grounds that no practical alternative could be found. The 
Committee further concluded that the majority of uncontested elections were 
concluded on the nomination day without any disturbance. The public nomination 
thus remained until the passage of the Secret Ballot Act of 1872, when it was replaced 
by the sending in of papers. 
The Ballot Act of 1872 had potentially the greatest impact on the frequency of 
electoral violence of any legislation during the period. Yet even so it had a limited 
influence over the pattern of violence down to 1880. The abolition of the public 
nomination undoubtedly reduced the opportunities available for crowd violence. 
After 1872 disturbances before the polling day declined sharply. Between 1857 and 
1872 26% of election disorder occurred before the polling day compared to 13% after 
the nomination was abolished.101 The same cannot, however, be said for the impact 
of secret voting. Prior to the Ballot Act the polling day accounted for 49% of 
electoral violence, after 1872 that increased slightly to 52%.102 The continued 
lOO Jbid., p.6. 
101 Between 1857 and 1872, 35 episodes of violence occurred before the poll, 65 cases on polling day 
and 18 after the poll was closed (the timing of 14 cases was unknown). Between 1872 and 1880, 8 
episodes of violence occurred before the poll, 31 cases on polling day and 9 after the poll was closed 
(with 11 cases unknown). For more details of the timing of electoral violence see Chapter IV. 
102 Between 1857 and 1872 a total of65 out of 132 cases of election violence occurred on the polling 
day. After 1872 31 out of 59 cases took place while the polls were open (the timing for a total of 25 
episodes is unknown). 
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outbreak of riots and disturbances during the general elections of 1874 and 1880 
suggest that what influence the Ballot Act had was slight. 
The scale of violence after 1872 must also be viewed within the context of the 
entire period. The General Election of 1868 was an unusually contentious campaign 
that followed a major piece of reform legislation. In addition the issue oflrish Church 
disestablishment provided a divisive religious issue, the influence of which was 
hardly diminished by William Murphy's inflammatory anti-Catholic lectures. The 
scale of violence in 1868 -it accounted for 40% of all cases of disorder between 1857 
and 1880 - thus stands out as something of an anomaly during the period. The 
peculiar circumstances of that campaign were unlikely to occur repeatedly, much less 
at consecutive general elections. Thus the reduced frequency of violence after 1868 
should not be viewed as a consequence of reform in 1872. The levels of disorder in 
1874 and 1880 were still higher than those of the late 1850s and early 1860s. What 
the Ballot Act did achieve was to alter the pattern of disorder: the removal of the 
nomination ceremony merely increased the proportion of violence occurring on the 
polling day. 
The death of Palmerston in October 1865, just 4 months after the general election, 
signalled the end of an era in British politics. Within three years changes in party 
leadership on both sides of the House would see Russell and Derby retire in favour of 
Gladstone and Disraeli. Not only was the reintroduction of parliamentary reform 
inevitable after Palmerston's death but, as Angus Hawkins writes, "the 'truce of 
parties' was over".103 The trend toward contested elections barely visible before 1867 
accelerated after the Second Reform Act as party activity intensified. The registration 
103 Hawkins, British Party Politics, p.108. 
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of voters became an increasingly important element of party management in the new 
age of mass electorates. Richard Shannon writes that after 1867, "this time and 
money-consuming procedure became a standard feature of rival party 
manoeuvring" .104 He records the example of Blackburn where the revision in 1863 
took three hours, compared to seven days in 1868! 105 The new urgency in revising the 
registers, combined with central party efforts to bring local associations under their 
control, contributed to a post-1867 growth in electoral activity. 
Between 1867 and 1880 party organisation, on both sides, made undoubted 
advances. For their part the Conservatives were quicker to establish the framework of 
a national party bureaucracy than were the Liberals. In 1870 the Conservative 
National Union was brought under the auspices of the Central Office, directed by 
Spofforth's successor, John Gorst. Under his guidance the Union developed a 
network of centrally-affiliated local associations, whose activities included 
supervision of the registers, the distribution of pamphlets and the organisation of 
political meetings.106 Yet the control exercised over these provincial associations by 
the Central Office should not be exaggerated. Hawkins writes that "The National 
Union trod carefully. It assisted local organisations when requested, while avoiding 
exciting local suspicions of central control" .107 Yet the work of Gorst and the Central 
Office certainly paid dividends for Conservative electoral fortunes. At the general 
election of 1874 the party reaped the benefits of organisational efficiency and was 
returned with 352 seats compared to the Liberals' 243 seats.108 Thereafter the party 
104 Richard Shannon, The Age of Disraeli 1868~1881 :The rise of Tory democracy (London 1992), p.56. 
!OS /bid 
;
06 Hawkins, British Party Politics, p.184- 5. 
07 Ibid., p.185. 
108 
Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill (London, 1970), p.281- 283. 
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machinery entered a period of decline, culminating with the Conservative defeat of 
1880 - when the party captured fewer seats than in 184 7. 
The Liberals did not achieve a similar degree of centralised party control until 
1886 when, following the split over Irish Home Rule, the National Liberal Federation 
and the Liberal Central Association came under the joint-stewardship of Francis 
Schnadhorst.109 Before that date the party relied upon the joint efforts of the Liberal 
Registration Association and various pressure groups like the National Education 
League, the Reform League, the Liberation Society and the United Kingdom 
Alliance.110 These groups, with often divergent aspirations, made it difficult for 
popular liberalism to coalesce around a central party organisation. By 1877, under the 
direction of the Liberal chief Whip W.P .Adam, the Liberal Registration Association 
had been remodelled to become the Liberal Central Association. In that same year the 
Birmingham-based National Liberal Federation was established. As the National 
Union was for Gorst, so the NLF was a platform for the political ambitions of one 
man: Joseph Chamberlain. Its influence on party organisation, apart from providing a 
possible model for local party development, was slight. Hoppen writes that as late as 
1884, "the majority of borough associations (110 out of 198) were not even 
affiliated" .111 Of greater importance in building a consensus of liberal opinion was 
the influence of militant nonconformity which, "provided the moral conscience of 
Liberal activism". 112 
These developments in central and local party organisation, coupled with the 
renewed vigour of registration efforts, contributed to a growth in electoral contests. 
In 1868 a total of 49 more seats were contested than at the general election of 1865. 
1o9H 
1 awkins, British Party Politics, p.272. 10 Ib"d Ill l ., p.273. 
112 Hoppen, Mid-Victorian Generation, p.260. 
Hawkins, British Party Politics., p.273. 
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Table 4 shows a 52.9% decrease in uncontested borough elections between 1865 and 
1868, while the counties experienced a 21.9% decrease over the same period. 
However the steady decline in uncontested elections did not continue uninterrupted 
thereafter. Whereas in 1874 the pattern of decline in the boroughs continued 
unbroken, there was an almost 40% increase in the number of counties that failed to 
produce a contest. An explanation for this can be found in the sweeping Conservative 
victory of that year. The party's success in 1874 was most evident in the counties, 
where they captured all but 33 of the 187 English and Welsh county seats. This 
achievement was based as much on Liberal disunity as on advances in Conservative 
organisation. The Liberals were less prepared to fight an election than were the 
Conservatives, and their organisational weakness was compounded by internal schism 
and disaffection. Under cover of the ballot large numbers of Liberal desertions 
contributed to the loss of 136 parliamentary seats. The Conservatives benefited from 
organisational advances begun after their defeat in 1868 and increased their 
representation by 73 seats. In 1874 the Conservatives were able to field between 40 
and 50 more candidates than in 1868, compared to the Liberals who fielded about 70 
fewer candidates.113 The strength of Conservative organisation contributed to their 
victory in 47 of the 60 uncontested counties recorded in Table 4. The increase in 
uncontested county elections in 1874 is therefore a reflection of Conservative party 
dominance, and Liberal weakness, in those constituencies. 
Greater partisan activity in the constituencies after 1867 inevitably led to an 
increase in the potential for election violence. Table 1 (see page 62) reveals the 
general rise in violence between 1857 and 1868 (with the exception of 1859). 
Thereafter the level of disorder declined, but remained relatively high compared to the 
113 • Blake, The Conservatzve Party, p.114. 
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pre-1868 period. As the temper of constituency electioneering rose so too did the 
frequency of contested elections, and with it a greater likelihood of disorder. The 
incidence of violence was certainly related to more than just the frequency of electoral 
contests: contentious campaign issues, local party conflict and the strength of 
disruptive electoral traditions could all contribute to the level of disorder. Yet the 
correlation between contested elections and the outbreak of violence is an important 
one. Table 8 (see Chapter N) reveals that fluctuations in the incidence of violence at 
elections between 1857 and 1874 mirrored changes in the frequency of electoral 
contests. Only in 1880, when the number of contests increased but the amount of 
disorder declined, was the link between them disrupted. It has already been noted that 
alterations in electoral procedure had little, if any, impact on the frequency of 
electoral disturbances. The growth of electoral activity, measured here by the 
increasing frequency of contested elections, provides the most compelling explanation 
for the pattern of mid-Victorian election violence. 
IV 
This chapter posed two questions related to the nature of election violence. Firstly, 
were Robert Lowe's fears regarding the influence of franchise extension justified on 
the grounds of contemporary electoral realities or on his own, somewhat biased, 
experiences? Secondly, did reform in 1832 and 1867 increase the frequency of 
electoral violence? These two questions are, in fact, interrelated: The first queried the 
empirical basis of Lowe's statement that a rise in violence would follow the 
enfranchisement of the lower classes; the second involved an assessment of the 
impact of such reforms on the pattern of election disorder. The first question is 
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perhaps better answered in later chapters. Chapter Ill examines violence within the 
context of Victorian electioneering, while Chapter IV outlines the scale and frequency 
of disorder and attempts an analysis of the participants of such events - were they 
drawn exclusively, as Lowe predicted, from the bottom of society? However, given 
the sudden and dramatic rise in electoral riots in 1868 - the ftrst general election after 
the passage of the Second Reform Act - and the contemporary perception that 
widespread corruption of the new working class voters had contributed to the 
increase, Lowe' s fears of 1866 appear largely to have been realized. Yet the influence 
of reform on the frequency of disorder is more complicated than a direct casual link 
between increasing numbers of lower class voters and violence. The growth of the 
urban electorate in 1867 was a powerful stimulus to party organization which in turn 
contributed to a rise in party conflict, and thus to an increase in electoral contests. 
English and Welsh elections produced more violence after 1867 because more 
elections were contested - providing more occasions at which partisan conflict, 
popular enthusiasm and corruption could lead to episodes of crowd violence. 
In answering the second question this chapter has suggested that alterations in 
electoral procedure were less responsible for fluctuations in the pattern of disorder 
than were structural changes to the system and the steady rise of organized party 
bureaucracy. The Reform Act of 1832 acted as a long-term stimulus to violent 
electioneering because, through the introduction of a system of registration and 
franchise extensions, it established the basis for a gradual rise in partisan activity, an 
important precursor of electoral conflict. However, a post-1832 decline in contested 
elections led to a reduction in the potential for violence. In the 1860s, however, 
increasing party activity and the growth of contests contributed to an increase in 
disorder. After the relative somnolence of electoral rioting in the 1850s and early 
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1860s, the Second Reform Act laid the foundations for an increase in disorder because 
further franchise extensions, increased registration efforts, the growth of party 
organization and the growing importance of consistent electoral management helped 
stoke the flames of partisan conflict. Therefore, rather than interpreting mid-
nineteenth century electoral violence as a sort of cultural or political 'hangover' from 
a more vulgar and unreformed era, it should be recognized as a phenomenon that was 
generated, and indeed fostered, by the processes and structures of the electoral 
system. Violence did not continue into the Victorian era and beyond despite reform 
legislation, it continued in large part because of reform. Reform in 1832 and 1867 
failed to remove those structural aspects of the system that encouraged violence, and 
added to the potential for disorder by stimulating partisan conflict and the 
development of political organisations by which that conflict could be pursued at the 
local and national level. 
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Chapter IV 
A Statistical Analysis of Electoral Violence 
I 
The Game of MP- The turmoil of a General Election, with all its rows 
and riots, has at least suggested one peaceful amusement into which 
the youngsters of the day may enter without any fear of 'pains and 
penalties.' Messrs Stanley Rivers and Co. have published the Game of 
MP ... wherein the juveniles may indulge in harmless mirth while their 
seniors are engaged in a synonymous game with graver aspects. 1 
It is hardly surprising that the publication of a board game based on the chaos of 
electioneering should have been announced in December 1868. The general election 
of the previous month had set new benchmarks for venality and violence. Players of 
Game of MP would hardly have been short of riotous examples to emulate 
because the 'licensed saturnalia' of a contested election was a recognised feature of 
political culture by the nineteenth-century. Contemporary newspaper 
Following the 1865 general election the Nonconformist reported that 
alliance with the scum of the population".2 During the middle decades of the century 
crowd violence, physical intimidation, rioting and general disorder had become an 
expected dimension of British electioneering. And when the Hartington Committee 
reported to the Commons in March 1870 that "Serious rioting frequently takes place 
on the polling day",3 their fmdings were not so much revelatory as stating the 
obvious. And yet the extent to which the hurly-burly of Victorian campaigning gave 
way to actual and serious violence has remained somewhat obscured. Given the 
1 Gloucester Journal, 5 December 1868, p.S. 2 . 
Nonconformist, 26 July 1865, p.605. 
3 British Parliamentary Papers, 1870, VI, 'Report from the Select Committee on Parliamentary and 
Municipal Elections,' p.3. 
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considerable quantitative vacuum in which previous discussions of election violence 
have been conducted, a survey of this phenomenon throughout the period is long 
overdue. 
The 23 years between 1857 and 1880 yield an impressive catalogue of electoral 
violence. A survey of contemporary newspapers, Home Office correspondence and 
election petition reports found a total of 191 cases of violence during that period.4 
The six general elections of 1857, 1859, 1865, 1868, 1874 and 1880 contributed 181 
episodes of disorder between them. A further 10 episodes were located during by-
elections in 1860, 1861, 1862, 1867, 1869, 1871 and 1877. Examples ofby-election 
violence are not the primary focus of this study, however they are included in the 
sample because they contribute to a general picture of mid-Victorian electioneering. 
A careful search of local records and provincial newspapers would undoubtedly find 
more examples of such violence. Table 7 below reveals the distribution of disorder at 
each general election of the period and by-election violence as it was uncovered.5 
The table includes 25 duplicate episodes of disorder during the period. A duplicate 
entry records the occurrence of more than one instance of violence in a single 
constituency during one particular campaign. In Carlisle, for example, the 1865 
borough election was disrupted by violence twice: the frrst time during the nomination 
ceremony; the second time on the polling day. Duplicate entries are included in the 
sample because they provide a clear picture of the frequency with which violence 
occurred at Victorian elections. 6 
4 This figure includes the 25 duplicate entries ofviolence recorded during the period. 
: In Table 7 years in bold type are general elections, other years are by-elections. 
Because duplicate entries can not be included in statistics that compare disorder with constituency 
numbers, they are discarded for some of the analysis which follows. When included in the tables of 
electoral violence they are clearly indicated. 
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Table 7. Election Disorder by Year: England and Wales, 1857- 1880 
Year Separate Cases of Violence Duplicate Cases Total Cases 
1857 12 0 12 
1859 10 1 11 
1860 2 0 2 
1861 1 0 1 
1862 2 0 2 
1865 24 5 29 
1867 2 0 2 
1868 59 12 71 
1869 1 0 1 
1871 1 0 1 
1874 25 7 32 
1877 1 0 1 
1880 26 0 26 
166 25 191 
Table 7 reveals an increase in the scale of violence at elections between 1857 and 
1868, and a gradual decline thereafter. The period opened with two relatively quiet 
elections in 1857 and 1859, with 12 and 11 cases of violence respectively. A low 
incidence of contested elections during those campaigns contributed to the relative 
lack of disorder. In 1857less than half(47%) of all English and Welsh constituencies 
went to the polls, a figure that decreased further in 1859 (43%).7 At the general 
election of 1865 an increase in contests was paralleled by an increase in the scale of 
violence. Despite the fact that no especially divisive issue dominated the hustings the 
election generated 29 episodes of violence. In 1868 an extended campaign, enlarged 
electorate, contentious political issue (Irish Church disestablishment) and an increase 
in contests contributed to a massive increase in cases of disorder. The general 
election of 1868 was the most violent of the period with 59 cases of violence. 
Election contests declined in 1874 during a campaign in which the Liberal hegemony 
that had existed since 1847 was broken. Despite the introduction of secret voting in 
1872 the election of 1874 was characterized by rioting and violence. A total of 32 
7 See Table 8 on page 121. 
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cases ofviolence were found, many of which occurred on the polling day. In 1880 
the Liberals returned to government amid a Conservative whitewash in which the 
latter lost 114 seats. This brief and bitter campaign was the most heavily contested of 
the period.· 84% of English and Welsh constituencies went to the polls, and a total of 
26 episodes of violence were recorded. 
What then, was the frequency with which English and Welsh constituencies 
experienced violent electioneering? Given the relatively low level of mid-Victorian 
contests, comparisons between figures of violence and the total number of 
constituencies in the system are misleading. Table 8, therefore, reveals a more 
accurate picture of the frequency of disorder by showing the percentage of contested 
elections that experienced some degree ofviolence.8 
Year 
1857 
1859 
1865 
1868 
1874 
1880 
Table 8.Contests and General Election Disorder: 
Total 
England and Wales, 1857 - 1880 
(Excludes duplicate entries) 
Contested Disorder % of contests that 
Constituencies Constituencies Figures e~erienced disorder 
280 134 12 8.9 
280 124 10 8.1 
282 158 24 15.1 
295 223 59 26.4 
293 214 25 11.6 
293 250 26 10.4 
The figures in table 8 reveal the substantial portion of the electoral system that was 
characterised by violence. During the relatively quiet elections of 1857 and 1859 
almost 9% of contested elections witnessed some form of disorder, while in 1868 as 
much as 26.4% of contests were violently disrupted. Table 8 provides a unique view 
8 
Note for Table 8: ''Total Constituencies" excludes universities; "Disorder Figures" excludes duplicate 
entries of violence. 
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of the scale of mid-nineteenth century violence. It reveals that the phenomenon 
occurred at a significant number of contested elections, and highlights the extent to 
which it continued throughout the period. Indeed as late as 1880 fully 10% of 
electoral contests continued to be disrupted by violence. It is worth noting that the 
sample of violence is not drawn from a handful of unreservedly venal and disorderly 
constituencies. The sample includes a wide range of boroughs and counties, many of 
which were disrupted by violence only once. Throughout the period (excluding 
duplicate entries) only 37 constituencies witnessed more than one case of violence, 11 
witnessed more than two and just three constituencies could claim more than three 
disturbed elections (Lincoln, Nottingham and Hull). A total of 80 constituencies 
experienced a single case of violence between 1857 and 1880. Indeed out of 26 
episodes of disorder in 1880, 18 occurred in constituencies never before disrupted by 
violence.9 
Table 8 highlights the important link between electoral contests and violence. 
In one respect the connection is an obvious one: English and Welsh elections 
experienced scenes of disorder only under the conditions of intense excitement, 
enthusiasm and interest that were generated by a contest. In the absence of a political 
contest the likelihood of disorder was remote. Consequently during the period no 
episode of violence was found that took place during an uncontested election. Table 8 
reveals that between 1859 and 1874 decreases in contests were paralleled by 
decreases in violence. Thus between 1859 and 1865 a 27% rise in contests was 
mirrored by a 140% leap in cases of violence, and between 1865 and 1868 electoral 
contests climbed by 41% and violence rose by 145%. However after 1868 this pattern 
is disrupted. In 1874 contested elections declined by just 4%, yet episodes of disorder 
9 For more details on how many constituencies experienced multiple episodes of violence see Table 13 
on page 167. 
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And in 1880, for the first time during the period, the percentage of 
contests that experienced violence declined when the rate of contests increased. 
What can therefore be said about the relationship between contests and 
violence? The level of contested elections undoubtedly contributed to the potential 
for disorder by raising the number of opportunities at which it might occur. After all, 
without a contest there was no likelihood of violence. However, the particular 
circumstances of each general election played a crucial role in the scale of violence. 
During the 1868 election 75.5% of English and Welsh constituencies were contested 
and 59 separate cases of violence occurred. Yet in 1880 there were just 26 episodes 
of disorder during a campaign in which 85.5% of constituencies were contested. The 
difference in the scale of violence at these elections has a two-fold explanation: 
firstly, the phenomenon of electoral disorder was undoubtedly declining during the 
late-Victorian period. Between 1868 and 1880 the proportion of contested elections 
that experienced violence dropped by 60%, from 26.4% to 10.4%; secondly, there is a 
strong but not defmitive correlation between the frequency of electoral contests and 
the scale of violence. Other factors obviously contributed to the scale of disorder. 
The 1868 general election owed its temper to the length of the campaign (four 
months), to the divisive issue of Irish Church disestablishment, and to the anti-
Catholic lecture tour of the evangelical activist William Murphy. The 1874 
campaign, by contrast, lasted just three weeks and included no issues of comparable 
The figures in Table 8 suggest that English and Welsh electoral violence 
enjoyed something of a mid-Victorian revival. From a relative low-point in the 1850s 
the frequency of election disorder increased steadily in the mid-to-late 1860s. 
Thereafter the phenomenon began to decline with progressively fewer cases of 
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vio1ence in 1874 and 1880. Table 8 shows a small numerical increase in cases of 
disorder between the last two elections of the period (from 25 to 26 cases of violence), 
but a 16% growth in contested elections in 1880 resulted in a net decline in the 
percentage of violent contests (from 11.6% to 10.4%). Table 8 therefore reveals three 
important points. Firstly, that mid-Victorian election violence occurred at a 
significant number of English and Welsh contested elections. Secondly, that the 
percentage of contests that experienced violence increased between 1857 and 1868, 
and declined in the years that followed. Thirdly, that despite the relative decline in 
violence after 1868, late-century contests continued to experience considerable levels 
of violence. Indeed both the 1874 and 1880 general elections witnessed more 
violence per contest than either 1857 or 1859, suggesting, as Stevenson has argued, 
that electioneering remained a potent source of disorder well beyond the mid-
Victorian period. 
The sample reveals the serious nature of election disorder. Hoppen questions the 
severity of the phenomenon and argues that most English violence of the period was, 
"merely a general disorder on the streets which only occasionally turned into 
something more serious".10 He records various election 'excesses' between 1837 and 
1868 that hardly extend in severity beyond a few smashed windows, a fractured knee-
cap and the singing of 'obscure local songs'.11 Hoppen thus describes the Beverley 
election of 1868: "'several gentlemen on the hustings were struck by stones and 
sticks, and the ladies were obliged to retire'- hardly the stuff of murderous 
confrontation".12 Indeed it is not, if that described the worst excesses of the 1868 
10 Hoppen, "Grammars", p.607. 
11 Ibid. see especially pp.607- 608. 
12 Ibid., p.607. 
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general election. Hoppen implies that election violence was more of an 'enjoyable 
circus' than a serious matter of public disorder. However Table 9 shows the nature of 
Victorian electoral violence to have been overwhelmingly serious, and even 
potentially fatal. 
Table 9.The Scale of Disorder, 1857-1880 
(Includes duplicate entries of violence) 
Year Riot Disturbance Incident Total 
1857 1 5 6 12 
1859 1 5 5 11 
1860 0 0 2 2 
1861 1 0 0 1 
1862 2 0, 0 2 
1865 8 14 7 29 
1867 1 0 1 2 
1868 27 30 14 71 
1869 1 0 0 1 
1871 1 0 0 1 
1874 11 12 9 32 
1877 0 1 0 1 
1880 9 10 7 26 
63 77 51 191 
Table 9 shows that between 1857 and 1880 English and Welsh elections accounted 
for 63 riots, 77 disturbances and 51 incidentsY 'Riots' and 'disturbances' are 
regarded as serious cases of disorder as both involved destruction of property, 
personal assault and some degree of magisterial response. The less serious category 
of 'incident' invoked little official reaction and commonly involved disruption to the 
electoral process through noise, minor assault or stone-throwing. The table reveals 
that during the mid-Victorian era serious cases of election violence outnumbered less 
serious cases by 140 to 51. Violent electioneering during the period also resulted in 
11 fatalities: a police constable was killed during a riot in Kidderminster in 1857/4 
13 For a detailed discussion of the definitions of'Riot', 'Disturbance' and 'Incident' see Chapter Ill. 
14 See Kidderminster case study in Chapter V for details. 
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the Grantham borough election of 1865 left one voter dead after a crowd of Liberal 
supporters attempted to up-end the hustings into a frre; 15 in Newport during the 1868 
Monmouth borough election a woman was killed as soldiers cleared the streets during 
a riot/6 the county election of Monmouthshire in the same year left 3 people dead;17 
in Blackburn in 1868 two men died during violence at the municipal and 
parliamentary elections;18 in North Durham a riot during the county contest resulted in 
the death of a 63 year-old man after a paving stone was smashed over his head;19 in 
Cambridge the porter of Christ's College was stoned to death during an election 
skirmish; and in Gravesend the leader of a riot during the borough contest died after 
his leg was broken.20 With the exception .of Kidderminster and Grantham all reports 
of fatalities occurred during the bitter campaign of 1868. 11 fatalities in 23 years is 
not a significant number of deaths. Yet alongside the statistics of violence they 
contribute to an impression that Victorian elections could generate serious levels of 
disorder. 
n 
Mid-Victorian election disorder was predominantly a feature of large, urban 
constituencies. In contrast to Richter's assertion that "It was in the small towns and 
rural areas that the great majority of election disturbances occurred"/1 the sample 
reveals violence to have been concentrated in the boroughs, with fewer cases of 
15 Lincolnshire Chronicle, 14 July 1865, p.7. 
:~Manchester Guardian, 5 December 1868, p.S. 
Gloucester Journal, 28 November 1868, p.2; Boston Gazette, 28 November 1868, page unknown. 
18 Nonconformist, 11 November 1868, p.1,104; Carmarthen Journal, 16 October 1868, p.7. 
~~Manchester Guardian, 26 November 1868, p.6. 
Gloucester Journal, 5 December 1868, p.3; Gravesend Journal, 2 December 1868, p.3. 
21 Richter, "The Role ofMob Riot", p.23. 
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disorder located in the largely rural counties. Table 10 below reveals the distribution 
of electoral violence across England and Wales between 1857 and 1880?2 
Table 10.Constituency Disorder: England and Wales, 1857-1880 
Year Borough Borough County County By-Election Total 
Disorder Duplicate Disorder Duplicate Disorder 
1857 12 0 0 0 0 12 
1859 9 1 1 0 0 11 
1860 0 0 0 0 2 2 
1861 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1862 0 0 0 0 2 2 
1865 19 3 5 2 0 29 
1867 0 0 0 0 2 2 
1868 36 4 23 8 0 71 
1869 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1871 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1874 19 5 6 2 0 32 
1877 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1880 14 0 12 0 0 26 
109 13 47 12 10 191 
Throughout the period borough elections accounted for 122 cases of general and by-
election violence. By comparison the counties contributed just 59 cases of violence. 
Therefore 63.8% of all entries of disorder took place in the boroughs, and just 30.8% 
occurred in the counties. To a large extent the lack of county violence reflected the 
numerical majority of borough constituencies. Between 1857 and 1880 boroughs 
outnumbered county constituencies by slightly more than two to one. In 1865 there 
were 200 boroughs and 82 counties across England and Wales. The very fact that 
there were more boroughs than counties increased their chances of experiencing 
disorder. Furthermore, the boroughs were more likely to be contested than the 
counties. In the latter politics were generally less open and political control might be 
in the hands of established land-owning families. During the period 72.6% of the 
22 Note on Table 10: "By-Election Disorder" refers to borough by-elections. No disorder was found at 
county by-elections during the period. 
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total number of borough elections were contested, compared to 44.6% of all county 
elections?3 However such figures can obscure the frequency of county violence. A 
comparison with the statistics of electoral contests provides· a more accurate picture of 
constituency disorder. The sample reveals that proportionately more contested 
county elections experienced some degree of violence than contested borough 
elections. Between 1857 and 1880 a total of 17.7% of the total number of county 
contests witnessed violence, compared to 12.4% of all borough contests. This 
percentage difference serves to illustrate that, in proportion to the total number of 
constituencies, county elections experienced similar levels of violence to the 
Larger boroughs in particular were prone to violence because of their 
concentrated population, larger electorate and greater political organization. The link 
between party organization and electoral disorder is made by John Stevenson. He 
writes that the passage of Reform in 1832 made, "little difference to the traditional 
tactics of electoral intimidation and violence ... the Act ... raised the level of 
constituency organization by enforcing the registration of voters, thus stimulating the 
formation of political clubs and associations".24 As the sizes of constituency 
electorates increased throughout the century, local party organizations became more 
important in mobilising partisan support. The development of local party associations 
could sharpen political divisions, intensify partisan rivalry and lead to the tit-for-tat 
hiring of marching bands, polling-booth 'defenders' or even armed gangs: all of 
which contributed to the potential for violence. The larger boroughs were thus more 
23 Between 1857 and 1880 there were 1,194 possible borough contests of which 867 were actually 
contested (72.6%). The counties experienced 236 contests out of a possible total of 529 ( 44.6% ). 
Figures drawn from Vincent and Stenton (eds), McCalmont's Parliamentary Poll Book, and corrected 
Tihere necessary with Cr~ig, British Parliamentary Election Results. 
Stevenson, Popular D1sturbances, (1st edn), p.287. 
Chapter IV 129 
likely to experience violent electioneering because the circumstances that helped 
generate partisan conflict was more pronounced. 
The distribution of borough violence is shown below in Table 11.25 For the 
years between 1857 and 1867 "small" refers to those boroughs with fewer than 1,000 
voters and "large" to those with more than 1,000 voters. After the redistribution of 
constituencies in 1867 small boroughs are classed as those with fewer than 2,000 
voters, and large boroughs with an electorate over 2,000. 
Table 11.Distribution of Borough 
Violence by Size of Electorate 
(Excludes duplicate entries) 
Borough Sizes 
Year Small Larg_e 
1857 4 8 
1859 3 6 
1860 0 2 
1861 0 1 
1862 0 2 
1865 7 12 
1867 1 1 
........... 1.868'"'""'""'" •~~•~wow"'"•'""'""'""'""'""'""'""' ........................................................ 2 34 
1869 0 1 
1871 1 0 
1874 2 17 
1877 1 0 
1880 4 10 
25 94 
Table 11 shows that election disorder was consistently a feature of the large boroughs, 
with 79% of violence occurring there compared to 21% in the small boroughs. This 
concentration of violence was despite the fact that between 1857 and 1867 small 
boroughs dominated the electoral system. Before the Second Reform Act of 1867 
approximately 57% of all English and Welsh boroughs had less than 1,000 electors. 
Despite the majority of small boroughs, violence appears to have been far more likely 
25 
Table 11 includes 119 cases ofborough violence (including 10 episodes ofby-election violence). 
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in the larger constituencies. Indeed of the 12 boroughs that experienced violence in 
1857 5 had more than 3,000 voters and in 1868 borough disorder occurred in 20 
constituencies with more than 5,000 voters, including 11 with an electorate over 
10,000. These figures suggest that far from being restricted to 'small towns and rural 
areas', electoral disorder was located in the greater urban centres. The borough of 
Wednesbury with a population of 116,809 and 14,277 voters experienced turbulent 
elections in 1868 and 1874; Sheffield with 185,172 inhabitants and an electorate of 
36,701 witnessed violence at contests in 1857 and 1874; and Finsbury with a 
population of 452,484 and 25,461 voters encountered serious election violence in 
1859 and 1868. 
The timing of disorder reveals a pattern of rising intensity as election 
campaigns progressed. Table 12 below reveals the timing of election disorder during 
the period. 26 
Year 
1857 
1859 
1860 
1861 
1862 
1865 
1867 
1868 
1869 
1871 
1874 
1877 
1880 
Table 12.The Timing of Election Violence, 1857 ·1880 
(Includes duplicate entries of violence) 
Canvass Meeting Nomination Polling Day Declaration 
0 2 5 2 3 
0 4 1 3 3 
0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 2 0 
1 2 5 12 3 
0 0 1 0 0 
0 4 9 44 8 
0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
~ouuou"'""'"''""""'"n>>n»nm>o '"""""'RDODDORRORD<nDO .. D<UD000 
·················a················· DDORR>D0RR0RD>DD>DDODDODHODHODDO .. DO 0DUODDODDODD<DD>D>DD0D00DD0DgoDDODD 1 4 21 6 
0 1 0 0 0 
0 2 0 10 3 
2 19 22 96 27 
Unknown 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
6 
1 
6 
0 
0 
DOD .. ODDODDODDODDOD .. ODDODDODOD 
0 
0 
11 
25 
26 Table 12 includes all figures of disorder including duplicate entries and by-election disorder. The 
dotted line above the 187 4 column indicates the point at which the nomination ceremony was 
discontinued and secret voting established- both of which were introduced in 1872. ''Unknown" 
entries of disorder include those where it was difficult to establish the exact timing of the disturbance. 
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While the declaration of the poll often generated scenes of violence, it was more often 
the polling day that provided the riotous denouement to the proceedings. Given the 
incendiary nature of English crowds at times of popular excitement it is little wonder 
that the forms and processes of constituency electioneering resulted in disorder. The 
rituals and ceremonies that comprised Victorian campaigns provided ample 
opportunities for mass participation. The entry of the candidate to the constituency, 
the nomination ceremony and the declaration of the poll all attracted enormous 
crowds. However throughout the period none resulted in violence more frequently 
than the polling day. 
Canvassing was a door-to-door process by which candidates and their supporters 
could meet their constituents, obtain promises for votes and gauge their chances in the 
coming contest. As the size of electorates increased however the personal canvass 
became less used as a method of securing support. The single case of disorder during 
a canvass occurred in Cheltenham during the borough election of 1865. On that 
occasion the Liberal member for the borough, Colonel Berkeley, was mobbed by 
Conservative roughs ''while on a canvassing expedition at the lower end of the 
town".27 
The term "meeting" refers to any official gathering of voters or non-voters 
organised by a candidate or his supporters, for the purpose of making known some 
information relating to the election campaign. Meetings could be called to announce 
a new candidature, to refute allegations made by political rivals or to deliver a speech 
on some topic of local or national importance. Jon Lawrence argues that such events 
provided a stage for what he describes as the 'politics of disruption'. He writes that 
27 Cheltenham Examiner, 12 July 1865, p.2. 
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"the physical control of civic space- of public squares, meeting-halls, factory gates or 
polling-day crowds -remained central to the symbolism of political legitimacy for 
politicians, as much as for their supporters".28 Election meetings provided a visible 
battleground for rival partisans who often sought to disrupt proceedings through noise 
or violence. During the period these meetings accounted for 19 cases of disorder. In 
Finsbury in 1859 an election address by the Liberal candidate Sir S.Morton Peto drew 
an estimated 3,000 people. As the meeting unfolded a large Radical element threw 
the proceedings into disarray, "A general melee ensued, terminated only by many of 
the gas fittings being tom down, the darkness causing the vast crowd to disperse" .29 
Between 1857 and 1872, 22 episodes of violence occurred on the day of the 
nomination of candidates. Before it was abolished in 1872 this procedure occupied a 
central role during an election campaign and was usually conducted in a central 
position in the constituency. James Vemon writes, "the sense of mounting tension 
generated by this ritual unfolding of the campaign ... reached a crescendo, with the 
construction of the hustings in preparation for the nomination".30 The process of 
nomination consisted of several speeches followed by a show of hands for each 
candidate. Involvement in the process was not restricted to voters, and nomination 
crowds commonly included women and children. Traditionally the contest could be 
decided without a poll of the electors if one candidate received a majority of the show 
of hands. However by the mid nineteenth-century the procedure had become largely 
redundant. A candidate could demand a poll regardless of the number of hands raised 
in his support, and in large constituencies the proceedings were often completely 
inaudible due to the size of the crowds that attended. 
28 Lawrence, Speaking for the People, p.l81. 
29 Manchester Guardian, 20 April1859, p.2 . 
. 
30 Vemon, Politics and the Pe,ople, p.158. 
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The poll normally followed the nomination by a single day. This proximity to 
the actual casting of votes made the ceremony an important focal point for corrupt 
practices. Indeed the Hartington Committee of 1869 found that in some cases the 
nomination day served to intensify the efforts, both legal and illegal, of a legion of 
party agents and canvassers. A member of the Liberal Central Committee in Bristol 
gave evidence to the Committee that men were hired to disrupt the nomination by 
giving "a hearing only to those people for whose side they are hired".31 The potential 
for disorder was always high during the nomination simply due to the size of the 
crowds that gathered. The amount of disorder recorded during the nomination day 
would doubtless be far higher if the sample included all instances in which the 
ceremony had been merely disrupted. Electoral law provided for the adjournment of 
the nomination "in case of riot...[or] until the obstruction ceases".32 In many cases 
the noise and excitement of a nomination crowd were an expected, though deplored, 
part of the process. In places such as Bradford, where nomination crowds were 
regularly - though doubtfully - estimated to reach 70,000, few people could clearly 
see the hustings and only press reporters were able to hear the speeches. In 1869 
Edward West, the Mayor of Bradford, described the 1868 nomination to the 
Hartington Committee: 
After the proposers and seconders of the two gentlemen had spoken, 
and spoken amidst very great interruption, very few of their remarks 
being heard, except by those close in front of the hustings, a battle 
royal ensued between some men carrying boards; they broke the 
boards in pieces and armed themselves with the pieces, and with sticks 
and stones, and other weapons that they could get hold of, and 
immediately commenced a riot. 33 
31 British Parliamentary Papers, 1868-9, VIII, "Report from the Select Committee on Parliamentary 
and Municipal Elections", p.221. 
32 Leader, The Franchise, p.83 (5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 36, s.8). 
33 British Parliamentary Papers, "Report from the Select Committee", p.144. 
' ' 
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In 1872 the public nomination was fmally legislated out of existence, a belated victim 
of the Hartington Committee's inquiry. The procedure was replaced by the sending in 
of nomination papers, and a potent cause of violence was removed from the election 
process. 
Several historians of popular disturbance in England have pointed to the 
impact of reform in altering the pattern of election violence. Quinault's study of 
public order in Warwickshire concludes that "electoral reform sapped the sources of 
electoral disorder''.34 Quinault argues that increases to the electorate after 1867 made 
voter intimidation more difficult. He stresses that the introduction of secret voting in 
1872 "further shielded the individual voter''. Quinault is not alone in suggesting that 
larger electorates and vote by ballot reduced the opportunities for disorder. Stevenson 
suggests that after the introduction of secret voting most violence took place during 
the campaign and not at the polls: "an obvious comment on the open hustings and 
centralised voting as a cause for disorder prior to 1872".35 Yet Table 12 suggests that 
little change occurred in the timing of electoral violence during the period. Between 
1857 and 1872 the polling day accounted for 49.6% of all cases of violence (131), 
whereas after 1872 the proportion of violence that occurred during the poll increased 
fractionally to 52.5% (31 cases out of a total of 59 post-1872 episodes of disorder). 
The percentage of cases that were unable to be categorised must be taken into 
account. These comprised 30.5% of all post-1872 episodes of violence. However 
Table 12 shows that after the introduction of secret ballot more than half of all 
disorder continued to take place on the polling day. The removal of voters from the 
public hustings therefore failed to significantly alter the pattern of election violence. 
Reform in 1867 and 1872 similarly failed to remove the potential for disorder. Indeed 
34 Quinault, "The Warwickshire County Magistracy", p.202. 
35 Stevenson, Popular Protest, p.288. 
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as the constituencies grew in size individual attempts at coercion gave way to 
organised crowd violence or to treating, and neither outcome was likely to reduce the 
temper of electioneering. 
The declaration, like the nomination, attracted considerable public attention. 
The announcement of the election result was always an anticipated and well attended 
event. The appearance on the hustings of defeated or victorious parties was often the 
signal for disorder. Successful candidates who were unpopular could be made to run 
a gauntlet of abuse, missiles or worse. In 1857 Richard Malins, the recently re-
elected member for Wallingford, was attacked and chased from the Town Hall 
following the declaration and forced to t~e shelter in a tavern until after dark. 36 
Neither were agents or supporters of candidates immune from attack. Following the 
York borough declaration in 1868 Captain John Sutton, described as a principal 
supporter of the Conservatives, "was attacked by a number of Irishmen. He was in a 
cab at the time, the windows of which were smashed in with sticks ... and after 
defending himself with his umbrella, had to seek refuge in a passage".37 The return of 
a popular candidate could also trigger violence. In Lincoln in 1868 the announcement 
of Radical victory in the borough election resulted in celebrations that saw lighted tar 
barrels rolled about the town and the chief constable's house attacked. 
Throughout the period 27 cases of disorder occurred during or after the 
declaration. This relatively high incidence of post-poll violence throws doubt upon 
the suggestion that much of the violence of the period was the result of corrupt 
practices. Instead it highlights the popular appeal of elections as entertainment. Once 
a contest was decided the apprehension and excitement of the campaign gave way in 
~~The Times, 30 March 1857, p.7. 
Manchester Guardian, 20 November 1868, p.3. 
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some cases to scenes of celebration or retribution. Neither were necessarily the 
outcome of corrupt inducements. 
m 
In mid-Victorian Britain the scale and distribution of election violence owed much to 
the particular features of each campaign, as well as to the number of contested 
elections. These included the relative strengths of party organization, the divisiveness 
of specific issues, local electoral traditions, personalities, influence and corruption. 
All could sharpen the intensity of constituency campaigning and thus contribute to the 
potential for disorder. The following section will examine electoral violence within 
the context of each general election of the period. This will be followed by a more 
thorough analysis of the geographic distribution of disorder. 
The 1857 general election produced 12 episodes of parliamentary violence. A lack of 
contested elections contributed to this relative lack of disorder: in England and Wales 
only 4 7% of constituencies went to the polls, making this campaign the least 
contested since 1832.38 Furthermore the fragmentation of party politics contributed to 
the blurring of distinctions between the parties. In 1857 there were 34 contests 
between Liberals alone. Contests between Liberals and Peelites also "reflect[ ed] the 
dislocation of Conservatism in the 1840s". 39 The Liberal party benefited from 
Conservative disarray in 1857 and was returned to power with a Commons majority 
of 92 seats. The Conservative failure was most pronounced in the counties where the 
Party lost 24 seats in England alone. The general election of 1857 has often been 
38 Hawkins, British Party Politics, p.61. 
39 Jackson, "The British General Elections", p.164. 
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described as a personal victory for Lord Palmerston: a "triumphant plebiscite" in 
support of the ageing premier based largely on his foreign policy record. Whereas 
the profile of parliamentary reform rose during the campaign, and religious questions 
gained importance in Ireland and Wales, it was support or criticism ofPalmerston and 
his government's handling of the Chinese Question that divided most candidates. The 
Liberals may have swept into power based largely on the premier's popular appeal but 
they were not to remain there for long. The new administration met in May 1857 and 
was gone by February 1858, driven from office by scandal, political blunder and 
foreign crisis. 
The pattern of disorder in 1857 reflected the general distribution and character 
of mid-century electoral disturbance. Episodes of violence occurred in the north, 
south and midlands of England (See Map 1 below) and included 1 riot, 5 disturbances 
All cases of disorder took place in borough constituencies. 
Furthermore the nature of the violence encompassed the full scope of electoral 
interference from organised intimidation to what contemporaries labelled 'rough 
sport'. Successful Conservative candidates who opposed Palmerston proved 
unpopular with election crowds in Tewkesbury, Wallingford and York. At 
Tewkesbury in Gloucestershire the Liberal monopoly of the borough since 1841 was 
broken with the election of a Conservative. The new member, Frederick Lygon, was 
opposed to "an aggressive foreign policy" and found himself pelted with stones and 
mud as he stood on the hustings. 40 The treatment of Richard Malins at the hands of a 
Wallingford crowd has already been noted.41 In York the election of a Conservative 
opposed to Palmerston led to fighting between the crowd and the police.42 
:~ Berrows and Worcester Journal, 4 April1857, p.2. 
See page 108. 
42 
Berrows and Worcester Journal, 4 April1857, p.2. 
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Map l.General election disorder in England and Wales, 1857 
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However not all violence in 1857 was related to the simple issue of support for 
Palmerston. Elections in the 1850s were still largely constructed within a local 
context and issues of nationwide significance were often secondary to those of a more 
provincial character. Indeed of the 12 cases of disorder in 1857, 8 occurred in 
boroughs where no Conservative was elected. In many cases the violence was more 
related to local concerns than to national political issues. Disorder in Beverley grew 
out of allegations that the Peelite candidate, E.A.Glover was ineligible to stand for 
election. Despite his success at the polls Glover's indignant supporters burnt an 
effigy of his principal accuser and attacked the Liberal party chairman. 43 The serious 
riot in K.idderminster was due to the economic and political situation in the borough, 
and to the personality of its bellicose member, Robert Lowe.44 In Rochdale an 
election meeting was broken up by colliers organised and paid for by the local 
Conservative association. During the disruption, "Alderman Livsey and the table in 
front of him were tippled (sic) over, he upon the table, and both upon the remains of 
the front seats, which were all smashed".45 Less serious instances of violence 
likewise showed little relation to national issues: at Harwich a crowd attacked and 
demolished the hustings following the declaration and "made a clean sweep of the 
materials in not more than ten minutes";46 at the Sheffield nomination it was the local 
police who came under fire from a crowd armed with furnace coke and tumips;47 and 
the Nottingham declaration was disrupted by a group of Chartists upset that their 
nominee had not been retumed.48 In few places can the imprint of national politics be 
found. Much of the violence had its origins in either local partisan rivalry 
43 British Parliamentary Papers, 1857, Session 2 (243), Vol.l59, "Select Committee on Beverley 
Borough Election Petition", p.6. 
44 A detailed analysis of the K.idderminster borough election of 1857 can be found in Chapter V. 
45 North Lincolnshire Herald, 4 April1857, p.3. 
46 The Times, 30 March 1857, p.8. 
47 Ibid., 28 March 1857, p.7. 
48 Ibid. 
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(Wallingford, York); corruption (Rochdale); campaign excitement and enthusiasm 
(Harwich, Sheffield, Brighton); or local personalities and issues (Beverley, 
Kidderminster). 
On April Fool's Day 1859 the Conservative ministry led by Disraeli was defeated on 
a Commons' motion attacking the Government's proposed reform legislation. The 
bill was too obviously favourable to Conservative electoral fortunes and was defeated 
by a coalition of opposition groups.49 The announcement that a general election 
would be held was made on the same day. Thus the stage was set for a campaign in 
which parliamentary reform would prove the most important political question. 
Foreign policy was again an issue, this time over the war between France, Austria and 
Sardinia. In 1859 party organization played a more important role than in 1857, 
particularly for the Conservatives. Improvements in organization and an increase in 
funding to the constituencies from the party's central fund contributed to a 
Conservative recovery. 50 
Electoral contests declined further than in 1857 and just 124 constituencies (or 
43% of the total) across England and Wales went to the polls in 1859. The 
Conservatives regained ground lost in 1857 and returned more than 300 members for 
the first time since 1841. They gained 16 county and 16 borough seats compared to 
the Liberal's 5 county and 28 borough seats. However the Conservative recovery was 
not enough to retain office and they were defeated by a liberal coalition with a 
majority of 40 seats. The election also witnessed the further marginalisation of the 
Peelite faction, which returned just 22 members in 1859 and which would soon be 
49 Norman McCord, British History, 1815 -1906 (Oxford, 1993), p.252. 
50 Jackson, "General Elections", p.258. 
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drawn into the emerging Liberal Party.51 The drop in contested elections in 1859 
contributed to a reduction in violence, with just 11 cases found including a duplicate 
entry from the Lancashire borough of Bury. The sample records one riot, five 
disturbances and four incidents in 1859. These cases were scattered across northern 
and southern England (See Map 2 below). The violence was concentrated in the 
boroughs with a single episode recorded in a county constituency (Yorkshire, W.R). 
In the single member borough of Bury the political battle was fought between 
moderate and radical Liberals. The Liberal split, which dated from 1852, proved 
bitter enough that rival allegations of corruption were common during elections. In 
1857 the borough was contested by the moderate Frederick Peel and the radical 
R.N.Philips. Caroline Jackson writes that the election ended in "a welter of 
accusation and last minute slanders".52 Peel's supporters lodged a petition against 
Philips' return citing the intimidation of voters but were unsuccessful. In 1859 Philips 
declined to contest the borough and his replacement was the radical Thomas Bames, a 
stranger to the town. Peel stood again and was this time successful due to his support 
among the town's publicans and to "an outlay of bribes of considerable value".53 
During the campaign drunken 'Peelites' disrupted Bames' election meeting and at the 
declaration fighting erupted between the rival parties. The Manchester Guardian 
reported that "the friends of Mr.Peel took forcible possession of that portion of the 
hustings allotted to the friends of Mr.Bames, not permitting the latter to retire by the 
way of the staircase, but throwing them over the front of the hustings, to the great 
danger of life and limb". 54 
51 McCord, British History, p.252-3. 
52 Jackson, "General Elections", p.3. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Manchester Guardian, 29 Apri11859, p.4. 
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Map 2.General election disorder in England and Wales, 1859 
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The Beverley election again resulted in disorder albeit of a more sedate character. In 
1859 E.A.Glover returned to contest the borough after being stripped of his election in 
1857 and having spent time in jail during 1858 for false declarations as to his property 
qualifications. The nomination was described as ''very disorderly" and stones were 
thrown at the hustings. The most serious case of disorder in 1859 occurred in Calne 
in Wiltshire. Two years after almost being killed at the hands of a K.idderminster 
mob, Robert Lowe found himself again at the centre ofan election riot. Lowe's 
return for Calne with the aid of his patron, Lord Lansdowne, was the signal for 
serious rioting. The Bridlington Free Press commented, 
The mob ... attacked the police in force, and drove them into the Town 
Hall, where they kept them prisoners for two hours ... The mob then 
demolished every pane of glass in the police station, smashed the 
windows of the agent ofMr.Lowe and Lord Lansdowne's solicitor, and 
kept the town in terror until a very late hour at night. 55 
Election violence in 1859 was characterised by disrupted political meetings with 
disorder attending speeches in Finsbury, Bury, Salford and Leeds. William Massey's 
election address in Salford was disturbed and in Hull the Conservative party were met 
with a boisterous reception at the declaration and pelted with mud, sticks, lumps of 
paper(!) and stones. 56 
The relatively quiet elections of 1857 and 1859 gave way to the more violent election 
of 1865. On the surface however there was little to indicate that the campaign would 
be a bitter one. The parliament elected in 1859 "had died a natural death" and no 
single contentious political issue dominated the hustings. Government expenditure, 
malt tax, church rates and foreign policy all rated more attention than parliamentary 
55 Bridlington Free Press, 7 May 1859, p.3. 
56 Manchester Guardian, 29 April1859, p.4. 
reform in 1865. The Liberals relied on careful domestic management and an 
unspectacular record in foreign policy. There was little doubt about the outcome and 
the Liberals were re-elected with the 80 year-old Palmerston again at the helm. The 
party actually increased their majority by 20 seats and in the Commons 359 Liberals 
faced 299 Conservatives. Yet the campaign was the most heavily contested since 
1841, a factor attributable to the retirement of many older members. Indeed the 1865 
election returned 105 members to the Commons for the first time.57 In England and 
Wales there were 158 contests, an increase of 34 over 1859, representing 55% of the 
total number of constituencies. At £750,000 the official election expenses were the 
highest yet recorded. A total of 35 petitions went to trial in 1865, a figure that 
represented one-fifth of all petitions lodged since 1832.58 The election occasioned 
more violence than the 1857 and 1859 campaigns combined. A total of 29 cases of 
disorder were recorded in 1865, including 5 duplicate entries.59 The Nonconformist 
commented of the campaign, "The great triumph of Liberal opinion at the General 
Election has been greatly tarnished by the senseless and disgraceful scenes which 
have been witnessed in various parts of the United Kingdom".60 The violence was 
located principally along a north-south corridor between Yorkshire and Wiltshire (See 
Map 3 below), with isolated cases in Devon, Pembrokeshire and Cumberland. 
Five county elections were disrupted by violence in 1865, with the North and 
South Warwickshire campaigns each contributing a duplicate entry (7 cases of county 
violence in total). Despite the increase in county disorder the large boroughs 
continued to dominate the sample. 
57 O'Leary, The Elimination of Corrupt Practices, p.28 and Hawkins, British Party Politics, p.105. 
58 O'Leary, op cit, p.28. 
59 The duplicate entries in 1865 included: Carlisle, Cheltenham, Nottingham, Atherstone 
(Warwickshire, North) and Leamington (Warwickshire, South). 
60 Nonconformist, 26 July 1865, p.603. 
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Map 3.General election disorder in England and Wales, 1865 
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There were 19 cases of borough violence in 1865, including 12 boroughs with more 
than 1,000 electors (Hull with 5,566 voters and Nottingham with 5,934 voters). The 
scale of violence reflected the general pattern of mid-century disorder with 8 riots, 14 
disturbances and 7 incidents. Serious riots broke out at elections in Rochdale, 
Lincoln, Nottingham, Chippenham, Cricklade, Dudley, Huddersfield and at 
Rotherham during the Yorkshire, West Riding contest. The general election resulted 
in a rare fatality: In Cheltenham a Liberal supporter died after being shot in the face 
by a Conservative voter.61 In Pembrokeshire election enthusiasm led to the old 
practice of 'cooping' voters prior to the poll. The Welshman reported of the 
Haverfordwest election, "A large number of tallymen had been engaged on both sides, 
and many an unsuspecting voter was taken captive only to be set at liberty after the 
turmoil had ended".62 The two cases of borough violence recorded in Pembrokeshire 
in 1865 (See Map 3 or appendix) represent the frrst instances of Welsh disorder 
during the period. The lack of violence in the Principality before 1865 reflected the 
lack of contests there. At both the 1857 and 1859 general elections there were just 4 
constituencies in Wales that went to the polls. This situation did not alter markedly in 
1865, when there were 5 contests. Welsh electoral lassitude during this period owed 
much to the political power of the local Anglican gentry; their decline and the 
resulting rise in contests (and therefore violence) date from the late-1860s. 
In Chippenham the election of two Conservatives, Sir. J.Neeld and Gabriel 
Goldney, sparked a riot in which the houses of at least 50 Conservative voters were 
attacked including that of Goldney' s election agent. Chippenham was a small 
patronage borough in Wiltshire with just 392 voters in 1865. The Neeld family, one 
of the most influential in the county, exercised a controlling influence over the 
61 Nonconformist, 19 July 1865, p.587. 
62Th e Welshman, 14 July 1865, p.3. 
borough's two seats. The violence in 1865 demonstrates the risks that patrons ran by 
openly ignoring popular sentiment. While the election result may never have been in 
doubt, the violent upheaval that followed the Liberal candidate's loss certainly reveals 
the unpopularity of the patron's political control. The local police force of 12 
constables faced an estimated 500 men, women and children infuriated at the loss of 
William Lysley. The Times reported the violence which rapidly escalated from stone-
throwing to destruction of property, 
For nearly three hours the windows, window panes, and furniture in 
the houses of obnoxious persons were destroyed ... In order to show 
their feelings against the Vicar, the Rev. J.Rich, the mob proceeded to 
the churchyard and tore up the tombstones, which they hurled against 
the windows of his house.63 
In the borough of Nottingham corruption and intimidation led to serious riots and 
ultimately to a void election. This large borough of 5,964 voters returned two 
members to parliament and had a well-established tradition of corruption. The hiring 
of organised mobs, or 'lambs', in the Conservative interest had become something of 
a local institution. The bitterly contested election of 1865 proved no exception, with 
violence being a feature of both the nomination and polling days. Three candidates 
stood in the Liberal interest including Sir R.J.Clifton, a former Peelite and the owner 
of several local collieries, Samuel Morley, a hosiery manufacturer and prominent 
nonconformist, and Charles Paget, a Nottingham manufacturer and deputy lieutenant 
ofthe county. A.G.Marten, QC stood as a Conservative. The employees ofClifton's 
collieries were prominent during the disturbances which punctuated the election 
campaign. 
63 The Times, 14 July 1865, p.6. 
Chapter IV 148 
On the day of the nomination a large group of framework knitters came by 
train to Nottingham in support of the Liberal candidates. When they arrived, 
however, they were "set upon by a violent rabble and driven back into the station".64 
The Nonconformist reported that ''Numbers of roughs waited in various avenues in the 
town for Messrs. Paget and Morley, but they did not make their appearance".65 
During the nomination the violence continued and "the hustings was got possession 
of, the flags tom down, the scaffolding set frre to, and totally consumed. The rabble 
pelted each other with stones, and several persons were severely wounded".66 On the 
polling day Paget and Morley's committee room was attacked and gutted and "bands 
of men armed with sticks [committed] serious outrages on the property and persons of 
the inhabitants".67 The violence continued to escalate and a request was made for 
military assistance. However the excitement declined after the declaration of the poll, 
no doubt due to Clifton' s success. 
The election result was petitioned against and both Samuel Morley and Sir 
Robert Clifton were unseated. Morley's supporters were found to have bribed over 
600 voters, ostensibly as protection against the intimidation practiced by his 
opponent. Clifton and his agents were found guilty of intimidation. For his part 
Morley denied any complicity in corrupt practices. In a letter to Gladstone following 
the verdict on the petition he wrote, 
It has been a great disappointment to find myself compromised by acts 
of which I was entirely ignorant till I heard of them last week; but for 
which I am justly held responsible, though I doubt whether the 
[election] Committee fully appreciated the difficulty my friends had to 
64 Nonconformist, 28 July 1865, p.527. 
65 /bid 
66 Ibid. 
67 HLRO, General Index to the House of Commons, "Special Reports from Election Committees", 
1866-1878-9, p.591. 
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encounter owing to the shameful conduct of unscrupulous opponents.68 
Gladstone regretted Morley' s departure from the Commons and remarked during the 
Church Rates debate that his "absence from this House I deplore on personal as well 
as moral grounds".69 Regardless of Morley's innocence or guilt in the matter, this 
incident provides an insight into how politicians found guilty of corruption were 
·viewed by their contemporaries. Morley's political career was not damaged by his 
association with corrupt practices. He was returned for Bristol in 1868 and remained 
member for that borough until1885. 
The scale of disorder during the 1868 general election undoubtedly casts a long 
shadow across the period, the prolonged campaign was certainly the most violent of 
the mid-Victorian era and, in terms of petitions lodged and corruption uncovered, one 
of the most venal. This election alone accounts for one-third of all cases of election 
disorder between 1857 and 1880. Fifty-nine English and Welsh elections experienced 
some form of disorder in 1868, representing an incredible 26.4%, or almost one-
quarter, of the total number of election contests in that year.70 A total of 57 serious 
cases of violence (27 riots and 30 disturbances) left at least 9 people dead in 
widespread rioting that stretched from Cumberland in the north to the Isle ofWight in 
the south. The violence was predominantly located in the midlands and in Lancashire 
and Yorkshire, though violence was also reported as far afield as Devon, Kent, 
Suffolk, Carmarthenshire and Carnarvonshire (See Map 4 below). 
68 British Library, Additional Mss 44410, ff.99, Samuel Morley to W.E.Gladstone, 25 April1866. 
69 Hansard 3, Vol.183, 8 May 1866, p.620- 621. 
70 The figure of 59 cases of violence disregards duplicate entries. See Table 7 (p.121) for more details 
of the scale of election disorder during the period. 
Chapter IV 150 
Map 4.General election disorder in England and Wales, 1868 
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The military were needed to restore order in several towns during the 1868 campaign 
including Ashton-under-Lyne, Bolton, Blackburn, Blaenavon, Brierly Hill, Newport 
and Wakefield.71 At Shepshed in North Leicestershire the-Pensioners and Yeomanry 
were put on alert after rioters clashed with police reinforcements sent from 
Loughborough.72 During the West Staffordshire election the polling was abandoned 
at Brierly Hill after the hustings were destroyed and mobs of Liberal and Tory roughs 
fought in the streets.73 In North Durham a riot erupted on the polling day during 
which rival partisans fought for control of the hustings. A fierce stone-throwing battle 
ensued during which the Manchester Guardian reported: "the shrieks of women and 
children for assistance [were] ... awfully distinct even above the din that prevailed 
during the stampede down Framwell-gate".74 At the close of the poll in Whittlesey, 
Cambridgeshire an organised mob of navvies and labourers descended on the town 
and "demolished everything they could lay their hands on".75 In all the general 
election generated a total of 27 riots, 30 disturbances and 14 incidents. The increase 
in county violence in 1868 reflected the growth of contests in those constituencies. In 
1865 only 17.8% of English and Welsh counties were contested compared to 40.3% 
in 1868, an increase fuelled by a leap in Welsh county contests from 5 (in 1865) to 15, 
and by contests in 16 English counties that were new creations of the Second Reform 
Act. 
There were unique reasons for the scale of violence in 1868. This bitter 
election featured a recently enlarged electorate, a lengthy campaign and a significant 
increase in the number of contests. The reforms of 1867 ensured that a larger 
71 These towns were not all boroughs in their own right, and include some county towns where polling 
took place. 
72 Derbyshire Courier, 28 November 1868, p.3. 
73 Manchester Guardian, 26 November 1868, p.6. 
74 Ibid. 
75 The Times, 26 November 1868, p.7. 
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proportion of the working class were enfranchised in 1868 than at previous elections. 
These new voters included many who were vulnerable to the pressures of intimidation 
and to the lure of bribery. Martin Pugh writes that "the· exercise of influence was 
naturally marked in the election following immediately upon the 1867 Reform Act, 
when large numbers of working men voted for the first time but under the old 
conditions of open voting".76 These newly enfranchised voters were sought after by 
the established political parties, and the increase in contests. in 1868 is evidence of the 
stimulus Reform had on party organization. A total of 223 English and Welsh 
contests in 1868 represented 74% of the total number of constituencies, and an 
increase of 65 from 1865. Widespread press reports of bribery, treating and 
intimidation clearly indicate the efforts of party agents to capture the new electorate, 
and the increased level of party activity, whether legal or illegal, led to a significant 
increase in both official election expenses and the number of petitions lodged. 
Though grossly underestimated the 1868 expenses totalled £1.3 million, almost 
£700,000 more than in 1865.77 The voters themselves proved no less immune to 
political pressures or corruption than their predecessors; 101 petitions, or double that 
of 1865, being presented following the election, and 22 contests were declared void, 
an increase of 16 over the previous general election.78 
The campaign itself lasted from August to November and was described by 
the Home Secretary H.A.Bruce as "the long agony which preceded the general 
election".79 Disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Ireland was the most 
prominent and most contentious issue during the election. Gladstone committed the 
Liberals to a policy of reform in Ireland where the established Church commanded a 
76 Pugh, The Making of Modern British Politics, p.13. 
77 O'Leary, The Elimination of Corrupt Practices, p.56. 
78 Ibid., p.47. 
79 Hansard 3, Vol.194, 4 March 1869, p.650. 
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membership of just 12% of the population.8° Furthermore the issue of Irish reform 
coincided with a rise in Anglo-Irish tensions. Several high profile Fenian attacks on 
the British mainland in the winter of 1867 were followed by the controversial lecture 
tour of the anti-Catholic evangelist William Murphy. Local causes of disorder were 
thus less important during a campaign in which a single political issue dominated the 
hustings. And in 1868 the subject of Irish reform forced "a national agenda on local 
platforms to an extent previously unknown in mid-Victorian elections".81 English 
working-class hostility towards immigrant Irish labour merely exacerbated strongly 
held anti-Catholic sentiment. Anglo-Irish conflict thus played a prominent role in 
many election disturbances in 1868. In Lancashire in particular William Murphy's 
talks generated a considerable amount of disorder, one example being in Wigan, 
where two Liberals headed the poll, a body of Tory colliers attacked houses in the 
Irish section of town. However, "The Irishmen ... soon organised themselves, drove 
out their assailants, and also repulsed a second attack". 82 Irishmen and women were 
also reported as being prominent in disturbances in Blackburn, Bury, Bolton and 
York. 
However not all disorder was influenced by the divisive national agenda of 
Irish reform. Corruption in the form of treating and undue influence provided a ready 
precursor to violence. In Bolton local Irishmen were reported as indulging in serious 
fighting, but defeated Liberal's also accused the Conservatives of importing "large 
bodies of armed and violent men"83 into the town. Violence in Warrington flared 
after Conservative supporters kidnapped several Liberal voters. 84 In Sandbach, 
80 Hawkins, British Party Politics, p.144. 
81 Ibid., p.147. 
82 Manchester Guardian, 19 November 1868, p.6. 
83 Ibid., 18 November 1868, p.5. 
84 Special Edition of the Warrington Guardian, 17 November 1868, p.2. 
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following the Mid-Cheshire election, a riot broke out after rival gangs of 'roughs' 
clashed in the streets. On that occasion the police came under serious attack and 
"several of the constables were received with a volley of stones. One was beaten with 
a flagstaff, another had his head cut open, and Captain Smith was injured in the 
side".85 And during the West Staffordshire election a ferocious riot ensued after a 
body of "lambs" from Dudley marched on body of "roughs" from Cradley-Heath. 86 
The concentration of violence in 1868 raises important questions about the 
nature and frequency of mid-century electoral disorder. What implications does this 
cluster of violence at a single campaign have for conclusions about disorder across the 
entire period? Was the general election of 1868 merely an anomaly in an otherwise 
peaceful period? It seems reasonably clear that a peculiar convergence of factors 
contributed to the scale of violence in 1868. A greatly enlarged electorate, the 
intensification of party activity with its adjutants of corruption and undue influence, a 
divisive religious issue, all exacerbated long held traditions of participation, carnival 
and disorder. 
The violence in 1868 led directly to a Commons investigation into the procedure of 
both parliamentary and municipal elections. The Hartington Committee presented its 
fmdings to the House in March 1870. Its report on electioneering in mid-Victorian 
Britain concluded that many borough elections were characterised by fighting, 
drinking and various forms of corruption. Among the recommendations made by the 
Committee to improve this situation were the abolition of open nominations, an 
increase in the number of polling booths, an improvement of the law relating to 
electoral malpractice and the introduction of secret voting. These proposals were 
85 Manchester Guardian, 8 December 1868, p.5. 
86 Ibid., 26 November 1868, p.6. 
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included in the Parliamentary and Municipal Elections Bill (Ballot Act) passed in July 
1872. The simultaneous passage of a Corrupt Practices Act outlawed the use of 
public houses as committee rooms. 87 These changes may have led some to hope for 
an improvement in electoral conditions. However such hopes were soon to be proved 
illusory. The scale of violence in 1874 was second only to that of 1868 and proved 
that alterations to the procedure of electioneering made little impact on the outbreak 
of violence. 
The General Election of 1874 provided the Conservatives with their only 
electoral victory of the period. A mere three weeks were provided for the campaign 
which was characterised by Liberal disunity as much as Conservative cohesion. Since 
1868 the Conservatives had assiduously tended to the machinery of party 
organization. The National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations 
was formed in 1867 and was followed in 1870 with the establishment of the 
Conservative Central Office. The creation of these two bodies was an important step 
in the development of national party organizations.88 However their effectiveness in 
1874 should not be overdrawn. Conservative organization was more advanced in the 
larger urban boroughs and the counties remained largely under the influence of their 
traditional landlords. The smaller boroughs were often left with a single party agent 
or no organization at all. Yet the Conservatives were far better prepared than the 
Liberals in 187 4 and were able to present a coherent and unified front. Their 
campaign addresses followed broadly similar lines including: "defence of the Church 
of England, an end to Gladstone's domestic hyperactivity, more religious teaching in 
87 Richter, "Public Order", p.184. 
88 E.J.Feuchtwanger, Disraeli, Democracy and the Tory Party: Conservative leadership and 
organization after the Second Reform Bill (Oxford, 1968), p.105. 
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schools, opposition to Home Rule, relief for local taxpayers, and the vaguest of 
vagueness on foreign affairs". 89 
By comparison the Liberal Party was divided and in disarray. Without an 
issue such as Irish Church disestablishment to rally the various elements of liberalism 
the party struggled to maintain unity. Radicals and nonconformists were unhappy 
with the pace and extent of government reforms and the Whigs and moderate Liberals 
were increasingly alarmed at Gladstone's democratic rhetoric. Nonconformist 
disillusionment contributed to a split in the Liberal vote. In 1874 official Liberals 
were challenged by unofficial candidates in 34 constituencies.90 The passage of the 
1872 Licensing Act had alienated both the temperance movement and the brewing 
interest. The former believed the licensing reforms had not gone far enough, the latter 
was angry with increased industry regulation. By reducing the opening hours of 
public houses the Liberals created a powerful enemy in the publicans. A total of 214 
English and Welsh constituencies were contested in 1874, representing a marginal 
decrease from 223 in 1868. The election proved a spectacular Conservative victory, 
with the Liberal majority of 100 seats obtained in 1868 being converted into a 
Conservative majority of 52. In England the Conservatives captured 143 out of 170 
county seats and "pushed Liberal electoral support back into Northern England".91 
The 1874 general election produced an all too familiar inventory of riot, 
mayhem and destruction. In al119 borough elections and 6 county elections produced 
a total of 32 cases of electoral violence. There were 11 riots, 12 disturbances and 9 
incidents at elections as far field as Cornwall, Norfolk and North Durham (See Map 5 
below). 
89 Hoppen, Mid-Victorian Generation, p.612. 
90 !bid 
91 Hawkins, British Party Politics, p.172. 
Chapter IV 157 
Map 5.General election disorder in England and Wales, 1874 
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The scale of disorder in 1874 marks it as the second most violent of the period. 
Violence was most marked on the polling day (See Table 12) which accounted for 21 
out of 32 cases of disorder. Such figures contradict Richter's argument that most 
violence took place after the declaration of the poll. Similarly Comelius O'Leary 
writes that "the riots that occurred in 187 4 took place (as before) during the campaign, 
not on polling day".92 The scale and distribution of violence in 1874 challenges the 
notion that electoral disorder had largely disappeared by the late-Victorian period. 
The election campaign of 1874 may have been, as Hoppen asserts, "notable for its 
calmness and quiet"93 in comparison with its immediate predecessor. However it was 
still far from peaceful: in Sheffield an armed mob paraded through the streets, 
attacked passers-by, "entered a beer house ... and got nine gallons of beer from the 
landlord under pressure";94 as in 1868 the polling at Barnsley for the South-West 
Yorkshire election ended in riot. The police were pelted with "stones, oranges [and] 
earthenware" before the windows of seven hotels were smashed and a cab carrying 
the ballot boxes was attacked;95 several borough elections in Staffordshire proved 
disorderly, as at Wolverhampton where the ironworks and factories shut early and 
there were pitched battles between rival mobs of partisans. 
At half-past one a mob of youths, wearing Conservative colours, and 
armed with staves, collected in the centre of Wolverhampton, and 
commenced an indiscriminate attack upon all wearing the Liberal 
colours ... Vehicles and horses and even women were beaten ... The 
Liberals responded and commenced a similar sally, armed with timber, 
which they tore down from fences.96 
92 O'Leary, The Elimination of Corrupt Practices, p.89. 
93 Hoppen, "Grammars ", p.610. 
94 Manchester Guardian, 13 February 1874, p.7. 
95 Ibid., 11 February 1874, p.6. 
96 Ibid., 6 February 1874, p.5. 
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In April 1874 the Chief Constable of Staffordshire, William Congreve, wrote to the 
Home Office concerning his preparations for the recent county and borough elections. 
He described how by-elections in 1873 for East Staffordshire, Stafford and Tamworth 
had, "led me to hope that under the Ballot the excitement which frequently prevailed 
under the former system was not to be anticipated". However his optimism was 
''undeceived by the riotous proceedings at Dudley on the 4th of February". The 
borough elections for Wednesbury, Stoke and Wolverhampton all took place on the 
same day. Congreve admitted that in many places his force was "at times more or 
less overpowered" and that "most of the oldest officers affirm that never, on any 
previous occasion, have they seen at Elections so savage and determined a mob".97 
As during the rest of the period, the causes of violence in 187 4 were many and 
varied. Violence was always likely to be marked during a campaign in which the 
publicans were supposed to have taken an active role. In some places anti-
government campaigning by the licensed victuallers led to disorder. In Hull a number 
of publicans who had supported the Conservative interest had their windows smashed, 
while public houses were also the focus of riotous mobs in Barnsley, Nottingham, 
Sheffield and Bewdley. Such places were, however, perennial targets for attack 
during mid-Victorian elections. In Dudley the intimidation of voters by an armed 
mob led to a void election. At Penryn in Cornwall partisan rivalry erupted into 
violence when a Liberal procession was attacked by a body of Conservatives. The 
police were frequent targets of mobs throughout the period and this was particularly 
obvious in 1874. For example a force of constables from Stourbridge were sent to 
97 Staffordshire Record Office, C/PC/1!1!1, "Reports of Staffordshire Chief Constable, 1859 -1887", 2 
April1874. 
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Lye during the East Worcestershire election only to be stoned halfway home again. 
Several of their comrades were left in Lye, "being too much injured to march away".98 
Election crowds often responded violently to police interference, particularly 
when force was required to restore order. In North Durham a riot developed after a 
constable struck a rioter with his truncheon. This act precipitated a general attack on 
the police, the rescue of several prisoners and attacks on houses in which the police 
had fled for safety.99 However the violence in North Durham was more complicated 
than mere police-mob conflict. One of the Conservative candidates was unpopular 
with the local miners. George Elliot was a self-made man and an ex-miner himself 
The Nonconformist described him as, "very wealthy ... but, like some others, he is 
dead against the class from which he has risen" .100 He was credited with an 
unpopular insertion in the Mines Regulation Act and during an election meeting in 
1874 was stoned by hundreds of miners. They campaigned vigorously against him, 
employing exclusive dealing and intimidation against Tory tradesmen. The result was 
serious rioting in many county towns including Seaham where the mob, "ftred a truck 
containing 25 barrels of tar, and burnt a stack of pit props and other timber". 101 
The Conservative government elected in 1874 limped into its seventh session in 1880, 
the ftrst to do so in the nineteenth-century, dogged by foreign and domestic troubles 
and hounded by a re-invigorated and morally outraged Gladstone. Disraeli's 
dissolution on 8 March thus proved the party leadership to be out of touch with the 
state of its electoral strength and complacent in the face of Liberal reorganisation. 
Gladstone's return to the political limelight came in the wake of the Bulgarian 
98 Manchester Guardian, 13 February 1874, p.5. 
99 Ibid., 11 February 1874, p.7. 
100 Nonconformist, 4 February 1874, p.107. 
101 Manchester Guardian, 11 February 1874, p.7. 
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atrocities and as a candidate for the Scottish county of Midlothian. His campaign 
speeches there in November and December 1879 harshly criticised Conservative 
foreign policy in the Balkans and South Africa. A ·worsening industrial and 
agricultural depression in the late 1870s added to Conservative ills. In addition the 
failure of the government to protect the landed interest against falling food prices and 
cheaper imports eroded their traditional support base.102 Conservative prospects in 
1880 were further weakened by the deterioration of the party's organization. Since 
187 4 the work of Gorst and the Central Office had been allowed to decay until the 
latter had "practically ceased to exist except as a clerical agency" .103 
By contrast the Liberals had steadily improved their organization since 1874. 
The split between Whigs and radical nonconformists had been repaired and in many 
large boroughs Liberal associations were being remodelled to reflect a more 'popular' 
appeal. Working-class participation was encouraged in these new organs of Liberal 
party machinery, the most famous model of organization being the Birmingham 
'caucus'. In 1877 the National Liberal Federation was created to coordinate local 
party associations. By the end of that year 4 7 English and Welsh boroughs were 
affiliated.104 The national scope and effectiveness of the NLF should not, however, be 
overstated. Its power was weakened by internal divisions and both Whigs and 
moderate Liberals were wary of its radical nature. 105 The Federation was also largely 
controlled by Joseph Chamberlain and the Birmingham Liberals and was resented by 
party associations in Scotland and Wales.106 Despite these divisions the Liberal Party 
102 McCord, British History, p.280 - 281. 
103 Feuchtwanger, p.138. 
104 D.G.Wright, Democracy and Reform, 1815-1885 (London, 1970), p.91. 
105 Hawkins, British Party Politics, p.221. 
106 Ibid. 
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was in a much better position to contest the 1880 election than were the 
Conservatives. 
The dissolution in March left three weeks for the campaign. The session 
ended with the controversial passage of the Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt 
Practices Act (1880). This legislation repealed a section of the 1867 Reform Act 
which prohibited the payment of travel expenses for voters. 107 The use of paid cabs 
and conveyances was thus marked during the bitter campaign that followed. There 
were 249 electoral contests in England and Wales in 1880, an increase from 214 in 
187 4. The Liberals were returned in a stunning victory with their largest nominal 
majority since 1832. Conservative numbers in the Commons fell from 352 to 238 
while Liberal numbers increased from 300 to 414, including 61 Home Rulers. 108 
Liberal gains were marked in the counties where they captured 38 English and 
Scottish seats.109 In many ways the election marked the transition towards a more 
modern style of politics. It was the ftrst 'national' campaign to be fought by two mass 
party organizations and the involvement of the party leadership in campaigning was a 
portent of the future. Yet the influence of an older style of politics lingered in the 
continued significance of local issues and the local influence of party associations. 
Members of parliament who enjoyed strong local support were unlikely to be 
influenced by the 'party machine' or the party leadership.11° Finally the prevalence of 
corruption and violence during the campaign proved that, at least at the constituency 
level, little had changed since 1857. 
The Nonconformist could always be counted on for the most vitriolic and 
high-minded denunciations of electoral disorder and in 1880 commented that "The 
107 O'Leary, The Elimination of Corrupt Practices, p.115. 
108 Hawkins, British Party Politics, p.210. 
109 Hoppen, Mid-Victorian Generation, p.635. 
l!O !bid, p.260. 
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election excesses visible in the present contest have much of the rancour and brutality 
of old times without the humour that at least enlivened the grossness" .111 There were 
indeed serious riots in 1880 but not all the humour had been·stripped from the system. 
In Richmond during the polling for mid-Surrey a tradesman 'of liberal views' was 
captured by Conservatives and, "pasted over with Tory bills, put in a boat and sent 
down the river ... after having been covered in flour''. 112 The campaign proved an 
exceptionally bitter one and 26 elections witnessed violence of some kind. In all there 
were 9 riots, 10 disturbances and 7 incidents (See Map 6 below). Conservative 
candidates proved generally unpopular during the election. In South Shields the 
borough election drew an enormous crowd that barricaded the Conservative 
candidate, H.B.Hamilton, inside his hotel. During the melee that followed "six 
policemen were severely cut about the head and face" .113 Conservative candidates 
and voters were the focus of crowd violence in Warrington, Dorchester, Pontefract, 
Rotherham, Devonshire, Winchester and Northwick (Mid-Cheshire). 
However Liberals also suffered at the hands of riotous crowds. At Shanklin 
on the Isle of Wight a Liberal election meeting was disrupted by a body of 'navvies' 
who, "smashed the furniture and fittings, and a fight between them and the 
townspeople took place, in which several persons were seriously hurt".114 More 
serious violence occurred in Shaftesbury and Rotherham, at the former a large crowd 
prevented the Mayor and the successful Liberal candidate from leaving the Town 
Hall, while at the latter the Riot Act was read and the 21st Hussars paraded through 
the streets "with drawn sabres" .115 
111 Nonconformist, 1 April1880, p.339. 
112 Manchester Guardian, 7 April1880, p.6; note this incident is not included in the sample as it was a 
short-lived and largely non-violent event. 
113 Manchester Guardian, 5 April1880, p.7. 
114 Ibid. 
115 William Saunders, The New Parliament, 1880 (London, 1880), p.230. 
Chapter IV 164 
Map 6.General election disorder in England and Wales, 1880 
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At Chester the candidacy ofF .L.Malgarini led to a riot, owing to Liberal working men 
believing he was a 'tory decoy' sent to Chester to split the Liberal vote. He appeared 
at an election meeting wearing "evening dress, white kid gloves and [a] silk hat". 116 
However after being chased from the meeting he was attacked in the streets and 
viciously assaulted, his committee-room was trashed and he was forced to leave town 
before the polling. Chester was an extensively corrupt borough and a subsequent 
investigation revealed that £9,000 was spent in 1880 treating an estimated 2,000 venal 
voters.117 The election was ultimately declared void on the grounds of bribery and 
treating by Liberal agents.118 
Following the election 42 petitions were presented of which 28 came forward 
for trial. The election may have borne the imprint of modernism but it was still 
largely operating within an older model of politics. The removal of the prohibition on 
paid conveyances had seen a considerable increase in the practice. Combined with 
the lack of a legal limit to election expenses and little public condemnation of 
corruption there was little likelihood that fiscal restraint or electoral morality would 
be shown. Given the scale of violence in 1880 it is little wonder that Cornelius 
O'Leary described the campaign as "an unparalleled orgy ofextravagance".119 
IV 
The location of electoral violence across England and Wales is shown in maps 1 to 7 
(See Map 7 below). For the 1857 and 1859 elections the maps reflect a scarcity of 
disorder and the dominance ofborough violence. 
116 Ibid., p.232. 
117 O'Leary, The Elimination of Corrupt Practices, p.l36 -139. 
118 HLRO, Journals of the House of Commons, Vol.135, 1880, "Chester Election Petition", p.313. 
119 O'Leary, The Elimination of Corrupt Practices, p.157. 
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Map 3 (1865) reveals a notable increase in mid-century violence and establishes a 
pattern of concentration through the midlands and northern England. The widespread 
distribution of violence in 1868 is illustrated clearly in Map 4, particularly in 
Lancashire where there were numerous Anglo-Irish conflicts. Maps 5 (1874) and 6 
(1880) show the continued, and widely dispersed, nature of electoral violence in the 
later half of the period, while map 7 shows the distribution of all 166 separate cases of 
parliamentary disorder that occurred between 1857 and 1880.120 Map 7 reveals two 
important features of mid-Victorian election disorder: violence occurred at 
constituencies spread across England and Wales; and the area of greatest 
concentration was in the west midlands and in northern England. What if any 
explanations are there for the patterns of violence shown in the maps, and do they 
shed light on the incidence of electoral violence? 
The wide distribution of disorder shown in map 7 reinforces the importance of 
this study. Election violence was not an isolated or regional anomaly but a nation-
wide phenomenon. The sample therefore does not reflect a large amount of violence 
in a small number of constituencies. Table 13 below reveals the frequency with 
which individual boroughs and counties experienced violence. 
Table 13.The Frequency of Violence at Borough and County Elections, 1857 ·1880 
(Excludes duplicate entries of violence) 
Constituency Number of occasions each constituency type experienced violence Total Total Cases 
Type 1 case 2 cases 3 cases 4 cases 5 cases Constituency of violence 
Boroughs 57 20 3 2 1 83 119 
Counties 25 5 4 0 0 34 47 
Between 1857 and 1880 a total of 117 English and Welsh constituencies accounted 
for 166 separate cases of electoral violence. Table 13, which excludes duplicate 
120 Map 7 excludes all duplicate cases of violence. 
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entries, shows that disorder was more likely to occur in a new location than an old, 
with only 10 constituencies experiencing more than two disrupted elections. In 
England and Wales as few as six counties escaped any form of electoral disturbance: 
Surrey, Hertfordshire, Bedfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Rutland and Westmoreland all 
failed to produce a single episode of violence; and in Wales there were no reports of 
election disorder in Anglesey, Breconshire, Cardiganshire, Flintshire, Merionethshire, 
Montgomeryshire or Radnorshire. The lack of violence in these districts is largely 
due to the fact that they included few boroughs, and fewer still of any notable size. 
The 6 English counties included just 8 boroughs, of which 5 had fewer than 1,000 
voters before 1867. In the 7 Welsh counties there were 6 districts, none of which had 
more than 1,000 voters before 1867. In Wales the scarcity of large boroughs 
combined with the rarity of contested elections resulted in relatively few cases of 
disorder until 1868. 
Map 7 shows that electoral violence was largely concentrated in the west 
midlands and northern districts of England. These areas were classified by the 1871 
Census (England and Wales) as the West Midland, North Midland, North-Western 
and York divisions.121 These four districts accounted for 105 separate cases of 
violence during the period, compared to 61 cases in the remaining 7 divisions.122 The 
concentration of disorder in these areas can largely be explained by the distribution of 
large urban constituencies. The point has been made that electoral violence was 
121 The divisions as classed in the 1871 Census were as follows: London (London and metropolitan 
areas of Middlesex, Surrey and Kent); South Eastern (Surrey, Kent, Sussex, Hampshire, Berkshire); 
South Midland (Middlesex, Herts, Bucks, Oxford, Northamptonshire, Hunts, Bedfordshire, 
Cambridgeshire); Eastern (Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk); South Western (Wiltshire, Dorset, Devon, 
Cornwall, Somerset); West Midland (Gloucester, Hereford, Shropshire, Staffordshire, Worcestershire, 
Warwickshire); North Midland (Leicestershire, Rutlandshire, Lincolnshire, Notts, Derbyshire); North 
Western (Cheshire, Lancashire); York (Yorkshire); Northern (Durham, Cumberland, Northumberland, 
Westmoreland); Wales (Monmouthshire and all counties of Wales). British Parliamentary Papers, 
Session 1873 (18), LXXI, I, "1871 Census England and Wales, III", p.63. 
122 If duplicate episodes of violence are added: the first four divisions experienced 123 cases of 
violence, the remaining 7 divisions experienced 68. 
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predominantly a feature of large borough constituencies. The midlands and northern 
districts of England incorporated a considerable number of large boroughs compared 
to areas which recorded less disorder. Table 14 below outlines the number of small 
and large boroughs in each of the 11 divisions that constituted England and Wales. 
The figures for both 1857 and 1880 are included for comparative purposes. 
Table 14.Eiection Violence and the Distribution of Boroughs by Size and 
Division, 1857-1880 
(Excludes duplicates entries) 
Division Cases of Small Boroughs Large Boroughs 
Violence 1857 1880 1857 1880 
West Midland 26 16 10 11 18 
North Western 31 3 0 14 19 
York 26 10 6 8 13 
North Midland 22 4 1 6 9 
·sali.ifi··westam····················· ·····-······Ts············· ·············3·3···························24············ ···············6······························a· ............ . 
Welsh 10 11 3 4 12 
South Eastern 12 18 12 15 20 
Northern 9 6 3 6 12 
South Midland 8 9 7 4 6 
Eastern 5 5 3 5 5 
London 2 0 0 5 7 
The dotted line in Table 14123 divides the bulk of the divisions from the four that 
experienced the greatest frequency of disorder. The West Midland, North Western, 
York and North Midland divisions are characterised by fewer small boroughs and a 
greater number of large boroughs. By comparison the divisions with the least amount 
of disorder, South Midland, Eastern and London, had the lowest number of large 
boroughs. In 1857 the four most disorderly divisions included 33 small boroughs and 
39 large boroughs. By contrast the remaining 7 divisions incorporated 82 small and 
45 large boroughs. This table reinforces the point that it was in the larger urban 
123 In 1857 "small" refers to a borough with less than 1,000 voters and "large" to a borough with over 
1,000 voters. In 1880 "small" refers to a borough with less than 2,000 voters and "large" to a borough 
. with more than 2,000 voters. 
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boroughs that electoral disorder was more likely to occur, and not in the smaller 
country towns as suggested by Donald Richter. Violence was centred predominantly 
in the midlands and northern districts due to the concentration of larger boroughs in 
some of those areas. Thus the South Western division had the most number of 
boroughs during the period but experienced relatively little disorder because most of 
those were small in size. 
The maps show electoral violence to have been concentrated in the industrial districts 
of England where the employment of those engaged in, "Art and Mechanic 
Productions ... the textile fabrics and dress ... in food and drinks ... [and] Animal 
Substances"124 was high and employment in agriculture was generally low. Thus it 
was in the Black Country, the Potteries, and the cotton, woollen and metal production 
and manufacturing areas of Lancashire and Yorkshire that much of the disorder 
occurred. Table 15 below shows the division of labour across the 11 divisions of 
England and Wales. 
Table 15.Explaining the Pattern of Disorder: Labour, Ethnic and Police Statistics 
(Includes duplicates) 
Division Violence %Employed %Employed %General %Irish Police to 
Industry Agriculture Labourers Immigrants Population 
West Midland 40 24 7 2.5 1.4 1:1317 
North Western 33 31 3 2.1 6.6 1:1473 
York 27 29 6 1.4 2.4 1:1167 
North Midland 23 23 11 1.9 0.8 1:1200 
·sa.litti··wastern-· ···········1·6········· ·~~·~~·~ .................................................. ......................................... 0 ..................... .................................................... ············a·:y············ ········1·:·1'277"''''' 18 12 2.4 
Welsh 14 19 10 3.1 1.6 1:1658 
South Eastern 12 14 10 1.8 1.8 1:1043 
Northern 11 23 6 2.6 4.7 1:1176 
South Midland 8 19 13 1 2 1:1309 
Eastern 5 14 15 2 0.5 1:1217 
London 2 22 1 2 2.8 1:268 
124 British Parliamentary Papers, "1871 Census England and Wales", p.63. 
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Table 15125 includes duplicate entries of violence to provide a more accurate picture 
of the scale of Victorian disorder. The table shows the percentages of the population 
in each division that were employed in industry, agriculture or general labour. The 
figures are drawn from the 1871 Census. The West Midland, North Western, York 
and North Midland divisions all recorded high percentages of industrial employees 
and correspondingly low rates of agricultural employment. Those divisions with 
fewer industrial and more agricultural labourers generally experienced less disorder. 
Somewhat surprisingly the figures for "General Labourers" are not higher in the four 
most disturbed divisions. Given that navvies, lumpers, and colliers featured 
prominently in electoral riots it is surprising that there is not a greater correlation 
between this category and the more disorderly divisions. Table 15 shows no obvious 
link between violence and the presence of general or itinerant labourers. However it 
is important to remember that these demographic figures do not serve to discount the 
involvement of particular occupational groups in electoral violence. Rather they 
provide a means of understanding the general distribution of disorder. The lack of 
violence in a predominantly rural area does not rule out the participation of 
agricultural labourers. 
A case in point is the involvement of the Irish. Hoppen suggests that during 
the period "many of the more violent riots ... were, in some close or remote manner-
connected with the local presence of Irish immigrants" .126 Certainly contemporary 
opinion would have agreed with such a verdict and accounts of electoral disorder 
contain numerous references to Irish involvement. Yet Table 15 reveals that the 
125 Figures for Table 15 drawn from 1871 Census England and Wales. Those classed as employed in 
Agriculture included "Persons possessing or working the land, and engaged in growing Grain, Fruits, 
Grasses, Animals and other Products. Persons engaged about animals." (p.63). General Labourers 
constituted a sub-division of what was classed an Indefinite and Non-Productive Class and included, 
"labourers and others- branch labour undefmed" (p.63). 
126 Hoppen, "Grammars", p.605. 
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pattern of disorder was not necessarily concentrated in areas with large numbers of 
Irish immigrants. The West Midlands could claim just 1.4% of its population were 
Irish-born yet it experienced the most cases of disorder. The North Western district, 
with 6.6%, had the largest Irish population and a high frequency of violent 
electioneering, yet the same could not be said for the Northern division. Likewise the 
Irish population of the North Midlands reached only 0.8% yet it was the fourth most 
disorderly division during the period. Thus the pattern of disorder can not be 
quantitatively linked to the distribution of Irish immigrants, although in the North 
Western division it does perhaps account for the scale of violence in 1868, when the 
issue of Irish Church reform inflamed Anglo-Irish conflict. 
Donald Richter asserts that election violence was a feature of small rural 
towns because "it was there that the absence as yet of any effective policing was most 
conspicuous" .127 It has been noted already that violence was overwhelmingly 
concentrated in large urban constituencies. Yet to what extent did a police presence 
influence the outbreak of election violence? Throughout the period borough forces 
remained small and in many cases were bolstered by county reinforcements during 
elections. The policing of campaigns was a difficult business given the large numbers 
of people involved and the lack of sufficient trained constables. In 1876 the borough 
of Blackbum had 80 officers to police 76,339 people, Nottingham had 120 police to 
86,621 people and Wolverhampton had just 69 police to a population of 68,291.128 
Community policing was still in its infancy during the period and the quality 
of recruits was sometimes questionable. David Large writes that "In the eighteen-
fifties policemen were not infrequently found drunk on duty, failing to carry out all 
127 Richter, "The Role of Mob Riot", p.23. 
128 British Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons Sessional Papers, 1876, (17) LXI, "Return of 
Number of Separate Forces of Police in Metropolis, City of London, Counties and Boroughs of 
England and Wales", p.397. 
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their beat, taking naps while on duty [or] idling their time away chatting to ladies of 
dubious reputation".129 William Congreve, Chief Constable of the Staffordshire 
Police, in special orders to his force on the eve of the 1868 general election exhorted 
his men, "to observe the strictest sobriety, punctuality and attention to orders" .130 In 
Hampshire following the general election of 1880 Superintendent Littleton of the 
County Police was charged with misconduct after being found, "the worse for liquor 
and unfit for duty" .131 In many instances, however the police were merely 
outnumbered and unable to prevent crowd violence. At the Harwich borough election 
in 1857 a mob destroyed the hustings: "notwithstanding the protection of a large body 
of the county constabulary" .132 In such c~ses the local force was supplemented by a 
military presence. In Nottingham during the 1865 general election a body of special 
constables and regular police were "not deemed sufficient to keep the peace", and 
were replaced by a squadron of the 1oth Hussars. In 1868 the Manchester Guardian 
reported that during the Newport election in Monmouthshire, "rioters had beaten back 
the police before the military was called in".133 Nevertheless local forces were not 
completely ineffectual and where reinforced could prevent the escalation of violence. 
It should also be noted that the police were often targeted by election crowds. 
Police intervention could also lead to an increase in violence, particularly if rioters 
were arrested. In a study of popular disturbance in the Black Country between 1835 
and 1860, D.Philips writes that "The forces of authority, clumsily used, may provoke 
a crowd and offer it something to unite against, thus turning a disorganised protest 
129 David Large, "The Municipal Government of Bristol, 1857 - 1901" (Bristol, 1999), p. 76. 
130 Staffordshire Record Office, General Orders of County Police Force, 1865-1873, p.367. 
131 Hampshire Record Office, Hampshire County Constabulary Records, General Orders 1879- 1881, 
17th April 1880, pp.32 - 80. 
132 The Times, 30 March 1857, p.8. 
133 Manchester Guardian, 5 December 1868, p.S. 
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into a riot".134 In North Durham in 1874 a constable's use of his baton against a rioter 
precipitated a riot in which the prison was attacked and policemen pursued by an 
angry mob. Richter himself writes that "Where the police constituted a defensible 
force, they attempted to control the rioting as best they could, but in most instances 
the crowd attacked them with far greater fury and with more formidable weapons than 
they the people".135 Establishing the role of the police in the incidence of electoral 
violence is thus problematic. The figures in Table 14 do not reveal an obvious pattern 
between police numbers and electoral disorder. It is possible that an analysis of 
police numbers in each borough of each division would provide a different result. Yet 
such a task is beyond the scope of this study. Given that in some cases police action 
prevented disorder and in other cases inflamed public opinion, it appears likely that an 
explanation for election violence based on police presence, or lack of it, is not 
plausible. 
The distribution of disorder shown in Map 7 reveals that election violence was most 
likely to occur in areas where large, urban conurbations coincided with industrial 
districts. Large boroughs experienced a greater frequency of disorder because they 
occasioned more contests, a vital pre-requisite for election violence. The politics of 
small rural constituencies were often more tightly controlled by patron influence or 
corruption, thus limiting the opportunity for an open contest. Furthermore small 
boroughs were less likely to possess the highly organised party associations more 
common in larger constituencies. Such organizations could act as an engine for 
partisan enthusiasm and thus conflict. Areas with a high density of industrial 
employment recorded high levels of disorder possibly due to the concentration of 
134 Philips, "Riots and Public Order", p.l71. 
135 Richter, "The Role of Mob Riot", p.24. 
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labour in a single area. There are numerous examples of factories closing early on the 
polling day, disgorging into the street crowds of machine operatives keen to enjoy a 
half-day within the carnival atmosphere of a contested election. Norman Gash, in 
writing of election disorder argued that "In the big industrial towns the poorer class 
formed the raw material for mob riots". 136 However the identification of those who 
participated in electioneering violence, and their motives for doing so, is a less precise 
enterprise and one not revealed by the maps or through statistical analysis. 
V 
Sprinkled very thinly here and there, you might find a few fighting 
men, but the great majority are labourers bent on rough play, and with 
nothing else in view than 'a lark' and in far larger numbers you may 
count the disreputable idlers who frequent low public-houses and the 
corners of dirty streets. As regards this last class, their physical powers 
are in direct proportion to their intelligence and sobriety.137 
A survey of those involved in election disturbances is necessarily anecdotal. The 
sources available which might be used to compile a profile of participants in crowd 
violence do not often provide detailed lists of rioters' occupations, social status, ethnic 
or religious background. In many cases individual details were subsumed in favour of 
generalised labels such as 'mob', 'crowd' or 'roughs'. However it seems clear that 
the majority of election crowds were made up of non-voters; women, children and 
men unenfranchised by virtue of their socio-economic status. Participation in such 
events was not exclusive though, and there is evidence that voters could and did 
become involved in violence. Contemporary descriptions of rioters ranged from the 
common to the extraordinary. In Carmarthenshire a number of Conservative 'lambs' 
136 Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, p.143. 
137 Nonconformist, 19 July 1865, p.584. 
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were led by, "the leading professors of fistiana in the neighbourhood" .138 The Bristol 
Daily Post in 1868 commented that "at every Tory gathering which takes place 
organised gangs of the flat-nosed, close-cropped genus are found regularly 
marshalled, frowning defiance at all who hesitate to bow down before the Blue 
rag" .139 Newspaper articles usually provided descriptions of rioters only when 
criminal charges had been laid, or when participants were regarded as unusual either 
because of their sex or social position. Election petitions, police reports and Home 
Office correspondence also provide limited details of the identity of rioters. However 
a survey of these sources can provide some insights into the composition of violent 
election crowds. 
To contemporary observers at least there was no doubting the social make-up of 
election 'mobs'. When in 1867 the Bradford Observer wrote, "to whom [do] we owe 
it that the fountains of the great deep of ruffianism were, as it seemed, broken up," 
they did not question who had been involved. It was, in their words, "these sons of 
Belial, flushed with insolence and beer," or more specifically, "the spume of the inns 
and pothouses for miles all round". 14° Frequently blame fell on the ubiquitous 
'rough', although fistmen, bludgeon-men, lambs and ruffians were all drawn from the 
'lower orders' or the 'poorer classes'. Indeed Victorians identified a 'dangerous 
class' to whom they attributed much of the violence of the period. This class was 
commonly seen as a product of the large, industrial cities which were viewed as 
"breeding grounds of both physical and social disorders" .141 John Stevenson writes 
that "Violence was the product of a residuum which remained to be brought under the 
138 Carmarthen Weekly Reporter, 28 November 1868, [page unknown]. 
139 Bristol Daily Post, 13 November 1868, p.2. 
140 Bradford Observer quoted in Nonconformist, 19 July 1865, p.584. 
141 Stevenson, Popular Disturbances, p.299. 
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ameliorative influences of Victorian philanthropy".142 Thus disorder was popularly 
viewed as the preserve of particular groups such as the Irish or itinerant labourers. In 
1868 the Boston Gazette blamed members of "the lower -class" for an attack which 
destroyed the hustings, 143 and violence in Staffordshire in 1868 was credited to, "the 
lower class of voters, who had been drinking too freely". 144 
Historians of English crowd violence have likewise attributed disorder to 
specific ethnic or occupational groups. Richter focused on the 'labouring classes' for 
whom, "the prospect of happy relief from the dreary responsibility of their pedestrian 
lives in a boisterous outburst ... was too appealing to resist". 145 Gash looked to the 
'poorer classes' in the industrial cities and in the smaller boroughs, "the England of 
the luddites and chartists ... could usually provide the dissolute, the lawless, the 
unemployed, the professional bully, to carry out the will of any one with money and 
influence".146 Hanham writes that corruption too was blamed on the residuum in the 
big towns, ''where the dregs ofthe population tended to accumulate".147 Certainly all 
such groups were included in reports of election violence. Yet our impression of 
Victorian rioters should not be restricted to a 'rabble' of idle and lawless labourers or 
malcontent Irish imports. Indeed a surprising cross section of society appeared within 
contemporary accounts of disorder. 
The involvement of general labourers in election violence was frequently 
recorded. Numerous reports of riots included descriptions of navigators or 'navvies'. 
These were Irish or Scottish labourers employed to work on the canals and waterways 
of England. Their participation in violence seems often to have been organised and 
142 Ibid., p.300. 
143 Boston Gazette, 21 November 1868, [page unknown] 
144 Staffordshire Advertiser, 21 November 1868, p.6. 
145 Richter, "The Role of Mob Riot", p.25- 26. 
146 Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, p.142. 
147 Hanham, Elections and Party Management, p.264. 
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even bought. In Bristol in 1868 the Tories were accused of hiring "a regular army 
of ... 'navvies' drawn from the dock works, to spread terror amongst the peaceably 
disposed citizens".148 In Lyme Regis a large number of navvies were brought in from 
Axminster during the 1859 borough election to hold up their hands for the 
Conservative candidate on the nomination day.149 And at Shanklin on the Isle of 
Wight in 1880 a body of navigators employed at the harbour invaded a Liberal 
meeting and fought with those present.15° Colliers, miners. and factory workers were 
also notable· participants; in Blackburn it was "the great ruffians of the mills" who 
initiated violence. The riotous contribution of factory operatives was recognised by 
William Congreve, Chief Constable of Staffordshire, in a letter to the Home Office in 
1874. 
I might also point out the inexpediency of closing works employing a 
large number of hands for the whole or part of the day at such times of 
excitement. This was done by several finns on the present occasion, 
and was the means of adding largely to the crowds of idle and 
disorderly persons.151 
However mob violence was not restricted to unskilled or semi-skilled labourers. 
Artisans and tradesmen were included in transcripts of election trials and 
investigations. In Ripley in 1868 a moulder and a butcher gave evidence of their 
involvement in an electoral riot. A shoemaker from Cambridge was charged with the 
manslaughter of a porter from Christ's College after a fatal election disturbance in 
1868. Those charged following the vicious riot at Kidderminster in 1857 included, "a 
forge man, a mason, a pump-maker, a weaver, a boatman, an umbrella maker, a 
148 Bristol Daily Post, 24 November 1868, p.2. 
149 The Times, 3 May 1859, p.8. 
150 Manchester Guardian, 5 April1880, p.7. 
151 Staffordshire Record Office, Reports of Staffordshire Chief Constable, 1859 - 1887, Letter to Home 
Office, 2 April1874. 
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butcher, an innkeeper, several publicans, a railway contractor, a beer-house keeper, a 
corn-dealer and a town councillor".152 The Coventry Weekly Times also described the 
crowd that attacked Robert Lowe as consisting of, "numerous tradesmen ... the most 
violent appearing to be bricklayers, masons and stonecutters".153 During the Bristol 
riots in 1868 a druggist was charged with inciting a Conservative crowd to violence, 
and a large body of working men organised to protect Liberal voters was comprised, 
"for the most part of stalwart artisans" .154 In some notable cases members of the 
commercial or business class were reported as being prominent in disorder. A young 
man charged with breaking windows during the riot in Kidderminster in 1857 was 
described as, "apparently in the situation of a clerk, and decently attired", 155 while at 
Haverfordwest in 1868 a number of 'roughs' were allegedly, ''urged on by a few 
respectably dressed 'men of business"' .156 However the participation of urban 
professionals was most likely exceptional. 
Though Table 15 failed to show a clear correlation between the distribution of 
Irish immigrants and the outbreak of disorder, the Irish were often reported as being 
prominent during moments of election violence. During the period they were 
specifically identified as being involved in riots or disturbances in Ashton-under-
Lyne, Blackbum, Bolton, Bradford, Bury, Famworth (S.E.Lancashire), Newport 
(loW), Preston, Warrington, Wednesbury, Wigan and York. This should not be 
considered an exhaustive list of Irish involvement in rioting. To this list should be 
added any case in which navvies or dock workers were recorded as both groups 
included Irish immigrants. The Irish were not always reported as having initiated 
152 Berrows and Worcester Journal, 18 April1857, p.8. 
153 Coventry Weekly Times, 15 Apri11857, p.2. 
154 Gloucester Journal, 21 November 1868, p.7. 
155 The Times, 4 April1857, p.lO. 
156 CarmarthenJournal, 13 November 1868, p.S. 
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outbursts of violence, and in many cases they found themselves the targets of violent 
crowds. Following the close of the poll in Wigan in 1868 a body of Tory colliers 
attacked Irish homes and commenced a riot. 157 The defeat of two Conservative 
candidates in South East Lancashire in 1880 precipitated similar scenes in which, "the 
wearers of the blue ... invaded the Irish district", smashed windows and fought with 
the police.158 Contemporary accounts of crowd violence also recorded the presence of 
professional fighters or pugilists. In a number of cases these men headed election 
crowds. In July 1865 the Cheltenham Examiner reported the actions of a 
Conservative crowd led by "James Paul, a pugilist, and James Burge, a member of the 
same 'honourable fraternity"'. 159 And d~g the Wednesbury borough election in 
1868 a "party of prize-fighters" in the Conservative interest fought with the Irish. 
Women appear to have been willing and enthusiastic participants in election 
violence. Throughout the period both women and children feature consistently in the 
records of electoral disorder. Bohstedt writes of female involvement in English riots 
between 1790 and 1810, arguing that women were most prominent in food riots yet 
were virtually absent from political riots.160 However by the middle of the century 
women were recorded as participating in a number of electoral disturbances. In 
Warrington in 1880 a violent election crowd included "a great many Irishwomen and 
female factory operatives", while a fisherman who voted for the Tories at Carmarthen 
in 1868 was "assaulted by a band of female viragos" .161 In Boston the nomination in 
1868 was disrupted by a body of ''women, girls and boys", all of them apparently 
from a local factory. 162 
157 Manchester Guardian, 19 November 1868, p.6. 
158 !bid, 7 April1880, p.6. 
159 Cheltenham Examiner, 12 July 1865, p.2. 
160 Bohstedt, "Gender, Household", pp.88 -122. 
161 Manchester Guardian, 3 April1880, p.S; and Carmarthen Journal, 20 November 1868, p.6. 
162 Boston Gazette, 21 November 1868, page unknown. 
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VI 
The origins of electoral disturbance were rarely straightforward or obvious. Violence 
could be the direct outcome of corruption either as organised intimidation or as the 
end product of excessive treating, or it could be the result of popular opposition to a 
candidate or his supporters. Isolating the motives of riotous crowds is a largely 
speculative process. An election riot could be caused by a number of factors that 
might only come to light under sustained local analysis. A comprehensive survey of 
all cases of disorder in the sample is obviously beyond the scope of this study. 
However Chapter IV includes four case studies which highlight the sometimes 
complicated, often parochial nature of electoral disturbance. For the bulk of the 
sample there are usually only brief media accounts to rely on or the fmdings of 
election petitions. In some cases a motive for violence is suggested while in others no 
explanation is given. Thus in Nottingham in 1857 a disturbance was blamed on 
Chartists who were "disappointed that their nominee had not been elected"/63 
whereas in 1865 the only explanation offered by the Times for violence in 
Kidderminster was: "Here as usual great excitement prevailed ... this was all that could 
be ascertained out of the borough for the mob became riotous (as usual) and smashed 
the telegraph wires."164 
Hoppen suggests that "much (my emphasis) of the English election violence of 
the period" was related to bribery and corruption. Yet he goes on to suggest that 
'letting off steam', "might well be the most accurate description of what went on at 
the majority of English elections".165 Hoppen's comments echo those of Richter who 
163 The Times, 28 March 1857, p.7. 
164 Ibid., 9 July 1865, p.9. 
165 Happen, "Grammars ", p.607. 
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suggests that not all cases of election violence were attempts to influence the outcome 
of the polling. Rather he suggests that "many of the most serious disorders ... were 
spontaneous outbursts of sheer ebullience" .166 Both studies subscribe to the idea that 
participation in riots was often pursued merely as a form of working-class 
entertainment. Richter writes that "the magnetic attraction of excitement for its own 
sake cannot be minimized, especially in an era notoriously deficient in public 
amusements".167 It is certainly true that Victorian elections were popular events and 
occupied a position roughly analogous to that of modem sporting events. However 
this interpretation of violence strips the phenomenon of any meaning within the 
context of electoral politics. What is left is the motiveless, boredom-driven outburst 
of an overworked industrial populace. Such a reading renders irrelevant any 
examination of the process of political modernisation in the light of continued election 
violence. 
Yet the premeditation and organization of many riots in targeting specific 
people, places and events suggests that discounting election violence as purely 
"enjoyable circuses" is premature. Richter asserts that "For the labouring classes the 
prospect of happy relief from the dreary responsibility of their pedestrian lives in a 
boisterous outburst for which they would, in all probability, incur no personal 
responsibility, was too appealing to resist".168 Yet the deficiency of public 
amusements in the Victorian era is debatable. Various studies of popular recreation 
during this period have suggested a gradual improvement in leisure opportunities and 
facilities. Peter Bailey writes that growing concern for social order and public health 
in the 1830s and 1840s led to the promotion of 'rational recreation' for an 
166 Richter, "The Role of Mob Riot", p.25. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Richter, "The Role of Mob Riof', p.26. 
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increasingly industrial and urban population. This movement represented attempts by 
the middle class to reform and 'improve' popular modes of recreation for the 
'labouring classes'. He writes that "popular recreations were to be improved, not 
through repression, but through the operation of superior counter-attractions".169 
Robert Malcolmson may have concluded that the public house was the most important 
"recreational centre for the common people,"170 but other alternatives were gradually 
becoming available. H.E.Meller writes that in Bristol the provision of public baths, 
botanical gardens, tennis courts and football pitches dated from the 1860s, 171 and in 
Bradford David Russell found that by 1830, "popular recreation ... was taking on a 
more 'modem' aspect". 172 
During the early Victorian period the working population of Bradford could 
choose from a variety of entertainment options including musical performances, 
regular travelling theatres and circuses and various village fairs and feasts. In 
addition he argues that "it must be remembered that the public house itself was not 
merely a source of drink and company, but acted as a focus for such diverse activities 
as music, botany, geology, cricket and bowls".173 In Blackbum in 1841 the mill 
owners Homby and Kensworthy opened a gymnasium for their employees which 
"provided for football, tennis, skittles and quoits among other pastimes".174 The 
factory picnic or trip also became increasingly common during the second half of the 
century. There is no suggestion that the Victorian working class were spoiled for 
choice in terms of leisure time or amusements. And certainly many popular forms of 
169 Peter Bailey, Leisure and Class in Victorian England: Rational Recreation and the contest for 
control, 1830-1885 (London, 1978), p.170. 
170 Robert Malcolmson, Popular Recreations in English Society, 1700-1850 (Cambridge, 1973), 
f·171. 
71 H.E.Meller, Leisure and the Changing City, 1870-1914 (Cambridge, 1976), p.ll2. 
172 David Russell, "The Pursuit of Leisure" in D.G.Wright and J.A.Jowitt, Victorians Bradford: Essays 
in Honour of Jack Reynolds (Bradford, 1982), p.200. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Derek Beattie, Blackburn: The Development of a Lancashire Cotton Town (Ryburn, 1992), p.118. 
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recreation such as cockfighting, dog fighting, bear baiting and coursing were violent 
in nature. In the field of mass entertainment too there was little development until the 
advent of organised sport later in the century. Yet as David Russell writes, "there can 
be no doubt that the Victorian age saw a massive expansion of recreational 
opportunity for a community better endowed in terms of money and free time than 
their immediate ancestors". 175 
The improvement of recreational choice during the period brings into question 
the idea that much of the electoral violence of the period was the product ofboredom. 
Indeed the scale of violence at each general election was the product of various 
converging influences: great political issues divided communities along lines of race 
and religion; contested elections galvanized highly politicised electorates and raised 
the temperature of partisan enthusiasm. In addition the inadequacies of both electoral 
scrutiny and community policing allowed wealthy candidates and unscrupulous 
agents free reign over the stage of electoral politics. Thus ambition and opportunity 
increased the likelihood of corruption and with it the spectre of organised intimidation 
and violence. Mid-century elections were public spectacles and popular 
entertainment as well as a mechanism for electing parliamentary representatives. The 
public casting of votes until 1872, lengthy campaigns, centralised polling and long-
established traditions of bribery and treating further undoubtedly exacerbated the 
excitement and ritual of contested elections, and in some places this led to the 
outbreak of physical violence. 
175 Russell, The Pursuit of Leisure., p.217. 
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Constituency Case Studies 
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I 
The evidence presented in Chapter IV demonstrates the often serious and widespread 
nature of mid-Victorian electoral violence. Yet how far are the general trends shown 
in the tables, statistics and maps representative of what was occurring within 
individual constituencies? A closer examination of the causes of election disorder 
provides a means of testing conclusions drawn from quantitative evidence. So the 
following case studies allow a close insight into the character of English electoral 
culture, and a grass-roots perspective of the complexities that lay behind episodes of 
election violence. 
The chosen constituencies represent, as far as is possible for such a small 
number, the range and diversity that existed within the English and Welsh electoral 
systems. Four constituency-types are included in the case studies including: one 
small borough, two large boroughs and one county .1 The boroughs are drawn from 
mid-western, north-eastern and northern districts of England, while the county is 
drawn from the south of Wales. The comparative lack of county violence during the 
period accounts for the single county case study, whereas the three English boroughs 
represent the most common type of constituency during the period. The four 
constituencies include: the small mid-western borough of Kidderminster; the large 
north-eastern borough of Lincoln; the large northern borough of Bradford; and the 
sprawling south-coast county of Carmarthenshire. 
Kidderminster in Worcestershire was a small proprietary borough with a 
population of 15,399 in 1861 and an electorate that numbered just 612 prior to the 
Second Reform Act of 1867. In the 1850s Kidderminster was largely reliant on a 
1 The boroughs are described as 'small' or 'large' according to the size of their electorates. "Small" 
includes boroughs with less than 1,000 voters before 1867 and less than 2,000 after; "Large" refers to 
boroughs with more than 1,000 voters before 1867 and over 2,000 after 1867. 
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single, struggling industry: carpet manufacture. The large borough of Lincoln was the 
county town of Lincolnshire, with a population of 20,999 (1861) and a pre-1867 
electorate of 1,713. During the 1850s and 1860s Lincoln was emerging as a semi-
manufacturing town in the centre of an agricultural district. The much larger urban 
borough of Bradford in Yorkshire was the centre of the English worsted industry and 
the global textile trade. In the 1860s the town had a population in excess of 100,000, 
and an electorate that leapt from 5,189 to 21,518 as a result of the Second Reform Act 
of 1867. Carmarthenshire was the third most populous county in Wales with an 1871 
population of 115,710 and an electorate of more than 8,000. Although the county 
remained predominantly agricultural during the period, some mineral exploitation 
near Llanelly saw the development of a fledgling mining industry. 
Chapter V 
IT 
Kidderminster 
The mob came up, and though Mr.Lowe was bleeding, his white hair 
dabbled in blood had no effect on them - they kept pelting him with 
cowardly ferocity and the most horrid imprecations. 
Worcester Herald, 4 Apri11857.2 
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The violent scenes that engulfed the Kidderminster election of 1857 would have 
surprised few contemporary Englishmen. This small proprietary borough in the west 
of Worcestershire was no stranger to corruption and disorder, and as the election 
campaign unfolded the likelihood of violence became a certainty. The contest was 
fought between Robert Lowe, the unpopular and aloof Liberal member and Vice 
President of the Board of Trade, and William Boycott, a popular local solicitor and 
Conservative manufacturer. Arrayed against Lowe were many of the town's non-
voters, disgruntled unemployed and part-time weavers who were victims of the 
town's economic depression. They were as bitter at Lowe's ignorance of their 
condition as they were angry at his refusal to treat and bribe them. In the five years 
since his election to the borough Lowe had alienated himself from the constituency. 
An almost blind albino he had compounded his natural ability for upsetting people 
with a complete disregard for the borough he represented, thus when the polling day 
dawned on 28 March 1857 all the ingredients were present for the outbreak of serious 
violence. 
2 Worcester Herald, 4 Apri11857, p.6. 
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Robert Lowe was not long returned from Australia when in 1852 he was offered the 
chance to contest the borough of Kidderminster. During his eight years in Sydney 
Lowe had earned a reputation as an eminent lawyer, politician and scholar. He was 
prominent in local politics and while a member of the New South Wales Legislative 
Council had campaigned successfully for the abolition of imprisonment for debt 
(1843) and the establishment of a national school system (1847). He also opposed the 
squatters' claims for "land aggrandizement", and through his journal the Atlas lobbied 
for responsible government and local control of colonial land. In 1848 he was elected 
as a popular candidate for one of Sydney's two seats in the legislative council. 
Despite his nomination by the city's tradesmen Lowe was not a champion of working 
class political aims. He was opposed to class legislation and manhood suffrage, and 
his refusal to support either would win him no friends among his constituents. When 
in 1849 he announced his decision to return to England there were few in Sydney who 
mourned his departure. 3 
Upon his arrival in England Lowe began work as a barrister on the Northern 
Circuit and contributed articles to The Times. His eloquence as a critic of Russell's 
colonial reforms brought him to the attention of a faction of Whigs opposed to the 
government. Through Joseph Parkes, the Whig election agent, they endeavoured to 
fmd him a seat in the Commons. In 1852 Lowe was introduced to Lord Ward who, 
Parkes knew, "could deliver the liberal vote in the Worcestershire town of 
Kidderminster".4 Ward was a Whig and a large investor in that town's struggling 
carpet industry. He was the architect of a recent coalition of Whigs, Radicals and 
Tories concerned about corruption and working-class militancy in the borough, and 
was searching for a liberal candidate who supported free trade and parliamentary 
3 Michael Stenton (Ed), Who's Who of British Members of Parliament (Hassocks, 1981), pp.135-136. 
4 James Winter, Robert Lowe (University of Toronto Press, 1976), p.67. 
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reform, and who was "not closely associated with either the Palmerston or Russell 
factions". 5 Lowe was certainly a free-trade Liberal but he was opposed to 
parliamentary reform and the extension of the franchise. On these points of principle 
Parkes convinced him to remain silent, at least for the moment, and Ward gave him 
his support. On 7 July 1852, despite being a complete stranger to the borough and 
pitted against a popular local candidate, Lowe was elected by a majority of 94 votes. 
Unfortunately for Lowe his inability to compromise on political principles 
would bring him into conflict with his new constituency almost immediately. He was, 
as his biographer states, an intelligent man and an eloquent and forceful speaker; he 
was also "arrogant and inflexible, he did not bend to meet changing circumstances nor 
would he compromise with principle; conciliation was a word unknown to him". 6 It 
was only a matter of time before his true political colours were shown. His election 
as a popular candidate in Australia was well received by Kidderminster' s Radicals, 
yet unknown to them Lowe had refused to assist Sydney's unemployed in their efforts 
to obtain welfare from the government. His opinion on the evils of charity would gain 
immediate relevance as Kidderminster slid into economic depression. Furthermore 
the influence of his patron was far from assured. Ward's interest in borough politics 
was not due to his pre-eminence as a territorial magnate, or even his contributions to 
the town's carpet mills. His influence rested on a compromise that depended on 
Lowe 's ability to please the various elements of the coalition. As such his silence 
during the debates on Lord Russell's Reform Bill in 1852 did not go unnoticed by the 
Radicals. 
In the 1850s Kidderminster was a volatile town with a recent history of class 
conflict, corruption and strike-related violence. Indeed at the election of 1841 the 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., p.137. 
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Liberal candidate Ricardo Samson reportedly spent £4,000 in one week, an exorbitant 
sum, and still lost to Richard Godson (Peelite) - albeit by a paltry twelve votes. 7 In 
the 1850s Kidderminster was a small constituency with an electorate that numbered 
just over 500 voters in 1857. Carpet weaving, the dominant industry in the borough 
since the eighteenth century, was hard hit by an economic downturn during the 
Crimean War. The old carpet mills were also facing increasing competition from 
mechanised factories in the north. Wages were down and the number of unemployed 
weavers was growing. James Winter writes that "the people of Kidderminster were 
easily provoked to riot because their livelihoods were dependent on an industry which 
was particularly sensitive to any fluctuati~ns in the economy".8 Violent disturbances 
during strike action in 1853 and 1854 underlined the seriousness of the situation.9 
The borough's reputation for corruption was the result of a political struggle between 
Kidderminster's traditional oligarchy (Conservative) and the emerging elites of the 
carpet industry (Liberal). 
The compromise engineered by Lord Ward in the 1850s ensured that all but 
160 of the borough's 502 voters would support the coalition's candidate. Robert 
Lowe's election in 1852 without recourse to corruption undoubtedly put him on a 
collision course with those in the borough who were accustomed to receiving electoral 
'compensation.' The town's parlous economic condition, and Lowe's seeming 
ignorance of his constituency's plight, only added to an atmosphere of hostility 
towards the sitting member. His opposition to the extension of the Factory Act in 
1853, which would have reduced the hours of carpet weavers, added to his 
unpopularity amongst the town's unenfranchised. Furthermore his failure to give 
7 Winter, Robert Lowe, p.157. 
8 Ibid., p.138. 
9 Home Office Disturbance Papers, PRO Class H.0.45/5244 [A]. September 1854- Strikes and 
disturbances provoked by importation ofblackleg labour. H.0.45/5128 [B] (f.59-81). July 1853-
Request for military assistance due to strikes and unemployment situation. 
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willingly to local charities also told against him. In 1855 the Mayor's relief fund was 
keeping more than 200 families from starvation, yet applications to Lowe for 
assistance were met with miserly donations and lectures on the futility of charity and 
welfare. 10 In 1855 Lowe's appointment as Vice President of the Board of Trade 
created a by-election in K.idderminster, and he was opposed by William Boycott, a 
local Conservative solicitor. Boycott's candidacy revealed frrst hand Lowe's 
unpopularity with the unemployed weavers. Violence was avoided only after Boycott 
withdrew from the contest, presumably due to the strength of Lord Ward's coalition. 
Lowe was elected unopposed but the signs were ominous for the peace of future 
elections. 
William Boycott opposed Lowe again in 1857 and his election campaign skilfully 
exploited the sitting member's weaknesses. He gave generously to charities, 
addressed issues of local importance such as the price of bread and unemployment, 
and used his position as Alderman on the town council to criticise the Whig-Tory 
compromise that kept Lowe in power. Throughout the campaign he played on 
Lowe's unpopularity and contributed to a considerable amount of popular antipathy 
towards him. Lowe's local standing was further handicapped by his association with 
his patron and James Pardoe, the local Liberal leader. Lord Ward was a large investor 
in the town's newest carpet mills, and the power looms of his factories required fewer 
employees, while Pardoe was the manager of the town's largest carpet factory and 
head of the Liberal association in K.idderminster. He was also the chairman of 
Lowe' s election campaign and the man who nominated him. His factory survived the 
depression and competition from mechanised mills by reducing wages. Consequently 
10 Winter, Robert Lowe, p.141. 
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Lowe's principal supporters included two men who had contributed to both 
Kidderminster's unemployment level and the reduction of wages. It would not be 
exaggerating to say that on the eve of the election the Liberal camp included some of 
the town's most unpopular personalities. 
For his part Lowe continued to blunder through the campaign. His election 
addresses ignored local issues and concentrated on Palmerston's foreign policy 
towards China. Indeed his only concession to the issue of unemployment was to 
recommend an increase in the flow of emigrants to Australia, hardly a suggestion 
calculated to improve his popularity! He was opposed by the town's publicans 
because he had refused to support their petition in 1855 for an extension to the 
Sunday trading hours. As a result, during the campaign the majority of 
Kidderminster's 150 public houses became focal centres for Boycott supporters. 
Furthermore his cross-party support had effectively ended the lucrative practice of 
treating in the borough. His unwillingness to play the part of 'beer lobbyist' earned 
him a dangerous enemy in the publicans. His biographer A.P .Martin 
characteristically blamed the beer interest for much ofLowe's unpopularity. 
Further it may be remembered Lowe had opposed some Beer Bill in 
the House, while his pointed remarks on the malt tax and the brewing 
interest were not likely to be forgotten at election time in a borough 
blessed with such a superfluity of pothouses. 11 
Lowe's public addresses failed to improve his position. At one noisy election meeting 
he lost his temper and called the crowd 'children' for not allowing him to speak. A 
local lawyer later commented that "the employment of the term 'children' towards the 
electors was calculated to irritate and annoy them and to excite the feelings of the 
11 Martin, The Life and Letters, p.l57. 
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populace against that gentleman".12 At the nomination an estimated crowd of 5,000 
people chanted cries of 'children, children' at the sitting member and nothing could be 
heard beyond the hustings. This was probably just as well for Lowe chose this 
opportunity to reveal that he had been offered £16,000 in expenses to contest the 
borough of Manchester. His motives in explaining this offer, and his refusal to accept 
it, may have been calculated to demonstrate his loyalty to K.idderminster. Yet the 
arrogance with which he addressed the issue, as reported by the press, seemed rather 
to suggest that he could do without the borough if he so chose. At any rate the crowd 
were spared the details as "the uproar continued so great that the right honourable 
gentleman was compelled to desist" .13 The show of hands was overwhelmingly in 
favour of Boycott, and a poll was demanded on behalf of Lowe for the following day. 
In anticipation of disorder the Mayor had earlier added seventy 'special constables' to 
the regular borough force of twenty, and their presence was almost immediately 
required, for several fights broke out as the nomination ended and more occurred as 
the evening progressed. That night there was an attack on the Swan Inn after it was 
rumoured that Lowe's supporters were holding several voters there against their 
wi11. 14 As the election day dawned there must have been few in the town who 
believed that the polling would pass off quietly. 
The polling day was fixed for a Saturday and the polling was relatively peaceful until 
the mills closed at two o'clock. Up to that time there had been little confrontation 
between voters and the unenfranchised, and only a small crowd was gathered around 
the principal polling booth on Blake-way Green. Once the factories shut, however, 
the crowd began to swell until an estimated 6,000 people surrounded the hustings. 
12 Berrows and Worcester Journal, 18 Apri11857, p.8. 
13 Manchester Guardian, 28 March 1857, p.5. 
14 Winter, Robert Lowe, p.143. 
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The Manchester Guardian reported that if a voter was known to be a Liberal, "the 
mob assailed him with groans and execrations, spat upon him, kicked and cuffed him, 
and subjected him to the most dastardly ill-usage."15 Robert Lowe remained inside 
the polling booth for the entire day, whereas William Boycott visited periodically to 
loud cheers of support. The Whig-Tory-Radical compromise held firm, though, and-
when the result was made known at four o'clock Lowe was declared victorious by 88 
votes. 
The already volatile situation rapidly deteriorated and soon the mob began to 
pelt the polling booth with stones and pieces of brick. Boycott and his supporters 
allegedly offered Lowe and his committee safe passage through the crowd but they 
refused, ostensibly because they believed the disturbance was organised.16 Amid 
cries of "throw them out", "kill the pink-eye" and "pitch the ------- out",17 Boycott 
stood on the hustings and urged the crowd to disperse. He was ignored and soon after 
left the hustings and walked through the mob unharmed. The Manchester Guardian 
reported that the departure of Boycott and his supporters ''was a signal to the cowards 
surrounding the booth, and instantly missiles of every description, stones, brickbats, 
pailings and even penny pieces, were thrown at Mr .Lowe and his friends" .18 
It soon became apparent that the polling booth was too dangerous a refuge. 
Those police constables and 'specials' still inside formed a ring around Lowe and his 
friends and they attempted to escort him through the mob. Their progress was 
followed by a shower of stones, so that after just one hundred metres all were injured 
in some way. Their passage forward was blocked and they were forced to take shelter 
15 Manchester Guardian, 31 March 1857, p.4. 
16 Winter, Robert Lowe, p.143. 
17 Coventry Weekly Times, 15 April1857, p.2. (word omitted in original source) 
18 Manchester Guardian, 31 March 1857, p.4. 
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in the home of Reverend Sheppard, principal ofthe town's Grammar School. A local 
newspaper commented on what had awaited the group further down the road. 
In the street called the Battery, a deep hollow way through which 
Mr.Lowe and his friends were to pass, heaps of stones were piled on 
the terrace, which would have done fearful execution. Water was kept 
boiling, and sinister expressions left but little doubt of the horrible use 
to which it was to be put; and buckets of filthy liquid had been 
accumulated to be discharged on the passengers below.19 
Once inside the house Lowe was found to have sustained a fractured skull and serious 
bruising. Few of his supporters had escaped unhurt. Outside, the mob turned on the 
policemen and those 'specials' who had not already fled. A constable named Jewkes 
was dragged into the house "in a state of insensibility" / 0 and he later died in hospital 
of his injuries. Shortly afterwards the mob decided that their prey had escaped to the 
Albert Inn and they "defiled into the town, amusing themselves by the way with 
occasionally smashing windows, insulting every well-dressed person they met, and 
lustily yelling 'Boycott for ever! "'21 Robert Lowe was smuggled out of town at 
eleven o'clock just as another disturbance threatened in front of the Lion Hotel. A 
body of fifty hussars from Birmingham arrived, however, and after the Mayor read 
the Riot Act the crowd were eventually dispersed, but not before smashing more 
windows and attacking any Liberals brave enough to show their faces. 
The local newspapers provided full, and often conflicting, accounts of the rioting and 
of the trial that followed. The Coventry Weekly Times reported that Boycott's 
supporters had offered Lowe their assistance in leaving the polling booth, whereas the 
Worcester Herald wrote that Boycott had left the area despite being requested to stay 
19 Berrows and Worcester Journal, 11 Apri11857, page unknown. 
20 Manchester Guardian, 31 March 1857, p.4. 
21 Ibid. 
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and calm the mob. The Herald quoted the Conservative candidate as saying, 
"Mr.Lowe and his friends might take care ofthemselves".22 There was also confusion 
over the involvement of certain prominent townspeople. Two of William Boycott's 
principal supporters, Alfred Talbot and Henry Chellingworth, were prosecuted for 
their role in the violence. Talbot was charged with leading a mob to the hustings and 
urging them to riot. The prosecution accused him of bringing to the hustings a crowd 
of people, "of different appearance to the carpet weavers".23 Several witnesses also 
testified that· they had heard Talbot say "go it lads" prior to the mob stoning the 
polling booth. Paradoxically, he was also later reported as being present with Lowe 
when he was stoned by the very crowd he was supposed to have incited. He also 
contributed £50 to a fund that was established to prosecute those arrested for attacking 
Lowe. 
Chellingworth was similarly charged with inciting the crowd. During the trial 
a witness testified that he had laughed at the violence and had commented, "let 
everyone have a taste".24 His sympathy with the rioters may have been due to his 
involvement in corrupt practices, as he was a local contact for the Conservative chief 
whip and had been involved in organising votes. In 1859 William Jolliffe wrote of 
Conservative chances in Kidderminster that "Mr.Chellingworth says Mr.Huddleston 
can get in for £500".25 However the evidence against both men was circumstantial 
and based on conflicting testimony. The charges were eventually dismissed for lack 
of evidence. Indeed most of those charged with riotous offences escaped with 
suspended sentences after witnesses refused to come forward. James Winter writes 
that "Witnesses against Boycott's associates were, in some cases, jeered at in the 
22 Worcester Herald, 4 April 1857, page unknown. 
23 Berrows and Worcester Journal, 18 April1857, p.6. 
24 Worcester Herald, 18 April1857, page unkown. 
25 [S]omerset [R]ecord [O]ffice, DD/HY/24 Unbundled Items, The political papers of Sir William 
Jolliffe, A List of English Boroughs with names of Parliamentary Candidates and Notes, 1859 ', p.202. 
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streets, threatened and beaten up, and when the case came to trial, the prosecutors 
discovered that they had insufficient evidence to make a case" ?6 The list of warrants 
issued for participation in the riot included a wide cross-section of the town's 
population, including some who were presumably voters. Those prosecuted included 
2 forge-men, 2 masons, 2 weavers, 2 innkeepers, a pump-maker, a boatman, an 
umbrella maker, a butcher, a railway contractor and several town councillors. There 
were also reports of large numbers of bricklayers and carpenters involved in the 
fighting. Women were also prominent; one witness stated that "there were many 
women there who had collected stones in their aprons, in the corners of their shawls, 
and in baskets".27 
Blame for the riot has been variously apportioned. Lowe's contemporary 
biographer laid responsibility for the violence at the feet of those who wished to 
return the borough to its corrupt past. He argued that the mob disliked Lowe because 
he had deprived them of "all the fierce excitement of an uncertain and hotly contested 
fight, during which some thousands of pounds would be spent in their midst".28 He 
also blamed the introduction of a mob hired for the purpose of starting trouble. There 
is certainly evidence to suggest that this occurred. Many townspeople commented on 
seeing strangers in the borough on the polling day, some with cards in their hats. 
Reverend Sheppard remarked that "the great majority of the men immediately 
assailing Mr.Lowe and his friends were not from Kidderminster".29 While it is 
possible that this was an attempt to protect the town's reputation, the result of the 
polling suggests that some voters at least may have been intimidated. Lowe's 
supporters had certainly expected a larger majority at the polls. It is likely that the 
26 Winter, Robert Lowe, p.144. 
27 Coventry Weekly Times, 15 Aprill857, p.2. 
28 Martin, The Life and Letters, p.l73. 
29 Worcester Herald, 4 April1857, page unknown. 
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violence of the mob deterred some voters from polling. Lowe himself seems to have 
favoured this interpretation of events, not least because it absolved him of any 
personal responsibility in provoking the riot. When in 1859 he declined to contest the 
borough due to an adverse canvass, he blamed the forces of corruption, "Even to the 
Tories and the parsons it can be no source of permanent gratification to see the town 
fall back into the slough in which it had been for so many years wallowing when we 
pulled it out".30 
John Winter has described the riot in Kidderminster as an example of 'class 
conflict.' He writes that the stones which fell on Lowe's head ''were painful 
reminders that the latent power of demos was beginning to awaken inside as well as 
outside Great Britain".31 Certainly Lowe's association with the town's factory 
managers and his patron made him a target for working-class frustrations, and yet he 
was frequently singled out by the mob for special attention despite the presence of 
James Pardoe in the crowd. This, as well as the personal taunts and abuse hurled at 
Lowe, suggest that personality as well as class conflict was at the core of the 
disturbance. 
The events in Kidderminster in 1857 reveal the complex interplay of personalities and 
issues that characterised small borough elections in the mid-Victorian period. The 
contest demonstrated the predominance of local concerns over national political 
issues: Lowe's focus on Palmerston's foreign policy and his unwillingness to engage 
adequately with local issues therefore lost him popular support. His ignorance of the 
town's needs and his impatience in dealing with the subtleties of constituency 
electioneering alienated him from the bulk of Kidderminster's population. His seat 
30 Martin, The Life and Letters, p.173. 
31 Winter, Robert Lowe, p.137. 
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was never in any danger as long as the Whig-Tory-Radical coalition remained unified. 
Yet the violence of the mob demonstrated the danger that politicians faced by 
ignoring the unenfranchised and their allies. Lowe's reduced majority reflected the 
power of the rioters to influence the outcome of the election, and although the popular 
candidate failed to be elected the results highlighted the weakness of Lord Ward's 
coalition in the face of popular pressure. Lowe recognised as much in the wake of the 
coalition's demise in 1859. In a letter outlining his retirement from the borough after 
the Conservatives decided to promote their own candidate, Lowe wrote, "I never for a 
moment doubted Lord Ward's goodwill ... unfortunately his power is not equal to it".32 
Ultimately the violence in 1857 was the result of a combination of economic, 
social and political factors. In the popular mind Lowe had failed his constituency by 
ignoring the extent of its economic difficulties - his alliance with the employers of the 
town's carpet factories did nothing to improve his standing amongst the working men 
and the unemployed. He further alienated himself from powerful interests in the 
borough, who then worked hard to campaign against him. It is impossible to know 
whether part of the mob were hired to create a disturbance, although it is likely that 
any outside involvement only added to the scale of the violence. The extent of 
popular resentment towards Lowe and his principal supporters, and the borough's past 
history of disorder, meant that violence was always likely to occur. And given the 
ferocity of the mob it was fortunate for Lowe that he managed to escape with his life. 
32 Martin, The Life and Letters, p.173. 
Chapter V 
m 
Lincoln 
The Polling - Commenced at eight o'clock on Wednesday 
morning ... The 'fair and legitimate influence,' so frequently alluded to 
by the Liberals during the contest, had, during the past week, been 
exercised in a most extraordinary manner, many cases of gross 
intimidation and open bribery having been brought to our notice. 
Lincolnshire Chronicle, 14 July 1865.33 
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Lincoln city elections during the mid-nineteenth century were remarkably disorderly 
even by the standards of the period. Violence and a disregard for civic authority seem 
to have been perennial features of Lincoln elections, and serious rioting occurred 
there in 1847, 1852, 1862, 1865, 1868, 1874 and 1880. The riots that followed the 
by-election of 1862 and the general election three years later in 1865 therefore form 
part of an established pattern of disorder in this ancient borough. Radical non-electors 
were the principal and repeat offenders in Lincoln. In 184 7 drunken radical 
supporters of Charles Seely (Radical) kidnapped voters on the eve ofthe poll, in 1852 
a radical mob stormed the election headquarters of G .F .Heneage (Whig), and in 1865 
they attacked the hotel of the defeated Tory candidate J.Bramley Moore and 
attempted to set frre to its doors. The violence of these years reflected the growing 
strength of radical opinion in Lincoln after 1850, and was the result of conflict 
between the town's established political hierarchy and an emerging commercial class 
of reformers and Dissenters. 
33 Lincolnshire Chronicle, 14 July 1865, p.7. 
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In 1861 Lincoln had a population of just over 20,000 and an electorate of 1,713. 
Despite being the county town and the venue for the annual assizes, the borough had 
little influence over Lincolnshire politics. No member for the borough had ever been 
elected to a county seat and no county interest intruded on borough politics. Lincoln 
was an ancient cathedral town and as the seat of a bishopric the influence of the clergy 
was strong in the borough. Both the gentry and the clergy supported the Tories who 
were established in the borough's first seat. Conservative domination in the borough 
was also the product of bribery. Colonel Sibthorp, the eccentric Tory member for 
Lincoln between 1835 and 1856 was said to have retained his seat through extensive 
treating. Prior to 1865 the Whigs held the city's second seat through a combination of 
support from Conservatives and the majority ofthe £10 householders created in 1832. 
However the mostly lower middle-class householders were likely to support Liberal 
or Radical candidates as they became available, and by the early 1850s they were 
becoming increasingly impatient with the Whig-dominated Liberal Association. The 
borough's 690 resident freemen were also an important equation in Lincoln elections 
as their politics were largely determined by pecuniary considerations. The Great 
Reform Act of 1832 removed about 1,000 non-resident freemen from the borough, as 
well as introducing the £10 householder franchise. The changes increased the 
electorate from 1,233 to 1,713 voters, but failed to improve the tone of electioneering 
in the borough. The resident freemen remained and proved as venal as their 
disfranchised cousins.34 
Political conflict in Lincoln coincided with the city's economic development. 
Though still an important market town for the surrounding countryside, in the 1840s 
Lincoln was emerging as a significant industrial centre. In 1842 the iron foundry of 
34 J.W.F.Hill, Victorian Lincoln (Cambridge, 1974), pp.14- 37. The freemen were largely implicated 
in the election petition of 184 7 as having received bribes in return for voting for Charles Seely, 
Radical. 
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Clayton and Shuttleworth opened and in 1846 the Midland Railway connected 
Lincoln to Nottingham and the rest of the country. Only a decade later the borough 
was described by a countryman as having become a "semi-manufacturing town in the 
centre of an agricultural district".35 As Lincoln's manufacturing industry grew so did 
the political aspirations of a new generation of commercial men. These newcomers 
included maltsters, ironmasters and corn merchants, many of whom were Dissenters, 
and were commonly Liberal or Radical. They found themselves in competition for 
local leadership with the Whigs and Tories who had combined in the 1840s over 
defence of the corn laws. The political divide in Lincoln, between the Whig-Tory 
element and the Liberal-Radicals was a bitter one, and between 1832 and 1884 only 
three borough elections went uncontested. The Radicals were unable, however, to 
make much progress in borough politics due to the strength of the Whig-Tory 
compromise. It was not until 1868 that the Liberals were able to capture both seats, 
and that was largely due to the fact that the Conservatives failed to field a candidate, 
after years of control of one seat. 
In the 1840s and 1850s, therefore, on both the town council and in borough 
politics the established Whig-Tory compromise faced an emerging Liberal-Radical 
challenge. The municipal divisions of the city were divided between the Whigs and 
Tories, who controlled the upper and middle wards, and the radicals who held the 
lower wards. These political alignments were reflected in the borough elections, and 
it was often the case that parliamentary battles were really extensions of municipal 
conflicts. In 1847 the borough election was declared void after a petition uncovered 
widespread treating and bribery. This petition marked the only occasion between 
1832 and 1884 that an election result was disputed in Lincoln, and it demonstrates 
35 Ibid., p.2 [Reference to Peacock MS in Hill's possession]. 
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both the strength of the liberal split in the borough and the nexus between municipal 
and parliamentary politics. 
The 1847 election was a four-way contest between the incumbent Tory 
members Colonel Sibthorp and William Collett, and two Liberals E.G.B.Lytton 
(Whig) and Charles Seely (Radical). Sibthorp was an old fashioned Tory and a strong 
advocate of the agricultural interest. Collett was a banker, a railway investor and the 
owner of a slate mine in Ireland. Both men were elected in 1841 when feeling ran 
high over the corn laws, and it would prove the only time that the Conservatives 
would capture both borough seats. Lytton was a Whig in the reforming interest who 
had been Member for Lincoln between 1832 and 183 7. While originally in favour of 
the corn laws his changing views on free trade did not endear him to the Tories. In 
1847 his position was weakened further by his support of the new Poor Law. Lytton's 
principal supporter was William Rudgard, an influential local maltster and a former 
Mayor of Lincoln. Rudgard was an opponent of Seely's on the Town Council and the 
two had clashed repeatedly, most recently over sewerage reform. Charles Seely, who 
was Mayor of Lincoln in 1840, had emerged as the borough's leading radical in the 
early 1840s. He was the son of a London baker and a partner in a local corn merchant 
and miller firm. A wealthy, arrogant man who doggedly pursued a borough seat, Hill 
writes that in his determination to be elected he "made no attempts at conciliation; he 
quarrelled with the Whigs, and even his friends regarded him as selflsh".36 When he 
took over the mayoralty in 1840 he snubbed Rudgard's retirement dinner. As 
opponents on the town council Seely and Rudgard transferred their political enmity to 
the parliamentary contest. 
36 Ibid., p.3. 
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Ultimately Sibthorp was returned at the head of the poll, and Seely was elected 
ahead of Lytton and Collett. In the victory procession that followed drunken radical 
supporters dragged an effigy of Rudgard through the streets of the city. A petition 
was soon brought forward against Seely on the grounds that voters had been treated 
and bribed, and Rudgard was prominent amongst the petitioners. Lincoln city was no 
stranger to electoral corruption. Certainly no political party held the moral high 
ground during elections, and borough campaigns were frequently characterised by 
allegations of corruption levelled by one side against the other. However cooler heads 
commonly prevailed before a petition was brought forward, as it would not do to have 
the borough investigated and possibly disfranchised. Given, therefore, that corruption 
was not a recent phenomenon in the borough, and that no petitions had previously 
been presented, it is hard not to judge that personal animosity informed the 184 7 
election petition. Seely and Rudgard's political quarrel on the town council had thus 
spilled into the parliamentary arena, resulting in the very dangerous presentation of an 
official inquiry into Lincoln electioneering. The borough was not disfranchised, but 
Charles Seely was unseated and the investigating committee concluded that "a system 
of treating has for a long time prevailed in the city ofLincoln".37 
The evidence uncovered by the election petition does provide an interesting 
insight into the mechanics of mid-century electoral corruption. It appears that on the 
polling day Seely's agents were involved in offering meals and drinks to willing 
supporters. A witness, who was a freemen voter, described how he and several 
friends were met at the train station by two men named Emmerson and Gresham. 
They were then conveyed to the Black Goats Inn and treated to a drink and a meal. 
The committee inquired as to what followed, 
37 House of Commons Journals, 1846-47 (296), XIII, Select Committee on Lincoln Election Petition, 
Minutes of Evidence, p.5. 
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After drinking there some time do you remember going up to the poll? 
-Yes. 
Who .did you poll for? -For Sibthorp and Seely 
At the time that you went up to poll from the Black Goats, did your 
friends from Bramston go with you?- We all went together; four of us. 
Did anyone take you up to the poll? - Emmerson and Gresham went 
into the polling booth with us.38 
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These particular voters were subsequently taken to the George and Dragon where they 
were treated to porter and ale and two glasses of rum each. The following day they 
returned to the city to receive 18s each. A number of freemen voters also testified 
that they were treated at the Black Goats Inn. The process of corruption, at least in 
Lincoln, appears to have been an organised and disciplined affair. From the public 
house to the polling booth voters were shadowed by electoral agents who scrutinised 
their vote and then 'compensated' them accordingly. Even more surprising is that the 
bribes were not expected to ensure a plumper for Seely, as his agents equally provided 
treats to those who split their vote between Sibthorp and Seely. This arrangement 
likely suited Seely because neither Lytton nor Collett benefited. It does, however, 
reveal how desperate he was to be elected; something he failed to do in 1847 as his 
election was declared void due to bribery. 
As in Kidderminster, election violence in Lincoln owed more to local conflicts than to 
national pressures. Indeed R.J.Olney writes that Lincoln was "not easily influenced 
by reports of agitation in London and the provincial capitals".39 Violence in Lincoln 
was the product of local tensions and local antagonisms. The by-election of 1862 was 
the result of a decision by the sitting member, G.F.Heneage (Whig), to contest the 
Lincolnshire borough of Grimsby. Incidentally his move there proved disastrous as 
he was both defeated and caught in the middle of a serious riot. Lincoln's vacant seat 
38 Ibid., p.21 
39 R.J.Olney, Lincolnshire Politics, 1832 -1885 (Oxford, 1973), p.4. 
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was contested by J.Bramley Moore (Conservative) and J.Hinde Palmer (Liberal). 
Palmer, a local barrister, was the popular candidate as he supported both the ballot 
and the extension of the franchise. He was supported by the iron foundry interest of 
Clayton and Shuttleworth, which gave him the backing of the town's radical non-
electors but little else. Moore was a Liverpool merchant and ship owner. He was a 
staunch Tory and could count on the support of the borough's gentry and clergy. His 
election committee also included William Rudgard who had previously backed the 
Whig candidate Lytton. Moore was an unpopular candidate, possibly because he was 
a stranger to the borough, and his campaign was marred by allegations that he had 
profited from slavery. His denials obviously proved unconvincing and at the 
nomination, "Mr Bramley Moore was met with groans and hooting". 40 
Given the borough's record of electoral disorder it is little wonder that city 
authorities viewed the pending contest with apprehension. In early February a public 
petition was presented to the Lincoln magistrates seeking an assurance that 
precautions would be taken regarding the election. The Mayor of Lincoln, John 
Torry, promptly wrote to the Home Secretary to "secure the attendance of a 
detachment of the military, or of an efficient body of Police Constables ... on the day 
appointed for the election".41 Subsequently a force of some 100 constables from the 
County Police were drafted into the borough for election duty. They bolstered the 
borough force which numbered just 23 men, yet their presence was ultimately to 
prove both a blessing and a curse. 
The election was a close-run event and Moore defeated Palmer by just 25 
votes, precisely the number accredited to Rudgard's influence. In the wake of the 
declaration a crowd gathered outside Moore's election headquarters and began 
40 Manchester Guardian, 11 February 1862, p.3. 
41 Home Office Disturbance Papers, PRO Class H.0.45/7319 (£2). "Letter from John Torry to Home 
Secretary, 9th February 1862". 
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breaking windows and assaulting the police. When the city Police intervened they 
were stoned and those who were arrested were promptly rescued by the crowd. The 
County Police were brought up and ordered to clear the streets, though no attempt was 
made to read the Riot Act. Apparently they were excessively rough in the execution 
of their orders, and many complaints were lodged about the degree of force used by 
the 'rurals'. A local newspaper described the riot in which "several persons were 
struck severely over their heads and bodies by the police, .. and many of the police 
were much injured. Many women and children who had congregated around the 
Guildhall were thrown down and trampled upon by the mob".42 
The involvement and behaviour of the County Police in the borough were 
deeply resented by the townspeople, and their departure from the town the following 
day signalled a resumption of the violence. This time the Mayor's house was 
attacked, apparently in retaliation for ordering the County Police into the city. 
Curiously the rioters were polite enough to allow the Mayor's wife and children time 
to leave the house before they "commenced breaking the windows with stones and 
bludgeons, and before they were satisfied that they had done a sufficient amount of 
damage scarcely a whole pane of glass was left in the house".43 At length the military 
were summoned but they arrived only after the rioters had dispersed. Colonel 
Amcotts, the High Sheriff, anticipated further rioting and wrote to the Home Secretary 
that "a vindictive spirit has been awakened amongst the [rioters] ... and reliable 
information has been received that they intend to use violence to attack the home and 
perhaps the life ofthe ChiefConstable".44 
42 Home Office DistUrbance Papers, PRO Class H.0.45/7319 (f.25). "Letter from Phillip Bicknell, 
ChiefConstab1e of Lincolnshire, to Home Secretary, 15 February 1862". [unnamed local newspaper 
enclosed in letter]. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Home Office Disturbance Papers, PRO Class H.0.45/7319 (f.32). "Letter from Weston Cracroft 
Amcotts to Home Office, 15 February 1862". 
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Both the Mayor and the Chief Constable of Lincolnshire were later to blame 
the escalation of violence on the rioters' resentment of the County Police. However 
that may have just been an excuse for further rioting. At any rate the political bias of 
the perpetrators was obvious. The houses of Charles Ward and William Marshall 
were attacked, and both men were supporters of Moore. William Rudgard's house 
was also targeted though the crowd were prevented from reaching there. It is likely 
that many of the rioters were employees of the various iron foundries,: the 
involvement of Clayton and Shuttleworth in the riots being particularly overt. They 
were stopped in the street by the High Sheriff during the riot, and warned that they 
would be held responsible for any pe~onal injuries inflicted by the crowds.45 
Whatever their degree of complicity in the violence they were responsible for ending 
the rampage. A local newspaper reported that the rioters were met on the road by 
"members ofMr.Palmer's committee", which included Shuttleworth, who "addressed 
the excited throng [and] drew them away from any further mischief in that locality".46 
These allegations of bias and. involvement in the riots by the iron foundries were 
discounted by the ironmaster John Ruston at a public meeting following the election. 
Certainly the extent of control that the ironmasters had over the mob is questionable, 
as during the riot Palmer's committee rooms were also attacked. 
The Lincoln ·crowds would not have to wait long for another opportunity to riot. The 
General Election of 1865 proved an unwelcome case of deja vu for the city. In a 
repetition of events in 1862 the Mayor's house was attacked and Moore found himself 
again besieged in his hotel by an angry crowd. The Liberals were in a strong position 
in the months leading up to the election. The borough's two sitting members Charles 
45 Hill, Victorian Lincoln, p.34. 
46 Home Office Disturbance Papers, PRO Class H.0.45/7319 (f.25). "Letter from Phillip Bicknell to 
Home Secretary, 15 February 1862 ". [unnamed local newspaper enclosed in letter]. 
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Seely (Radical) and Moore (Conservative) stood in defence of their seats, and the 
Liberals brought in a second candidate in the person of E.Heneage (Whig). The 
Conservatives did not field a second candidate. Heneage's·father had been a member 
for Lincoln between 1852 and 1862. He favoured liberal solutions to the question of 
church rates and the extension of the franchise, and stood as a supporter of 
Palmerston.47 Rioting was anticipated and the new Mayor of Lincoln, Richard 
Harvey, organised a detachment of Kings Hussars to be pre~ent in the borough. This 
decision instantly made him unpopular with the radical rioters, and both Seely and 
Heneage later denounced the presence of the military as an insult to the city. 
On the polling day voting was brisk at the borough's eight booths. The 
foundries were closed and the Lincolnshire Chronicle described how "the streets were 
filled with ardent admirers of the several candidates, the Radical section becoming in 
the course of the afternoon, so excited that the tradesmen of the city took the wise 
precaution of closing their establishments".48 Amid allegations that the Liberals had 
bribed and intimidated voters, Moore failed to retain his seat, being defeated by 105 
votes. Seely was elected at the head of the poll, closely followed by Heneage. At the 
declaration Seely described the attendance of the soldiers as "an unnecessary act on 
the part of the Mayor".49 Heneage complimented the crowd on their good behaviour 
and then called on them "to show by not kicking up a row that they did not require 
any soldiers to keep them in order". 50 His speech was greeted with loud cheers and 
laughter, but that evening a serious riot broke out and a great deal of damage was 
done. The rioters, who were mostly radical non-electors tried to set fire to the doors 
47 Hill, Victorian Lincoln, p.35. 
48 Lincolnshire Chronicle, 14 July 1865, p.7. 
49 Home Office Disturbance Papers, PRO Class H.0.45/7691 (f.58). "Extract from Seely's speech sent 
to Home Secretary by Richard Harvey, 14 July 1865". 
50 Lincolnshire Chronicle, 14 July 1865, p.7. 
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ofMoore's hote1.51 This time the Riot Act was read and the soldiers were called out 
to restore order. In a letter to the Home Secretary after the election Richard Harvey 
lamented the mob's propensity for violence. 
In the election of 1862 the then Mayor John Torry's authority was 
disregarded, his house partially demolished and he himself had to seek 
safety by flight, and I the Mayor of 1865 have had my house injured, and 
my windows smashed, and but for the timely arrival of the military I do 
not doubt but that it would have been gutted and personal violence 
afforded to myself and family. 52 
Although the troops proved more restrained than the County Police in 1862, their 
conduct was also called into question. Heneage accused the Captain in charge of the 
Hussars of allowing "a parcel of drunken [soldiers] to galop (sic) on the footpath and 
indiscriminately cut at everyone".53 There was obviously some truth to these 
allegations as Harvey himself had been concerned for the soldiers' sobriety. He even 
visited their inn at four o'clock on the morning after their arrival to prevent any sale 
of liquor to them. He told the Home Office that he remained there until nine o'clock, 
"so that I might be sure they would enter the Barracks, and be placed without 
interruption, under the immediate command of their own Officers". 54 The basis for 
Seely and Heneage's criticisms of the Mayor are difficult to discern. There was little 
likelihood that Seely and Harvey had opposed each other on the town council. Both 
men were municipal reformers and had voted together over the adoption of the Local 
Government Act of 1858.55 Perhaps they realised that the presence of the military had 
provoked the anger of the parochial Lincoln crowds. At any event Harvey' s response 
to the allegations that he had acted improperly was to ask the Home Office to 
51 Ibid. 
52 Home Office Disturbance Papers, PRO Class H.0.45/7691 (f.43). "Letter from Richard Harvey to 
Sir G.Grey, 20 July 1865". 
53 !bid, (f.64). "Letter from Captain E. Walker, XVth Kings Hussars to R.S.Harvey, 15 July 1865". 
54 Ibid., (f.43). "Letter from R.S.Harvey to Sir.G.Grey, 20 July 1865". 
55 Hill, Victorian Lincoln, p.167. 
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establish an impartial inquiry into the riots. However there is no record that such a 
commission was ever established, and ultimately the Lincoln magistrates upheld his 
actions. 56 
The advent of Reform in 1867 and the triumph of Liberalism at the 1868 
General Election failed to curb the riotous instincts of Lincoln's radicals. In 1866 the 
prospect that Gladstone's reform bill would raise the borough electorate to 1,377, of 
which 62% would be working class, cheered the radicals into believing they could 
throw off the Whigs for good. 57 However the defeat of Gladstone's government, in 
which the Whig E.Heneage played a part, resulted in public protests and a widening 
of divisions between Whigs and Radicals. In 1867 a Tory government passed the 
Second Reform Act and the borough electorate rose to 4,157. It was obvious that 
working-class voters would now dominate the constituency. Both Seely and Heneage 
were put forward by the Liberal Association in 1868, although the inclusion of the 
latter upset the new voters. Large public meetings were organised at which Palmer 
was endorsed as a popular candidate. In the confusion surrounding which Liberal 
candidate would be officially supported Heneage withdrew from the contest. The 
Conservatives failed to field a candidate for the first time, perhaps in recognition of 
the fact that the power of the clergy and gentry was likely to be swamped by a tide of 
working class voters. Seely and Palmer were therefore elected unopposed, only the 
second such outcome in the borough since 1832. The election of 1868 must certainly 
have been one of the purest elections in the borough's recent history. The new 
working class voters had effected the defeat of the Whigs without recourse to their 
newly found privilege of voting. 
56 Home Office Disturbance Papers, PRO Class H.0.45/7691 (f.45). "Letter from Lincoln magistrates 
to Home Office". The letter states that "the Mayor is entitled to the confidence of the Bench of 
Magistrates for the manner in which he has acted and that an expression of such confidence in the 
Mayor is hereby accorded to him". 
57 Hill, Victorian Lincoln., p.35. 
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Palmer himself knew nothing of his election until it was thrust upon him. He 
had been nominated in absentia and was elected without being aware that he was even 
in the running. He found himself Member for Lincoln. without contest, without 
expense and without consultation. 58 The election of two Radical members resulted in 
celebrations that soon led to disorder. Hill writes that "a vast crowd occupied the 
centre of the city for hours, and lighted tar barrels rolled about for two nights, the 
police office and the chief constable's house were wrecked". 59 The Boston Gazette 
reported the cost of the riot as in excess of £300; £200 for damage and £100 for the 
hire of special constables.60 Similar scenes followed the elections of 1874 and 1880. 
The military and borough police were called out in both cases to restore order. In 
1874 the riots were likely sparked by Seely's victory over Palmer, the former having 
made himself unpopular with the working class in a dispute with the iron foundry. 61 
In 1880 both Seely and Palmer were returned amid allegations that the Liberals had 
resorted to bribery. 
If the K.idderminster case study highlights the frailty of a patron's influence and the 
fury of the unenfranchised mob, then the Lincoln study reveals the complexities that 
underlay the outbreak of election disorder and the continued relevance of corruption 
in mid-Victorian electioneering. Both case studies demonstrate the parochial nature 
of constituency politics and both reveal the dangers that politicians faced by ignoring 
the sensitivities of non-voters. Whereas in K.idderminster violence was directly 
related to personality and local economic concerns, in Lincoln violence was the 
outcome of partisan conflict, corruption and public resentment of authority. The 
58 Ibid., p.36. 
59 Ibid., p.37. 
60 Boston Gazette, 28 November 1868, [page number's not provided]. 
61 Hill, Victorian Lincoln, p.189. 
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Lincoln mob's predisposition towards violence was the result of political frustration 
and militant parochialism. Radical non-electors were mobilised to violence through 
political impotency in the face of the Whig-Tory compromise. Furthermore Lincoln's 
geographic remoteness was compounded by a developing industrial character that 
alienated it from the surrounding rural countryside. This sense of isolation was 
manifest in the violent resentment of outside interference in borough affairs. Not for 
nothing were the County Police in 1862 derisorily termed "nrrals". Thus the Lincoln 
case study affirms the view of mid-century English elections as being largely framed 
within a local context and little influenced by national political issues, characterised 
by local and personal antagonisms, occasionally disorderly and even violent, and 
retaining a propensity for corruption and the exercise of influence. 
Chapter V 
IV 
Bradford 
A considerable number of people were very much hurt; pieces of iron 
were thrown about that were very sharp in the points, and a good many 
people were cut in the faces, and one man had his eye cut out. 
Bradford by-electi~n riot, 1869.62 
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Bradford was an archetypal industrial city of Victorian England. During the 
nineteenth-century rapid economic growth in this West Riding borough had 
transformed a previously small provincial town into a sprawling urban metropolis. 
By the middle of the century Bradford's adoption of mechanised fabric manufacture 
had placed it at the head of the English wool industry, and at the centre of the global 
textile trade. Between 1801 and 1861 Bradford's population increased from 13,264 to 
103,778, and the borough electorate grew from 1,139 in 1832 to 21,518 in 1868. In 
the 1850s Bradford was regarded as the national centre of religious dissent, and the 
city could boast the third highest urban population of Nonconformists in the 
country.63 As in many other boom towns of industrial England politics in the borough 
were largely dominated by men of entrepreneurial zeal and wealth; the champions of 
the new liberal economic zeitgeist. 
And yet Bradford was no stranger to electoral malpractice, and borough 
electors faced similar types of 'extra-political' pressures brought to bear upon the 
Lincoln and Kidderminster voters. Even after 1867 Bradford's electoral managers 
62 Parliamentary Papers, 1868-69, Vlll, 'Report from the Select Committee on Parliamentary and 
Municipal Elections', p.145. 
63 Tony Jowitt, "The Pattern of Religion in Victorian Bradford" in D.G.Wright and J.A.Jowitt (eds), 
Victorian Bradford (Bradford, 1982), p.37. 
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continued to supplement newer forms of political organization with more traditional 
means of persuasion. Corruption and undue influence were common in borough 
elections, and no Bradfordian contest was complete without the liberal flow of free 
beer from the city's numerous public-houses. In 1867 and 1869 violence in the 
borough was linked to the re-emergence of local sectarian conflict and to the 
disintegration of a mid-century political consensus. 
In the 1850s·Bradford was dominated by a political equilibrium that united moderate 
Liberals, Radicals and free-trade Tories under the banner of progressive bourgeois 
liberalism. Edward West, the Mayor of Bradford in 1868, described the state of party 
politics thus: "We are a Radical constituency, we are not Whigs and Tories; it is 
merely a division among the Liberals. The Conservative element, of course, is there 
to aid the one side or the other, whichever they choose".64 This consensus was made 
possible by the economic prosperity of the 1850s, and a softening of the Church-
Chapel confrontation of the 1840s. Despite the strong presence of working-class 
Radicalism in the borough a, "Tory-Whig-Liberal Moderate element discouraged the 
election of Advanced Radicals".65 This political consensus normally ensured that 
Bradford's two parliamentary seats were shared by a 'near-Tory' and a moderate 
Radical. A consequence of this arrangement was the lack of contested elections: 
between 1851 and 1865 only 2 out of 6 parliamentary elections went to the polls, in 
1852 and 1859. The 1852 general election exemplified the mid-century consensus, 
with the borough electorate divided between a Whig-Liberal, Richard Milligan, and a 
free-trade Tory, Henry Wickham. The sitting Radical member, T.P.Thompson, lost 
his seat after Catholic voters deserted him over his support of the Ecclesiastical Titles 
64 
'Report from the Select Committee,' 1868-69, VIII, p.145. 
65 Jack Reynolds, The Great Paternalist: Titus Salt and the Growth of Nineteenth Century Bradford 
(Bradford, 1983), p.194. 
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bill. Milligan was elected at the head of the poll with Wickham 107 votes behind. 
Despite standing as a Conservative, Wickham's free-trade credentials and defence of 
the First Reform Bill gained him vital moderate Liberal support. He defeated 
Thompson by just six votes, and went on to hold the seat until his death in 1867. 
Yet even amidst the apparent congeniality of Bradford borough politics there 
was still room for more direct methods of electoral coercion. Edward West told the 
Hartington Committee in 1869 that treating was notorious in the borough and that "it 
has been the usual practice in all elections".66 Both municipal and parliamentary 
elections were open to corrupt practices. Samuel Storey, a stuff merchant and town 
councillor, told the Hartington Committee that at Bradford municipal elections, "there 
were the usual meetings at public houses, and beer more or less given out in the way 
of refreshments".67 Both Edward West and Samuel Storey's evidence to the 
Committee provides an interesting insight into contemporary perceptions of electoral 
corruption and electoral law. Storey condemned what he saw as an increase in 
bribery and treating after 1867, urging that the law be amended to ensure that 
corruption at municipal elections carried the same penalties as at parliamentary 
elections. He stated that bribes had been paid at the 1868 municipal election with a 
view to influencing the parliamentary contest. 
I believe that the municipal election was largely used as a means of 
influencing the Parliamentary election which had to take place a 
fortnight afterwards; there is a general feeling that they can do 
anything at the municipal elections; they can bribe or treat and are not 
responsible for anything of that sort.68 
66 
'Report from the Select Committee,' 1868-69, VIII, p.l48. 
67 Ibid., p.l41. 
68 Ibid., p.l42. 
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Mayor West, however, believed that the law which dealt with treating was "almost 
too severe", and remarked that "I do not think that [treating] has been viewed as 
corruption in days gone by".69 His comments reflected contemporary public opinion 
of those suspected of electoral malpractice. Prosecutions and convictions for 
corruption were relatively rare as electoral offences were often viewed as only mild 
infractions of the law. West testified that legal action against corrupt practices was 
uncommon in Bradford because "public opinion will not support a man in prosecuting 
anybody for conduct of that description".70 
l11timidation was a well-established practice in Bradford by the late 1860s, and 
few contests passed off without some allegations of undue influence being exercised 
over the vulnerable part of the electorate. Samuel Storey believed that a "very 
intimidating influence" was brought to bear upon the borough's factory workers by, 
"overlookers and foremen in the various establishments".71 However the working-
class voters and the unenfranchised were not without their own weapon of influence; 
the shop boycott. Edward West stated that small shopkeepers and tradesmen suffered 
as badly as factory employees. He testified that they, "have more need of protection 
than the lower class; our working men are very independent, and generally speaking, 
they are quite independent of their masters".72 
Bradford was certainly no stranger to electoral violence or working-class 
agitation during the nineteenth century. There were serious riots at the 1835 and 1841 
general elections, and the borough was a regional centre of Chartist activity in the 
1840s. However by 1850 the economic prosperity that paved the way for Bradford's 
political consensus had contributed to the easing of class conflict. Elections 
69 Ibid., p.l48. 
70 Ibid., p.l46. 
71 Ibid., p.143. 
72 Ibid., p.l46. 
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subsequently became less likely to engender the bitterness of the 1830s, and the 
occurrence of only two contested elections between 1850 and 1867 further lessened 
the likelihood of serious violence. The disorder that attended the elections of 1867 
and 1869 thus marks the period at which the mid-century consensus began to fail. 
The late 1860s witnessed the re-emergence of sectarian conflict between 
Anglicans and Dissenters. The efforts of the Liberation Society further fuelled the 
bitterness of the Church-Chapel confrontation, and the resulting polarisation of party 
politics signalled the end of the liberal consensus. This period witnessed the gradual 
cohesion ofBradford Conservatism, with the formation of the Conservative Working 
Man's Association in 1866 and the Conse~ative Association in 1867.73 The Second 
Reform Act further contributed to the weakening of the consensus. Post-1867 the 
borough electorate was increased from 5,189 to 21,518. This massive increase 
represented the enfranchisement of a large number of working-class voters. The 
Bradford Liberals reorganised themselves to meet the demands of this new electoral 
environment. Various local Liberal organizations such as the Registration Society, 
the Reform Union and the Reform League were subsequently replaced by the new 
Liberal Electoral Association, formed in January 1868. The immediate effect of these 
changes was the destabilisation of Liberalism in the borough. The moderates rejected 
the radicalism of the new organization, and there were divisions over labour 
representation and education reform.74 Thus the bitter election contests of the late 
1860s reflected the changes occurring in Bradford politics. 
The Bradford by-election of 1867 was caused by the death of the Conservative 
member, H.W.Wickham. The election preceded the introduction of the franchise 
73 Reynolds, The Great Paternalist, p.220. 
74 Ibid., p.329. 
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provisions of the Second Reform Act and was thus the last in the borough to take 
place under the conditions set in 1832. The electorate numbered 5,189 and was 
distributed across the borough's thirteen wards. The contest, which revealed the new 
division in Bradford politics, was fought between an Anglican brewer and a 
Dissenting anti-drink campaigner. M.W.Thompson, a Whig-Moderate Liberal, strong 
supporter of the Church of England and the city's chief brewer, stood against Edward 
Miall, a dissenting anti-drink Radical, leading figure in the disestablishment 
movement and founder of the Liberation Society. Thompson was a local 
manufacturer who had been Mayor of Bradford in 1862 and 1863. He was supported 
by, "Tories, Anglicans, Methodists who disliked Miall, Moderate Liberals and old 
Whigs and naturally other brewers, publicans and many others who disliked the idea 
of anti-drink legislation". 75 Miall was a stranger to the borough having contested 
Southwark in 1845, Halifax in 1847 and Banbury in 1859.76 In a borough with a long 
tradition of treating it is little wonder that Miall was popularly described as 
representing the "kill-joy" party. Significant political differences between the 
candidates were few, as they both supported free-trade, parliamentary reform and vote 
by secret ballot. The main points of contention were therefore religion and drink 
legislation. Thompson was in France during the campaign and was nominated in his 
absence by Samuel Storey. 
There is some evidence that a disturbance was feared at the nomination day. 
The Leeds Mercury reported a request by Miall's committee to change the site of the 
nomination due to a preponderance of stones in the area that might, "be turned to evil 
account in the event of a tumult". 77 However their request came too late and the 
ceremony went ahead in its original location. An estimated 70,000 people attended 
75 Ibid., p.219. 
76 Stenton ( ed), Who's Who, p.268. 
77 Leeds Mercury, 11 October 1867, p.4. 
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the nomination, and while such a figure was almost cetiainly an exaggeration there is 
little doubt that an enormous crowd gathered near the hustings. Party placards soon 
became targets for violence, and what began as sporadic fighting between the 
'Miallites' and 'Thompsonites' rapidly degenerated into, "a perfect state of riot and 
stone-throwing".78 The show of hands was abandoned due to the disturbance and a 
poll was declared for the following day. However any hope that peace would be 
maintained was lost when the polling day began in much the same way that the 
nomination day had ended: voters were pelted with mud as they approached the 
polling booths and at one stage, "the mob separated into two hostile parties, and began 
to chase each other"?9 Miall's central co~ittee-room was attacked by a large crowd 
armed with stones and lumps of coal. The Nonconformist blamed the riot on roughs, 
"devoted to the brewing interest", and described the scene inside Miall's committee-
room where, "large stones and broken glass were flying about the rooms, which were 
crowded by Mr.Miall's supporters, and many were cut and bruised both in the face 
and hands". 80 The borough police eventually managed to contain the mob and several 
people were arrested for rioting. At the declaration of the poll a reserve of 60 police 
armed with cutlasses were held in readiness. There was, however, no repeat of the 
previous day's violence. 
Thompson was elected by the modest majority of 403 votes, and his opponents 
immediately claimed it as a victory for the drink interest. The Nonconformist 
commented bitterly on what it described as "the Beer-Barrel Triumph", 
The friends ofMr.Miall fought well and bravely; but against the crowd 
of influences with which they had to contend - against the unholy 
alliance of faithless Liberals, Tories, Church parsons, publicans, bigots 
78 
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and fanatics, their efforts were in vain.81 
However, such a view of Miall's defeat carries the obvious bias of a newspaper 
owned and edited by the defeated candidate. There is little doubt that public-houses 
were opened during the election and that beer was distributed in the form of treating. 
Furthermore Thompson's ownership of some 150 public-houses in the city gave 
added weight to the accusations of treating levelled against him. Yet Jack Reynolds 
argues that in attributing his loss entirely to the drink interest, Miall's supporters 
ignored those, "who saw the vote for Thompson as a vote against the sanctimonious 
kill-joy party".82 Miall's radical politics and militant disestablishment ideals likely 
helped align Bradford's Moderate Liberals and Tories against him. 
The General Election of 1868 proved that the politics of coercion could still exercise 
an influence over an enlarged electorate. In 1867 Bradford's electorate was increased 
four-fold from 5,189 to 21,518, and while the electoral conditions were new, the 
response of the electoral managers was not. Jack Reynolds writes that ''Nobody was 
certain how the new electorate would vote; neither side was prepared to leave the test 
entirely to the democratic decision of individuals, preferring to support the new 
system with some of the more traditional practices of English electioneering". 83 The 
local manufacturer Thompson retired in 1868 and the general election shaped as a 
three-way battle between the sitting member, W.E.Forster (Liberal), Edward Miall 
(Advanced Liberal) and Henry Ripley (Independent Liberal). Ultimately, however, 
the contest would prove a two-way battle between Miall and Ripley, as Forster's high 
profile virtually guaranteed his seat. Both Miall and Forster could rely on the 
81 Ibid. 
82 Reynolds, The Great Paternalist, p.219. 
83 Ibid., p.330. 
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assistance of the new Liberal Electoral Association, while Miall's support continued 
to rest mainly with the Nonconformists. H.W.Ripley, a local manufacturer who 
owned a dyeing factory, and had been brought up as a dissenter, had by 1858 moved 
to the Anglican Church, and by 1874 was regarded as virtually a member of the 
Conservative party. He was never very popular in Bradford, and in 1864 he had 
offended working-class opinion by inviting Lord Palmerston to open the city's new 
Wool Exchange. His supporters included some Liberals, and Anglican and Methodist 
Tories. 
The campaign proved the high point of Bradford corruption in the nineteenth 
century. The borough was virtually awash in free beer distributed from more than 
300 public-houses across the city. Henry Ripley's greatest political asset was his 
purse, and during the election he spent over £7,000 on drinks for 'committee-men' in 
hundreds of public-houses. More surprising is that Miall and Forster too spent more 
than £3,000 between them at 62 public-houses, despite the anti-drink sentiments of 
the former. 84 Reflecting the fact that the business of electoral politics could not yet be 
seriously pursued without recourse to such practices, and that political principle had 
still to triumph over the realities of constituency electioneering. Violence during the 
election was restricted to an isolated incident in the Irish quarter of the borough 
where, "rioters were throwing stones through the windows of certain houses".85 Jack 
Reynolds describes the first election in Bradford after the passage of the Second 
Reform Act, 
The election campaign in fact had been in the best traditions of 
Eatanswill with plenty of refreshment in the various inns and public 
houses used by the candidates ... the conduct of a number of Forster's 
committee men was criticised, but the misdemeanour of Ripley' s 
84 Hanham, Elections and Party Management, p.264. 
85 Bra4fordAdvertiser, 21 November 1868, p.3. 
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men ... had been not only excessive but blatant.86 
Amidst allegations of treating and intimidation by both sides W.E.Forster was elected 
at the head of the poll. However in a shock to the efforts of the new Liberal 
organization Ripley defeated Miall by 579 votes. Reynolds argues that the Radical 
loss proved that Bradford's Tories were not a spent force in local politics, and when 
pushed could align themselves with Moderate Liberals and Whigs to reject the 
Radicals. However the influence of corruption cannot be overlooked. It appeared 
that Ripley's 'committee-men' had been somewhat heavy-handed in their approach to 
canvassing, especially among the working-class Irish. A petition was lodged against 
Ripley's election and he was unseated on the grounds that "in one ward of the said 
borough, inhabited principally by Irishmen of the working class, large numbers were 
influenced by corrupt practices".87 Furthermore the reversed election result in 1869, 
when both sides agreed not to use public-houses for committee-rooms, suggests that 
treating was successful in swaying at least part of the electorate. 
The by-election caused by Ripley's disqualification was held in March 1869. This 
contest proved a mirror image of the by-election of 1867. Edward Miall faced the 
former member Thompson, who returned to the borough as an independent Liberal. 
Miall was absent during the campaign, and violence attended the nomination of 
candidates. There was a considerable amount of bad feeling between the two parties 
as a result of the 1868 election and petition. However the Nonconformist reported 
that "an understanding was drawn up and signed by both sides, pledging them to the 
86 Reynolds, The Great Paternalist, p.331. 
87 Journals of the House of Commons, 1868-69 (124), Bradford Election Petition, p.17. 
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use of none but honest means". 88 Whether it was the effect of this agreement, or the 
fear of another petition, there was an almost complete absence of corruption or 
treating in 1869. Edward West commented that the contest was, "as pure an election 
as could possibly be; there were very few public-houses engaged". 89 Whereas the 
polling day was peaceful, as in 1867 the nomination again resulted in a serious riot. 
The likelihood of violence at the show of hands was increased when, several days 
beforehand, the decision was made to close the mills between 11 and 1 o'clock on the 
nomination day. The resulting crowd was described by the Manchester Guardian as 
being, "the largest that ever assembled on a similar occasion".90 Thompson was 
accompanied to the hustings by Henry Ripley, who received an enthusiastic welcome, 
Mr.Ripley was greeted with imitations of cockcrowing and shouts of 
"who bought the game cock?" and one facetious individual 
displayed ... a well-executed representation of a game cock. It may be 
remembered that one of Mr.Ripley's supporters was said to have 
endeavoured to bribe a voter by purchasing a game fowl belonging to 
him for a large sum. The display was hailed with boisterous laughter 
and hooting.91 
As the speeches began a Mr.Mumford, one of Thompson's supporters, was seen 
signalling to the crowd to move forward. A general rush towards the hustings then 
took place and a scene of 'frightful confusion' ensued. Mumford continued to signal 
to the crowd until the Mayor told him to stop, adding "You are the worst of them 
all".92 A general disturbance then erupted amongst the crowd, ''between some men 
carrying boards; they broke the boards in pieces and armed themselves ... and 
immediately commenced a riot".93 After one hour the violence subsided and the 
88 Nonconformist, 17 March 1869, p.251. 
89 
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90 Manchester Guardian, 2 March 1869, p.3. 
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Mayor resumed the speeches. However, no sooner had Thompson come forward to 
speak than a more serious riot erupted and the entire proceedings were abandoned. 
The Manchester Guardian reported that "numbers· of men and women were 
knocked down by the stones. One poor woman, who found herself in the centre of a 
large ring, was made a target of by a number of ruffians, and received severe cuts on 
the head and face".94 The Mayor attempted to restore order but the hustings came 
under fire from the mob and it was soon deserted. The police intervened but were 
unable to contain the crowd which soon, "streamed in vast numbers into the town, and 
the state of things was so alarming that the shopkeepers ... closed their shops".95 The 
violence appeared to have been begun with Thompson's supporters, who were 
accused of bringing stones with them to the nomination. Later in the day the Mayor 
issued a notice that police reinforcements from Leeds and Wakefield would be present 
druing the polling. The polling day, however, proved the quietest in recent history. 
The Nonconformist reported that "there was scarcely a drunken man to be seen in the 
town during the day, and no public-house whatever was engaged on Mr.Miall's side, 
and very few were engaged on the other side". 96 In what was hailed as a victory for 
Radicalism, Miall was elected by 1,437 votes. Furthermore the Irish electors were 
reported as polling almost entirely for the Radical candidate. The large margin of 
victory in 1869, and the reversal of Miall's fortunes, certainly suggest that the 
influence of corruption and intimidation in 1868 had been substantial. 
The violence displayed at the Bradford elections of 1867 and 1869 fits the pattern 
established in the previous case studies: all three boroughs reflect the willingness of 
party elites to supplement political organisation with electoral coercion, and 
94 Manchester Guardian, 2 March 1869, p.3. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Nonconformist, 17 March 1869, p.249. 
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demonstrate the seriousness of English election violence. In addition, the polarisation 
of borough politics and the weakening of the mid-century consensus were due to local 
rifts in political and religious opinion, and not to the intrusion of national party 
politics. The incidence of violence in Bradford does, however, appear more 
spontaneous than in Kidderminster or Lincoln. The outbreak of disturbances during 
the nomination was more related to the large gathering of people that attended than to 
any form of organised intimidation. And given that Bradford's public-houses 
provided free beer to any and all who declared themselves 'committee-men', and that 
borough nominations regularly attracted enormous crowds of shouting, placard-
waving partisans, the chances of violence were always going to be high. Yet it is the 
similarities between these three constituencies, and not the differences, that are most 
striking. Despite the differences in size and character, Bradford fails to provide a 
clear contrast to the politics of a semi-rural borough like Lincoln or a small 
manufacturing town like Kidderminster. It is also interesting to note that disorder 
involving the Irish played such a small part in Bradford in 1868, when serious anti-
Murphy riots occurred just 30 kilometres away in Ashton and Stalybridge. It is likely 
that the numerical majority of Dissent, and the weakness of inter-party conflict helped 
Bradford weather the storm of Irish Church disestablishment. 
Chapter V 
V 
Carmarthenshire 
In Carmarthen, as in most polling places, the shops were closed, 
business suspended, and the town put on its holiday attire. Guildhall 
Square was filled by an excited concourse of persons ... Every window 
was occupied by the fair sex, who not only watched the progress of 
events ... but also were not backward in displaying their colours. 
Carmarthenshire county election, 1868.97 
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The excitement displayed in Carmarthen on the day of the 1868 county election 
reflected not only the anticipation of a close contest, but the first contest to be held in 
the constituency for 31 years. Not since 1837, when Colonel Trevor (Conservative) 
and John Jones (Conservative) were elected ahead of Sir J.Williams (Liberal), had the 
voters of this south-Wales county had an opportunity to exercise their franchise. For 
a generation before 1868 leading Whig and Tory families had engineered a consensus 
that usually ensured the uncontested return of two Conservatives. Indeed since 1857 
David Pugh and David Jones (both Conservatives) had been returned unopposed. The 
four-way contest in 1868, between two Conservatives, an Independent Liberal and a 
Radical, thus represented a spectacular break with Carmarthenshire's traditional 
political arrangement. The contest also reflected in many ways the changes that were 
taking place in Welsh politics during the period: the election represented the first 
serious challenge to the Carmarthenshire aristocracy by Liberal nonconformity; the 
return of a Liberal and a Conservative revealed both the new electoral power of 
dissent, and the continued strength of aristocratic influence; and Carmarthenshire was 
97 Carmarthen Weekly Reporter, 10 October 1868, [unpaged]. 
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at the centre of allegations regarding evictions by Tory landlords, an occurrence 
which had a profound impact on Welsh social and political consciousness in the years 
after 1868. 
Carmarthenshire was no stranger to election disorder during the nineteenth-century. 
In An Anglican Aristocracy Matthew Cragoe writes that between 1832 and 1895, 
"Carmarthenshire elections were frequently marked by outbreaks of violence",98 and 
cites examples of disorder in 1837, 1868, 1880 and 1886.99 With the exception of 
1874, this list includes all contested elections in the county between 1837 and 1886. 
Thus Carmarthenshire reflects the general pattern of electoral violence - the years of 
disturbance being exactly coterminous with the years in which an election contest 
occurred. Events during the General Election of 1868 confirm the county's 
propensity for violent contests: a Liberal election meeting in Llanelly concluded with 
an attack on the Conservative committee-rooms; and both the borough and county 
polling days were disrupted by fighting between rival partisans. Indeed 
Carmarthenshire's previous election contest in 1837 had resulted in violence during 
which a local magistrate was, "thrown through the window of a public house".100 
The 1868 election was always likely to engender some degree of excitement. 
The county contest was precipitated by a local Conservative split, the campaign was 
dominated by the emotive issue of Irish Church disestablishment and the Liberal 
nonconformists, aided by the electoral increases of the Second Reform Act and the 
efforts of the Liberation Society, were mobilised and organised on a scale sufficient to 
98 M.Cragoe,AnAnglicanAristocracy: The moral economy ofthe landed estate in Carmarthenshire, 
1832-1895 (Oxford, 1996), p.169. 
99 Cragoe's record of violence in Carmarthenshire in 1880 was (unfortunately) found too late to be 
included in the statistical analysis in Chapter IV. Therefore this incident is not included in my sample 
of violence and does not appear in any of the maps of electoral violence. 
100 Ibid. 
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threaten the political status quo. Both sides were active in preparing for the contest 
and reports of landlord coercion and chapel influence fought for prominence in the 
local newspapers. The Carmarthen Journal modestly described the contest as likely 
to be "a close one". 
Whereas Wales has a rich history of popular disturbance, from food riots in the 
eighteenth-century to the Rebecca Riots in the late 1830s, only rarely did such 
disorder translate into election violence. Indeed throughout the period Welsh 
elections produced little in the way of serious disorder. Between 1857 and 1880 
violent electioneering in the Principality was limited to two episodes in 1865 and 
eight in 1868. The lack of disorder can be accounted for by the low incidence of 
contested elections in Wales before 1868. At the general elections of 1857 and 1859 
only four constituencies out of a total of 28 actually went to the polls. The high 
number of uncontested elections reflected the strength of consensus politics and the 
electoral influence of the landed elite. The concentration of electoral violence in 
Wales during the 1860s was the product of a convergence of social, political and 
religious tensions. It was during this period that the latent forces of Welsh 
nationalism, popular radicalism and religious dissent emerged to challenge the social 
and political hegemony of the Welsh aristocracy. The scale of violence in 
Carmarthenshire101 is therefore comparatively atypical of the Welsh electoral 
experience during the Victorian period, given that the county experienced two 
outbreaks of disorder while most constituencies in either England or Wales failed to 
record multiple episodes of election violence. 
101 The sample records one case of borough violence in 1868 and one duplicate episode during the 
same election, and one case of county violence. Cragoe identifies two cases of county violence 
between 1857 and 1880, one in 1868 and the other in 1880. 
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Between the First and Second Reform Acts Welsh political representation was 
dominated by a ruling aristocracy. Land ownership, and thus social and political 
influence, was concentrated in the hands of a small Anglican oligarchy increasingly 
alienated from the bulk of the population by language, religion and politics. Welsh 
members of parliament were drawn from the nobility and gentry; their seats 
guaranteed by restrictive franchises and the exercise of landlord influence. However 
from the beginning of the nineteenth-century protestant nonconformity emerged to 
challenge the Anglican aristocracy's domination of politics and society. Dissent 
proved a popular movement in Wales because of its emphasis on the Welsh language 
and culture. By 1851 nonconformist chapels attracted roughly 80% of Welsh 
religious attendance, 102 and dissent had come to, "create a fundamental line of 
division within Welsh life".103 
In politics the Welsh nonconformists drew on their links with English dissent 
and popular radicalism. Throughout the period dissenting campaigns against church 
rates, tithes and burial laws were being increasingly linked with, "a more general 
programme of radical protest."104 The dissenting challenge to aristocratic authority 
thus evolved from a campaign for purely religious freedoms, to one of national and 
political recognition. And while the dissenters took the Tories as their natural enemy, 
they were equally opposed to the Whigs because, as Hanham writes, "on ecclesiastical 
questions both parties [Tory and Whig] voted together". 105 The Second Reform Act 
of 1867 further consolidated the rise of political nonconformity. The growth of the 
electorate coincided with an effective registration programme coordinated by the 
Liberation Society. From the 1850s the spread of Society branches across Wales 
102 K.O.Morgan, Wales in British Politics, 1868-1922 (Wales, 1963), p.12. 
103 Ibid., p.l3. 
104 Ibid., p.15. 
105 Hanham, Elections and Party Management, p.171. 
Chapter V 232 
provided the dissenters with, "an intelligible political creed and an efficient 
machinery".106 In addition the enlargement ofthe electorate placed the dissenters in a 
nominal majority for the frrst time. The increase of voters in 1867-8, and advances in 
registration and organization during the 1860s, provided the nonconformists with, "a 
unique opportunity to disturb the political balance of centuries" .107 
Carmarthenshire was a sprawling rural constituency on the south-west coast of Wales. 
Agriculture was the dominant industry in the county, which stretched for 935 square 
miles from the heaths and moor land of the north-east to the pastoral farms of the 
western hinterland. The county town of Carmarthen remained the most important 
regional centre during the period, although Llanelly on the south-east coast was 
growing in prominence due to the exploitation of mineral resources. The united 
boroughs of Cannarthen and Llanelly returned one member to parliament. 
Carmarthenshire was predominantly Welsh-speaking and with a population of 
115,710 in 1871 it was the third most populous county in Wales behind Glamorgan 
and Monmouthshire. The Second Reform Act effectively doubled the size of the 
county electorate to 8,026. County politics were dominated by large landowning 
families, the greatest of these being the Cawdors and the Dynevors. Earl Cawdor, 
head of the largest estate in west Wales and the leader of the Conservatives in 
Carmarthenshire, exercised a controlling interest over one of the county seats. In 
1868 his withdrawal of support for the sitting member, David Pugh, led to the rupture 
of the county consensus and the capture of one seat by the Liberals. 
The Carmarthenshire contest of 1868 developed as the result of Conservative 
disarray and Liberal opportunism. In the months prior to the election considerable 
106 Morgan, Wales in British Politics, p.17. 
107 Ibid., p.22. 
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doubt was held for the chances of the two sitting Conservative members, David Pugh 
and David Jones. Support for Pugh amongst traditional Tory voters had waned due to 
his increasingly Liberal views, while Jones was thought to be too ill to stand again. 
During his ftrst period as a county member between 1857 and 1868 David Pugh had 
stood as a Liberal-Conservative. He took an independent position on religious 
questions and voted against Church rates. In 1868 he refused to pledge himself over 
the Irish Church issue. His intransigence cost him Earl Cawdor' s support and the 
Conservative 'party' ticket. Two new Conservative candidates were rumoured to be 
coming forward in the event that the sitting members failed to stand: Henry Puxley, a 
rich Irish Tory, and Lord Emlyn, son of Earl Cawdor. Puxley owned estates in 
Ireland and had large copper mining interests. He held a series of election meetings in 
1868 and is described by Cragoe as being the popular candidate. 
Amid the Conservative disarray the Liberals decided to bring forward 
E.J.Sartoris, a landowner with radical sympathies. Sartoris owned land in 
Carmarthenshire but lived in Hampshire. Though a stranger to the constituency he 
was supported by an efficient registration network and, "the ultimate canvassing 
network in the shape of the chapels".108 The contest emerged thus: David Jones stood 
down but transferred his interest to his brother John Jones; David Pugh stood for re-
election "on 'independent' principles"/09 Lord Emlyn declined to contest the election; 
Henry Puxley stood as a Conservative in the Cawdor interest; and E.J.Sartoris stood 
as a Liberal. 
During the campaign Puxley proved the most popular candidate. He gave 
almost as many speeches as Sartoris and was loudly cheered at a succession of 
agricultural dinners and Conservative party meetings. By comparison both Pugh and 
108 Cragoe, An Anglican Aristocracy, p.160. 
109 Carmarthen Weekly Reporter, 10 October 1868, [unpaged]. 
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Jones campaigned less vigorously, with few speeches from either candidate. Sartoris, 
conducted an efficient campaign during which he out-spoke and out-spent his rivals. 
Conservative fears that the vote would be split were realised when Sartoris headed the 
poll with 3,280 votes, ahead of I ones with 2,942. Puxley was beaten into third place 
by just 114 votes. At the bottom of the poll with 1,340 votes was Pugh, whose 
presence had likely cost the Conservatives a seat. Liberal attention to the registration 
of voters after 1867 largely contributed to Sartoris'. victory in 1868. In 
Carmarthenshire the Liberal nonconformists were able to add some 1, 700 voters to 
the register in the months prior to the election. Puxley recognised as much when he 
blamed his defeat on, "the defective registration of 500 or 600 Conservative 
voters". 110 The influence of the dissenting clergy in the Liberal interest cannot be 
underestimated. On the polling day the Carmarthen Journal reported that "Dissenting 
ministers all over the county had converted themselves into electioneering agents for 
the Radical candidate" .111 
Violence at the Carmarthenshire county election in 1868 was preceded, and in fact 
precipitated, by violence at the borough contest. During that campaign Radical rioters 
were blamed for disorder. The first report of violence was recorded after an election 
meeting in Llanelly. The Liberal candidate for the borough, Colonel Stepney, had 
been attending a political meeting with the county candidate, E.J.Sartoris, when "a 
great tumult and rioting took place" .112 The Carmarthen Journal wrote that the 
Conservative committee-rooms at the Thomas' Arms had been attacked by a crowd 
allegedly incited by Stepney. It was claimed that he had contributed to the disorder 
by directing the crowd towards the hotel. The scale of the disorder was no doubt 
uo The Times, 28 November 1868, p.3. 
111 Carmarthen Journal, 27 November 1868, p.3. 
uz Ibid., 6 November 1868, p.5. 
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exaggerated as the damage only amounted to a few broken windows. This mild form 
of election excess gave way to more serious disorder on the borough polling day. In 
Carmarthen Radical partisans were again blamed for violenee. 
Many of the Conservative voters were chased around the town and 
roughly handled, and not even the recognised claims of the tenderer 
sex to freedom from insult could secure their protection ... one poor 
fisherman, who dared to vote for the British Constitution, was 
assaulted by a band of female viragos, incited by a number of Radical 
myrmidons, and beaten and scratched in the face. 113 
Several instances of assault were reported and the Carmarthen Journal concluded 
with the statement: "One good thing h~ been accomplished by the Election this 
week; it has taught the people of Carmarthen that Radicalism has not yet renounced 
its love for physical force" .114 
The actions of the mob left a good deal of ill-will in the county after the 
borough contest, and there were rumours that a disturbance would occur during the 
county election. The Carmarthen Journal reported that Conservative workmen, "felt 
sorely aggrieved by the treatment they [had] received at the hands of the Radical mob 
on the previous Tuesday" .115 As a result they had formed an organised body to 
protect themselves during the county election. Cragoe writes that the possibility of 
disorder was taken seriously by the Carmarthen authorities. There was some 
disagreement as to the best location for the polling booths as, "The Liberals favoured 
the Shire Hall, but the Conservatives feared that the approaches were too narrow, and 
that the mob which would inevitably gather would prevent 'timid voters' from casting 
their votes".116 The Carmarthen Weekly Reporter wrote that a large number of 
strangers had entered the borough, and that a great deal of excitement was building in 
113 Carmarthen Journal, 20 November 1868, p.6. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid., 27 November 1868, p.3. 
116 Cragoe, An Anglican Aristocracy, p.169. 
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all the polling districts. These strangers may have been part of a body organised by 
Henry Puxley, whose committee, "engaged a number of 'lambs', including the 
leading professors of 'fistiana' in the neighbourhood".11? These men wore red 
armbands and on the polling day organised themselves in front of the Town Hall. 
Several fights broke out during the day, between Conservative and Radical 
supporters, and at two o'clock fighting led to "signs of a general melee".118 However 
no serious outbreak of violence was reported. There were rumours of a riot at 
Llanelly, though this was later proved to be an exaggeration and that the extent of the 
damage was that one man had been assaulted. 
The General Election of 1868 has been described as a 'national awakening' in Wales, 
a moment of triumph for Welsh nationalism and Liberal nonconformity. 119 Certainly 
in some constituencies the political change was dramatic: in Cardiganshire the 
V aughan family interest failed to prevent the election of an industrialist and 
nonconformist, E.M.Richards; in Merthyr Tydfil Henry Richard, a leading figure in 
the Liberation Society, was returned ahead of the Anglican magistrate and Home 
Secretary H.A.Bruce; and in Carmarthenshire a 30-year old pattern of political 
representation was broken with the election of the Liberal E.J.Sartoris at the head of 
the poll. Across Wales the Liberals extended their 1865 majority with the capture of 
23 seats, while the Conservatives lost ground with 10 seats. Yet while the election 
signalled an important break with the past, the returns did not represent a solid victory 
for Liberal nonconformity. Almost without exception the 23 Liberals elected were 
117 Carmarthen Weekly Reporter, 28 November 1868, [unpaged]. 
118 Carmarthen Journal, 27 November 1868, p.3. 
119 For a discussion of this topic see Hanham, Elections and Party Management, esp, pp.170 - 179; 
Morgan, Wales in British Politics; Cragoe, An Anglican Aristocracy; J.Morgan, "Denbighshire's Annus 
Mirabilis: The borough and county elections of 1868" Welsh History Review, vii (1974), pp.63- 87. 
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Whigs, and only 3 out of 33 Welsh members were active dissenters.120 Rather than 
being a moment of national and political triumph, the General Election of 1868 may 
better be seen as straddling the period of change from one style of politics to another 
The Carmarthenshire county contest of 1868 was a notable break with the 
past. The election of a Liberal, and a stranger, to the county represented the growing 
significance of issues over personalities, and the importance party organisation over 
local influence. The election signalled the beginning of the end for interest-based 
politics, and heralded the emergence of a more nationally oriented, party-based 
politics. However, John Jones's election reflected the continued relevance of local 
connections and landlord influence. Much has been written of the political evictions 
by Tory landlords that followed the Liberal victory in 1868. Yet Cragoe argues that 
genuine examples of eviction were most likely less frequent than either side alleged. 
In Cannarthenshire at least there is evidence that what the Liberals lacked in the way 
of landlord-tenant influence, they made up for in chapel influence. Mob intimidation 
seems unlikely to have played a significant role in either the borough or county 
election. Indeed the episodes of disorder that accompanied the Carmarthenshire 
elections of 1868 were, by contemporary British standards, relatively muted: the 
disturbance at the borough election amounted to the assault of a number of 
Conservative voters, while the county contest was disrupted by a number of mild 
collisions between Radical and Conservative partisans. 
120 Morgan, Wales in British Politics, p.25. 
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VI 
The violent scenes depicted in the case studies represent only a small cross-section of 
mid-Victorian electoral disorder. A considerable number of riots and disturbances, 
many on a greater scale than those included here, are not discussed in detail. For 
example in 1868 alone a woman was killed in Newport, Monmouthshire when 
soldiers charged a riotous election crowd, a 63 year-old man was killed in front of the 
hustings during a riot in North Durham, pitched battles involving hundreds attended 
elections in Staffordshire and Shropshire, and in Preston, Lancashire a disturbance 
after the contest resulted in one man being shot in the neck (he did, however, 
survive!). In addition there were serious episodes of violence in election years not 
mentioned, particularly in 1880. The episodes of violence described here, and the 
catalogue of disorder outlined in Chapter N, reveal that throughout the period 
English and Welsh elections could provoke serious, and sustained, outbursts of crowd 
violence. The case studies therefore demonstrate that electoral violence was not a 
spent force in English politics during the mid-to-late Victorian period, and the scale of 
disorder described here goes well beyond that of broken windows and fractured 
kneecaps. 
Compared to the general patterns of violence established in Chapter N, the 
constituencies examined here provide relatively atypical examples of election 
violence. As Table 13 (p.167) shows most English and Welsh constituencies were 
unlikely to produce more than one case of electoral disorder during the period. Yet 
Lincoln elections were violent five times between 1857 and 1880, Carmarthenshire 
elections ended in violence twice in 1868 and 1880, Bradford elections were violent 
in 1867 and 1869, and Kidderminster produced electoral disorder in 1857 and again in 
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1865. However this does not lessen their value as case studies. While they are 
atypical in the pattern of recurrent violence, they are typical in revealing the dynamics 
of electoral violence within the framework of constituency politics. And what is most 
striking about the case studies are the similarities they exhibit. 
The case studies reflect the continuing role of violence at elections in the post-
reform era, and demonstrate both its complexity and seriousness. In contrast to 
Richter and Hoppen's suggestions that violence reflected a 'simple love of disorder' 
or the 'letting off of steam', these brief outlines of Victorian electoral culture reveal 
the multi-layered nature of election disorder. Rather than limiting the cause of crowd 
violence to a straightforward cash transaction, drunkenness or boredom (or 
combinations of such), we should recognise these events as phenomena that reflect 
the intricacies of local politics. In Kidderminster the events of 1857 highlight the 
complex interplay of personalities and issues that led to violence. The riot did not 
develop out of the carnival atmosphere of the campaign, or as the outcome of a bored 
populace seeking entertainment. It is highly likely that at least part of the crowd that 
attacked Robert Lowe was organised for the purpose. However, it is also clear that 
the townspeople had genuine grievances relating to their member's attitude towards 
them. Lowe's failure to engage adequately with local concerns and local issues cost 
him dearly. In a borough with a history of class conflict and crowd violence, and at a 
time when wages were being squeezed and hundreds living on charity, Lowe's 
seeming ambivalence towards his constituents set him on a collision course with an 
angry populace. 
In Lincoln election violence owed as much to popular resentment of civic 
authority as it did to radical frustration. A fierce parochialism informed the Lincoln 
riots: in 1862 the introduction of a county force to police a by-election led to an attack 
Chapter V 240 
on the Mayor's residence; and when in 1865 the military were summoned to assist the 
borough force, serious rioting again occurred. However, party conflict was at the core 
of violence in Lincoln: it was a Conservative candidate's hotel room that was 
repeatedly targeted by rioters. Contemporary reports identified employees of the 
town's iron foundries as being prominent in the disturbances. As radical non-electors 
their participation in the riots may have been the result of frustration at the political 
dominance of the Tory candidate and member, Bramley Moore. 
The Carmarthenshire election of 1868 proved somewhat different from those 
in Kidderminster, Lincoln and Bradford; the election of E.J.Sartoris in the face of 
local aristocratic opposition represented a triumph of organisation over influence, and 
of issues over personalities. And yet the similarities between the electoral cultures of 
all four constituencies are still striking. Electioneering in Carmarthenshire was 
punctuated by much the same scenes of disorder as in England, and the outbreak of 
violence, as elsewhere, reflected the strength of local partisan rivalries. What limited 
election violence there was in Carmarthenshire during the mid-Victorian period grew 
out of party conflict and organised intimidation; Conservative voters and supporters 
were 'chased around the town' by radical partisans during the borough election, then 
retaliated during the county contest by organising a 'mob' of their own. 
The constituency analyses presented here demonstrate that the diffusion of political 
principle after 1832 was not a rapid process. In contrast to Phillips and Wetherell's 
conclusion that "[after 1832] political principle defined in national terms by the 
parties in Westminster took the place of the local, factional and idiosyncratic concerns 
that had dominated England's unreformed political system", electioneering in Lincoln 
and Kidderminster during the mid-Victorian period reflected the continued 
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importance of local issues, local identities and local conflicts, without demonstrating 
much evidence of the adoption of a nationally-oriented politics of principle. Even the 
Cannarthenshire election of 1868, elements of which foreshadowed the emergence of 
a national, party based politics, still reflected the importance of local connections and 
landlord influence. Indeed national issues intruded not as the dominant force in these 
constituencies, but as one factor among many. And in the outbreak of electoral 
violence the influence of national political issues normally came a poor second behind 
a multitude of local economic, religious and political rivalries. 
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Chapter VI 
Electoral Violence and the Pace ofPolitical Change: A Conclusion 
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The purpose of this thesis has been to analyse mid-nineteenth century election 
violence in England and Wales in order to provide a better understanding of the 
character ofVictorian electioneering, and to assess the pace of political modernisation 
as defmed by John Phillips and Charles Wethere11.1 The analysis provided in Chapter 
N also allows conclusions to be drawn about a phenomenon that appears to defy easy 
categorisation.2 The statistical evidence of violence, the mapping of its occurrence at 
general elections, and the individual case studies present a picture of mid-century 
politics apparently little different from older, more traditional electoral forms. Ritual, 
symbolism and physical force clearly remained important elements of electioneering 
in England at least, and in larger urban boroughs in particular. As a visible reminder 
of the continuity of English electoral culture, the presence of violence in the mid-to-
late nineteenth century suggests a slow and disjointed process of political 
modernization. In Wales the lack of violence during the period is surprising, but not 
inexplicable. Prior to 1868 the electoral dominance of the Anglican gentry 
contributed to a lack of contests, and thus a lack of disorder. Thereafter, however, the 
frequency of contests increased and continued to rise, yet contemporary sources 
provide only scattered evidence of election violence. 
This study has contributed in several important ways to our understanding of 
mid-Victorian English and Welsh election violence. In Chapter I some of the 
ambiguities that characterise historical perceptions of electoral disorder were outlined, 
including issues of scale, origin and relevance. Donald Richter describes election 
1 See J.Phillips and C.Wetherell, "The Great Reform Act of 1832", pp.411 -436. 
2 Richter, "The Role of Mob Riot", p.26. Richter writes, "While the motivations of certain categories 
of rioters may be attributed to more or less specific sociological strains, religious and/or ethnic 
rivalries, and economic grievances, most election disorders defy such generalisation [my emphasis]". 
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violence as "brutal and vicious", and focuses on events that he classed as "mob 
action[s] of a terrorist nature", whereas K.T.Hoppen argues that electoral violence 
was "merely a general disorder" that rarely became serious. According to John 
Stevenson elections remained a potent source of disorder into the late Victorian 
period, yet Hoppen argues the decline of such violence from 1832. Both Richter and 
Hoppen contend that electoral disorder was most likely a product of corruption as 
well as public enthusiasm ("simple love of disorder" and "letting off steam"), whereas 
Jon Lawrence presents this type of violence as a purposeful use of physical force that 
was employed as part of the symbolism of political legitimacy. The 'student of 
electoral tumults' is thus left with a range of questions about the nature of this 
phenomenon. Did electoral violence represent a serious outburst of public disorder, 
or was it mostly 'harmless chaff'? What did electoral disorder represent within the 
context of electoral politics: was it 'artificially' generated and therefore devoid of 
political relevance; was it a spontaneous outburst of 'sheer ebullience' with no 
motivation beyond boisterous entertainment; or was it a controlled and symbolic 
demonstration of political legitimacy? How late into the nineteenth-century did 
English and Welsh elections continue to experience these kinds of disruptions, and 
which constituencies were most at risk? And did the pattern of disorder change 
during the century? What then has now been revealed about the realities of Victorian 
election violence? 
This study has identified several key features of English and Welsh election disorder 
between 1857 and 1880: a significant number of contested elections in England 
experienced some form of disorder, whereas in Wales this was comparatively rare; the 
scale of violence was most often 'serious' and required some degree of magisterial 
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response to bring it to an end; the frequency of violence increased during the middle 
decades of the period as electoral contests increased; the decline of disorder dates 
from the 1870s; violence in England was widely distributed and rarely occurred in the 
same constituency more than once; larger boroughs dominate the sample of disorder 
because of the frequency with which they were contested, and despite being 
outnumbered by small boroughs before 1867. 
Mid-Victorian election violence occurred at a significant number of contested 
elections between 1857 and 1880. Table 8 (p.121) reveals that between 1865 and 
1880 (the period with the greatest frequency of violence) a minimum of 10% of the 
total number of English and Welsh contests experienced some degree of violence. 3 
Indeed the frequency of disorder was usually higher, with 15.1% of contests 
experiencing violence in 1865, 26.4% in 1868, 11.6% in 1874 and 10.4% in 1880. 
These figures also demonstrate the increase in violence that occurred during the 
1860s, and the gradual decline in the 1870s and 1880s. An important characteristic of 
election disorder was that it rarely occurred in the same location twice. Table 13 
(p.167) shows that between 1857 and 1880 only three constituencies experienced 
more than three disrupted elections. The sample of violence is therefore not 
dominated by a handful of especially violent constituencies. This has important 
implications for a study of the causes of election disorder, which will be examined 
later. 
The scale of violence at English and Welsh elections during the period ranged 
from relatively minor incidents at one end, to full scale riots and mayhem at the other. 
3 If only the English figures are examined the trend appears the same. 9.2% of English contests 
occasioned violence in 1857, 8.3% in 1859, 14.3% in 1865, 24.5% in 1868, 12.7% in 1874 and 11.3% 
in 1880. For a comparison of the percentages for both England and Wales see Table 8. 
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However most cases of violence were serious outbursts of public disorder involving 
physical damage to persons and/or property. Table 9 (p.l25) reveals the scale of 
violence during the period; a total of 63 'riots', 77 'disturbances' and 51 'incidents' 
occurred during campaigning across six general elections between 1857 and 1880. 
Both 'riots' and 'disturbances' are classified as serious outbursts of public violence 
and commonly involved destruction of property and physical assault, as well as 
prompting some form of magisterial response. Thus almost three-quarters (73.2%) of 
all cases of election violence during the period can be described as serious. 'Riots' 
alone accounted for one-third of the sample of disorder. The many examples of 
bleeding bodies, cut faces, broken heads and smashed windows belies a description of 
these events as mere 'enjoyable circuses'. The ten fatalities recorded during these 
years further highlights how serious English, and on occasion Welsh elections could 
become. 
Importantly, in contrast to Richter and Hanham's assertion that electoral 
disorder was a feature of small towns and rural areas, much of the violence of the 
period was concentrated in boroughs rather than counties, and in large urban centres 
as opposed to small boroughs. Between 1857 and 1880 there were a total of 109 
separate cases of borough violence compared to 47 cases of county violence. The 
dominance of the boroughs was partly due to the fact that they outnumbered the 
counties by slightly more than two to one, and because throughout the period 72.6% 
of boroughs were contested compared to 44.6% of counties.4 County constituencies 
were in fact proportionately more likely to endure violence than the boroughs, with 
17.7% of contested counties experiencing disorder as opposed to 12.4% of borough 
4 For an explanation of how these percentages were derived see footnote 23 on page 128. 
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contests. However the greater number of boroughs meant that much of the violence 
during the period occurred there. 
Somewhat surprisingly the study reveals that election violence was not a 
feature of the small boroughs, where it is generally believed traditions of venal and 
corrupt politics were more likely to have persisted. Rather the sample reveals that 
disorder was concentrated in larger boroughs - during the period 94 'large' (more 
than 1,000 before 1867 and more than 2,000 thereafter) and 25 'small' (fewer than 
1,000 prior to 1867 and less than 2,000 after 1867) boroughs experienced some 
degree of violence. The reality was that the smaller boroughs were not contested as 
often as their larger counterparts, and so were less likely to be disrupted. In the larger 
urban constituencies greater and more consistent efforts were needed by the political 
parties to mobilise the electorate, efforts generating a heightened degree of partisan 
conflict and enthusiasm which were frequent causes of violence. Campaign events in 
larger constituencies were also able to attract far bigger crowds than smaller 
constituencies. This is not to argue that small boroughs were politically dormant, 
however they appear to have lacked the frequency of contests that provided an 
important stimulus to electoral violence. 
Map 7 in Chapter IV reveals the distribution of electoral disorder across 
England and Wales between 1857 and 1880. Violence in Wales was concentrated in 
the southern counties of Pembrokeshire, Carmarthenshire, Glamorganshire and 
Monmouthshire, with isolated cases in Denbighshire and Carnarvonshire. This 
pattern reflected the frequency of electoral contests. The low incidence of electoral 
contests in counties like Montgomeryshire, Brecknockshire and Radnorshire accounts 
for the lack of violence in those areas. In England, where violence was located 
predominantly in the North and West Midland, North Western and York divisions, the 
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concentration of disorder reflected the distribution of small and large boroughs. 
Areas with a high proportion of large boroughs experienced a greater number of 
electoral contests, and therefore recorded more cases of violence. Table 14 (p.169) 
reveals the lack of disorder in the Southern, South Eastern and Eastern divisions of 
England, where there was a greater preponderance of small boroughs than in the 
north. Map 7 shows the frequency of English electoral violence to have been 
concentrated in industrial districts, and correspondingly low in agricultural or rural 
areas such as the South Eastern or Southern divisions. This pattern exemplifies the 
distribution of English violence in large urban boroughs with a high population of 
industrial labourers, such as the potteries district and the manufacturing centres of 
Lancashire and Yorkshire. 
A demographic analysis of electoral violence (see Table 15, p.170) failed to 
provide clear evidence of a link between Irish populations and violence. The North-
western division, with the largest concentration of Irish immigrants of any division in 
England or Wales, did experience a considerable amount of violence. Yet the 
Northern, South Midland and London divisions had similarly large Irish populations 
and each failed to produce even half as much disorder as the north west. Table 15 
does not discount the role of the Irish in electoral violence. Yet it suggests that on the 
available evidence explanations of the pattern of violence cannot take into account the 
presence of Irish immigrants. 
The importance of effective policing in the suppression or prevention of 
election disorder is a debatable issue. Police forces, where clumsily used or heavy-
handed in the execution of their duty, were more likely to increase violence than end 
it. Violence in Lincoln during the 1862 by-election was prompted after the county 
police were judged by rioters to have been too rough in dealing with a disorderly 
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election crowd. The small size of borough and county forces meant that the police 
were always going to be outnumbered by disorderly campaign crowds. Table 15 fails 
to show any defmitive pattern of violence based on ratios of police to population. 
London, with the best figures for the country did suffer the least amount of violence 
during the period. Yet neither the South Midland nor Eastern divisions, with low 
ratios of police to population, experienced considerable amounts of violence. 
The pattern of disorder did not alter substantially during the mid-Victorian 
period. Neither the First nor the Second Reform Act contributed to more peaceful 
electioneering in England and Wales, despite Roland Quinalt's argument to the 
contrary, indeed the increases to the electorate in 1832 and particularly in 1867, the 
introduction of a system of registration in the former, and the inclusion of many new 
working class voters in the latter were factors that helped stimulate the frequency of 
electoral violence. These changes motivated the political parties to capture the new, 
enlarged electorates, thereby contributing to the intensification of party conflict and 
the likelihood of violence. The timing of disorder remained relatively static 
throughout the period with most elections being disturbed on the polling day. In that 
respect John Stevenson's argument that the Secret Ballot Act (1872) reduced the 
opportunity for violence by removing the open hustings is wide of the mark. Indeed 
as late as 1880 more than one-third (38.4%) of all disorder continued to occur during 
the poll.5 The Ballot Act did, however, abolish the nomination ceremony which was a 
frequent cause of violence during the period. 
5 For details see Table 12, p.l30. The amount of violence occurring on the polling day may have been 
higher as the statistics used in Table 12 include 26 cases of disorder in which the timing was unknown. 
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This study presents a picture of mid-Victorian election violence as often serious, 
geographically widespread (in England), relatively unchanged in scale and timing 
throughout the period and explicable largely in terms of the frequency of election 
contests. And yet what did these events represent within the context of Victorian 
electoral politics? The motives of 'mobs' or individual rioters are rarely easy to 
discern, and generalisations about the causes of election disorder are likely to obscure 
as much as they reveal. After all what is true of violence in Liverpool, Lancashire is 
not necessarily true of violence in Sandwich, Kent. What then has been written about 
the origins of electoral disorder and what has this study contributed to that discussion? 
As noted previously, there are several interpretations of election violence. It has 
either been characterised as a product of corruption and bribery, as a purposeful and 
ritualised aspect of electioneering, as the spontaneous outburst of a bored populace, or 
as a combination of all three. Richter argues that most episodes of election violence 
defy easy explanation and he suggests that beyond the influence of religious, 
economic and ethnic rivalries, "election riots seem to have occurred with the purest 
spontaneity, with the least degree of justifiable provocation or outrage". 6 Therefore 
Richter turns to a "simple love of disorder'' to explain the bulk of violence that, he 
stresses, owed less to specific sociological strains and more to "spontaneous outbursts 
of sheer ebullience". He largely discounts the importance of political conflict in the 
majority of election disturbances and writes that, "the difference between political 
candidates, many times minute or imperceptible, could hardly have constituted the 
6 Richter, "The Role ofMob Riot", p.26. 
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basis for such brutal and vicious scenes of violence during the campaign and on the 
polling day ... In short, the current of sustained, even habitual [my emphasis] violence 
and rioting burst the bounds of all ordinary discontent"? ·Richter therefore suggests 
that elections provided only the opportunity and not the motive for violence. 
Hoppen echoes Richter's assessment of election violence as a product of 
public boredom and the "letting off [of] steam". According to him Victorian electoral 
'mobs' did not challenge the political status quo and sought only "participation in 
enjoyable circuses". Yet Hoppen also contends that electoral manipulation was at the 
bottom uf most cases of violence and he describes English elections as being, 
"characterised by an atmosphere of urban mayhem and carnival underpinned by cash 
on the nail".8 Hoppen's interpretation of Victorian electoral disorder largely deprives 
the participants of self-determination and presents them as either thugs-for-hire or as 
bored spectators. 
Rather than a random, spontaneous or artificially generated outburst, 
Lawrence argues that electoral disorder represented a "widespread acceptance of, and 
frequent connivance in, 'the politics of disruption'".9 He presents these episodes as 
part of a controlled display of physical force in which the disruption of campaign 
events, or the 'capture' of civic space, formed a ritualised aspect of constituency 
electioneering. As such violence was employed by politicians and partisans alike as a 
highly visible and symbolic expression of political legitimacy. Lawrence's 
interpretation, while perhaps downplaying the severity of such events, suggests a 
purposeful use of violence in which an electoral contest provided the motive and not 
the opportunity for disorder. 
7 Richter, "Public Order", p.240. 
8 Hoppen, "Grammars", p.610. 
9 Lawrence, Speaking for the Pe~ple, p.l83. 
Chapter VI 252 
The case studies in Chapter V provide an insight into the relative complexity 
of electoral violence. The K.idderminster riot of 1857 owed much to partisan conflict, 
economic depression, the unpopularity of the sitting member and the introduction of 
an organised body of strangers to the town. Violence in Lincoln during the 1860s 
grew out of partisan conflict and the political frustrations of the town's radical non-
electors. Militant parochialism, opposition to authority and the influence of treating 
also contributed to Lincoln's disturbed elections. Bradford disorder was the product 
of corruption (large-scale treating) and local rifts in political and religious opinion. 
The popularity of election events in Bradford, and the large crowds that gathered for 
speeches and meetings, also added to the potential for violence. In Carmarthenshire 
violence grew out of partisan conflict and the introduction of organised 'roughs' in 
the Conservative interest. This evidence suggests that the origins of electoral disorder 
were rarely straightforward or simple. Beyond mere outbursts of 'sheer ebullience', 
election riots could express genuine political grievances, and even where local 
political tensions or religious conflicts provide a ready answer for violence, corrupt 
practices could be found to have exercised an influence over disorder. 
Given the apparent complexity that underlay moments of election disorder, 
interpretations that stress the spontaneity or randomness of violence require some 
assessment. Richter downplays the importance of political motivations in the 
outbreak of election violence and goes so far as to suggest that, 
This is not to say that the rioters were necessarily aware of the 
underlying motives for their rowdiness ... the more conscientious would 
hardly be willing to admit that they raised a row at meetings merely for 
the sake of a good time. Whether consciously or unconsciously the 
working class rowdy sought to rationalise or justify his conduct as 
fierce devotion to such commendable causes as religion, political 
:freedoms or social justice.10 
10 Richter, "Public Order", p.250. 
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Yet contemporary reports of violence in which indiscriminate looting and destruction 
of property took place are balanced by accounts in which partisan motives were 
clearly obvious. Attacks on committee-rooms, candidates besieged in their lodgings, 
the houses of prominent party supporters being targeted, successful and unsuccessful 
candidates pursued by 'mobs', and the partisan heckling, abuse and fighting that 
occurred in front of the hustings; all suggest that Victorians were passionate about 
their politics and were willing to engage even physically with the electoral campaign. 
Furthermore, mid-Victorian election violence does not appear to have been habitual. 
Only a handful of English and Welsh constituencies repeatedly experienced disturbed 
elections, a situation that would undoubtedly have been reversed had a recourse to 
violence been a habitual aspect of electioneering. Yet does the wide distribution of 
disorder shown in Table 13 (p.l67) provide evidence of the randomness of electoral 
violence? The case studies in Chapter V suggest another possibility as disorder in 
Kidderminster, Lincoln, Bradford and Carmarthenshire appears less the product of 
habitual patterns of violence, and more the outcome of specific local tensions. A 
complex interplay of social, economic, religious and political conflicts informed mid-
Victorian constituency politics, and the outbreak of violence in any constituency 
depended upon the convergence of a number of factors: the length of the campaign, 
the bitterness of the local political divide, the candidature of a stranger, the economic 
condition of the constituency, traditions of treating, corrupt practices and the potential 
local importance of national political issues. As such the frequency of violence within 
an individual constituency depended upon fluctuations in the intensity of those 
essentially local tensions. It seems clear, therefore, that elections provided the motive 
rather than the opportunity for violence. Victorian campaigning undoubtedly 
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provided a measure of popular entertainment, but to characterize election violence as 
the product of 'sheer ebullience' is wide of the mark. Whether generated by partisan 
enthusiasm, corruption or even as part ofthe symbolism of party legitimacy, electoral 
disorder represented the violent extension of a political contest. 
m 
According to John Phillips and Charles Wetherell, "England's frenzy over the Reform 
Bill in 1831, coupled with the effect of the bill itself upon its enactment in 1832, 
unleashed a wave of political modernization" .11 However the picture of Victorian 
electioneering that emerges from this study is one in which political change was 
delayed by the strength of pre-reform electoral traditions. In describing the nature of 
English electioneering during the mid-nineteenth century Hoppen writes, "Locally, 
involvement in electoral politics tended to mean action and ritual (often violent action 
and ritual) rather than decision-making" .12 Certainly in that respect little had changed 
for more than a century, and it is startling how far descriptions of mid-Victorian 
elections mirror those of Hanoverian England despite the passage of reform acts in 
1832 and 1867. Indeed much of the chaos and venality satirised in William Hogarth's 
prints of the Oxfordshire contest of 1754 can be found duplicated in particular 
nineteenth-century election reports. 13 Given this apparent level of continuity in 
English electoral culture, what conclusions can be drawn about the pace of political 
modernisation; that development which John Phillips and Charles Wetherell have 
argued began to rapidly change the face of English electoral politics after 1832? 
11 Phillips and Wetherell, "The Great Reform Act", p.412. 
12 Hoppen, The Mid-Victorian Generation, p.257. 
13 See for example Chairing the Members (1754) in which corruption, intimidation, treating, rioting 
and chairing are all displayed. 
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Phillips and Wetherell argue that the First Reform Act quickly replaced the 
Hanoverian political system with "an essentially modem electoral system based on 
rigid partisanship and clearly articulated political principle".14 They argue that 
"persistent flaws" should not obscure the new political realities that were ushered in 
with reform in 1832. Yet how far should those 'flaws' be ignored when they stand at 
odds with a picture of post-reform politics as inclusive, principled and partisan? This 
study has highlighted the largely parochial nature of a significant portion of the mid-
Victorian electoral system. Phillips and Wetherell stress that in the wake of the Great 
Reform Act, "political principle defined in national terms by the parties in 
Westminster took the place of the local, factional and idiosyncratic concerns that had 
dominated England's unreformed political system".15 And yet a quarter of a century 
later electoral politics in a number of English constituencies continued to revolve 
around the influence of local personalities, local political, economic and social 
tensions, corruption, electoral tradition and a recourse to the coercive or symbolic 
implications of physical force and violence. 
The pace of English political modernization after 183 2 has been challenged by 
Jaggard in a study of electoral politics in seven Cornish small boroughs between the 
First and Second Reform Acts.16 He argues that, 
Cornwall's small boroughs as well as family and proprietary boroughs 
elsewhere illustrate how voters' preferences were the outcome of a 
mixture of factors including questions of principle, electoral history, 
the power of patrons, and local circumstances. Furthermore, after 
1832 the speed of political modernisation was a function ofthe relative 
strength of these varied factors, which was slower in many smaller 
boroughs. 17 
14 Phillips and Wetherell, "The Great Reform Act of 1832", p.412. 
15 Ibid., p.415. 
16 Jaggard, "Small Boroughs", pp.622- 642. 'Small' boroughs refers to those with fewer than 1,000 
voters prior to 1867. 
17 Ibid., p.642. 
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Yet the evidence of election violence presented here suggests that a slow pace of 
modernisation was not restricted to the smaller boroughs. Indeed the majority of 
Victorian election disorder occurred in the larger boroughs, where party organisation 
might be expected to have been more advanced, and where the type of principled, 
partisan politics that Phillips and Wetherell describe could have had a chance to 
flourish. Indeed their conclusions about the pace of political modernisation are based 
on evidence drawn almost exclusively from larger boroughs.18 Thus in a number of 
mid-Victorian English constituencies, of the very type in which Phillips and Wetherell 
found a "new view of principle and principled behaviour"19 after 1832, electoral 
politics continued to resonate to older electoral tunes in which notions of party, 
principle and organisation were subsumed in favour of a reliance on ritual, symbolism 
and action. 
This thesis has identified the portion of the English electoral system that experienced 
violence during the mid-Victorian period. In Wales violence was largely muted as 
opportunities for electoral contests were stifled by the political hegemony of the 
landed aristocracy. In England the continued presence of violence beyond the frrst 
threshold of reform in 1832, and into the post-1867 era, reflected the strength of pre-
modem electoral traditions and priorities. Caroline Jackson describes the mid-
Victorian period as characterised by a dichotomy between two competing forms of 
politics; one that looked backwards to the past, and one that looked forwards to the 
future. Within such a framework violence remained as a visible expression of an 
18 Phillips and Wetherell, "The Great Reform Act of 1832", p.421. They used data drawn from 12 
large boroughs and 1 small borough. The size of the electorate (in 1857) for each borough is provided 
in brackets: Beverley (1,136), Bristol (12,612), Colchester (1,282), Hull (5,494), Lewes (724), 
Liverpool (18,314), Maidstone (1,611), Newcastle (1,365), Northampton (2,375), Norwich (6,175), 
Shrewsbury (1,617), Southampton (3,508) and Yarmouth (1,308). 
19 Ibid., p.425. 
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older style of politics. The nineteenth-century proved "a crucial transitional period 
between the comparatively narrow (yet lively) electoral world of the eighteenth-
century and the broad democracy of the twentieth" ?0 And as we have seen, in the 
mid-Victorian period the diffusion of political principle, voter partisanship and party 
organisation was at times slowed by, amongst other factors, the repeated occurrence 
of electoral violence. 
20 Ibid., p.553. 
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The appendix includes all cases of election violence referred to in the thesis as 'the 
sample'. Each episode has been categorized according to the following criteria: (i) 
the county in which the constituency was located; (ii) the location of the violence, 
normally a borough name but in some cases this records a county town; (iii) the year 
in which the violence occurred; (iv) the type of constituency involved, either borough 
or county; (v) the scale of the violence, either 'riot', 'disturbance' or 'incident'; and 
(vi) the timing of the episode, if known. The size of the electorate involved is also 
recorded, whether borough or county, and the source in which the episode of violence 
was located is also provided. For easy identification all duplicate episodes of violence 
have been highlighted and are in italics. In the constituency description category 
cases of county violence are in bold type. The numbers provided in the far left 
column are for reference purposes only. 
Aooendix 
Coun 
1 BERKSHIRE 
2 ESSEX 
3 GLOUCESTERSHIRE 
4 LANCASHIRE 
5 LANCASHIRE 
6 NOTTINGHAMSHIRE 
7 SUSSEX 
8 WARWICKSHIRE 
9 WORCESTERSHIRE 
10 YORKSHIRE 
11 YORKSHIRE 
12 YORKSHIRE 
Coun 
13 DORSET 
14 LANCASHIRE 
,'1~:!fANQifsftl8§,· 
16 LANCASHIRE 
17 LANCASHIRE 
18 MIDDLESEX 
19 OXFORDSHIRE 
20 WILTSHIRE 
21 YORKSHIRE 
22 YORKSHIRE 
23 YORKSHIRE,W.R 
Place 
Wallingford 
Harwich 
Tewkesbury 
Rochdale 
Bolton 
Nottingham 
Brighton 
Coventry 
Kidderminster 
Beverley 
York 
Sheffield 
Place 
Bury 
Oldham 
Finsbury 
Banbury 
Calne 
Beverley 
Hull 
Leeds 
Year 
1857 
1857 
1857 
1857 
1857 
1857 
1857 
1857 
1857 
1857 
1857 
1857 
Year 
1859 
1859 
1859 
1859 
1859 
1859 
1859 
1859 
1859 
Election 
Borough 
Borough 
Borough 
Borough 
Borough 
Borough 
Borough 
Borough 
Borough 
Borough 
Borough 
Borough 
Election 
Borough 
Borough 
Borough 
Borough 
Borough 
Borough 
Borough 
Borough 
Coun 
Disorder 
Disturbance 
Disturbance 
Incident 
Disturbance 
Incident 
Incident 
Incident 
Incident 
Riot 
Disturbance 
Disturbance 
Incident 
Disorder 
Incident 
Disturbance 
Disturbance 
Disturbance 
Disturbance 
Riot 
Incident 
Disturbance 
Incident 
Timin 
Declaration 
Declaration 
Polling Day 
Meeting 
Nomination 
Declaration 
Nomination 
Meeting 
Polling Day 
Nomination 
Nomination 
Nomination 
BOR 
371 
313 
371 
1255 
1933 
5650 
3936 
4982 
502 
1136 
4236 
6874 
cou Source 
The Times 
The Times 
B&WJ.1857 April4. 
259 
NLH, 1857 April 4 & Hoppen 
Manchester Guardian 
The Times 
The Times 
CWT, Supplement March 18 
MG, Coventry Weekly Times 
S/C.1857 Petition Mf.62.28-9 
Nonconformist 
The Times 
Timina BOR COU Source 
Polling Day 264 The Times 
Meeting 4222 Manchester Guardian 
NYiietJninFr ~;"T12?~ .. !~:~ ''·· ····•····· · ···Miiicfie~ter<.;uariit~Ji:· .j · 
Declaratio~· \289 ,,, Manchester Gtl~'rdian · ·. •· ·· 
Polling Day 2151 Manchester Guardian 
Meeting 21951 
Polling Day 672 
Declaration 17 4 
Nomination 1210 
Declaration 5526 
Meetin 40476 
Manchester Guardian 
Victorian Ban bury- B.Trinder 
Bridlington Free Press 
Manchester Guardian 
Manchester Guardian 
Manchester Guardian 
Appendix 
County Place Year Election 
24 BERKSHIRE Reading 1860 Borough BY 
25 YORKSHIRE, E Beverley 1860 Borough BY 
County Place Year Election 
26 LEICESTERSHIRE Leicester 1861 Borough BY 
County Place Year Election 
27 LINCOLNSHIRE Grimsby 1862 Borough BY 
28 LINCOLNSHIRE Lincoln 1862 Borough BY 
Disorder 
Incident 
Incident 
Disorder 
Riot 
Disorder 
Riot 
Riot 
Timin9 
Polling Day 
Declaration 
Timin9 
Unknown 
Timing 
Polling Day 
Polling Day 
BOR cou 
1451 
1210 
BOR cou 
4207 
BOR cou 
4348 
1435 
County Place Year Election Disorder Timing - BOR COU 
29 BERKSHIRE Maidenhead 1865 County Disturbance Polling Day 764 7 
30 BERKSHIRE Windsor 1865 Borough Disturbance Declaration 651 
31 CAMBRIDGESHIRE Cambridge 1865 Borough Incident Nomination 1769 
32 CUMBERLAND Carlisle 1865 Borough Disturbance Nomination 1304 
· s3:'c£JfVi8i{fj~ftt5L~:· · _., · · · ciiliisiir~r·:· .. : .. : •-, 1~~5'' ·• · .·· ai/rotlgh : · • ~ q[~t{{rpan<fe__ · F:9ijj~f;'fi~Yii"'H;;·~~Q~Sm!t ·.: •-• ··· ·· 
34 DEVON Tavistock 1865 Borough Disturbance Declaration 426 
35 GLOUCESTERSHIRE Cheltenham 1865 Borough Disturbance Canvass 2793 
~~~I({4<:Jl:f{Jg}~'il£F?.§HJtJ~;···gil~lfltn~~Jifjj: ··:·.••·]J36~-~--~-J¥fife~!L1i]::. :)pistuf6ance·r·r·: lifeiJJFifiJ0·· •· _: -~:~~9,"3''~"~~, · 
37 LANCASHIRE Rochdale 1865 Borough Riot Unknown 1358 
38 LANCASHIRE Oldham 1865 Borough Incident Unknown 2285 
39 LEICESTERSHIRE,N Leicestershire,N 1865 County Disturbance Polling Day 
40 Ll NCOLNSHIRE Lincoln 1865 Borough Riot Polling Day 
41 Ll NCOLNSHI RE Grantham 1865 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 
1713 
755 
6348 
260 
Source 
Manchester Guardian 
The Times 
Source 
The Times 
Source 
Manchester Guardian 
Home Office Papers 
Source 
Nonconformist 
Times 
Nonconformist 
Times, CENA 
·cgtR~_:::;· .?2.: ..• c ... 
C&DH 
Cheltenham Examiner 
· ci!felfen6aiif&'iimineHc:·r 
Richter, 1965 Thesis 
Hoppen, 1994 Article 
HLT 
Home Office Papers 
Noncon, C&DH 
Avvendix 261 
County Place Year Election Disorder flming BOR COU Source 
42 NOTTINGHAMSf-iiRE .... Nottingham •....... · ...... 1865 .. · .·•. B~rough·.·.·· ·.··•· Ri?t, .••.•. .Me~tin~···.: . 5934 ··•···· .. · •.. ··•···· ..... Non~o.~for~ist 
43 ·•ffovJtrf[Gfi:A!i!iJ§iiiftl& .• .li11/filfi9:7iiidlJ · ..•• ,: 4865 ;:-·T?C>iJ/ui:Jfli····.·.··. oisfu[ba~ce. :~ •r M1!Jl!na~O!J .· ,:;~~$4}i;T . ···.·· ...... ·.; : : ··• . Nonr/cFe;i1ofii-i[§f)'1J;:J;·:;~; 44P'EfVIsR.oKEsRTR.'E. ·Pembr.cil<e·~··· · Ts65 sorou9h.. incident. Nomination · ··1433 ···· · ·· ··········· ··The welshm·a·n · 
45 PEMBROKESHIRE Haverfordwest 1865 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 669 The Welshman 
46 SUSSEX Lewes 1865 Borough Incident Nomination 676 Times 
41 7 ltt~f5W£Gf(§l;fl@y!}£ / lMfl~rS.t9H!Pj;~.i . · ... ·.···18~§! .. d·9.R~~~T' ··~.IfnciCient : ····• · ··· 'P(jftt~9f!iiiit r::r• ··:r . ,.374(! U • (¥tJt~~t;; t~?4~~1$t~f&d~iirf&cfiL 
48 WARWICKSHIRE,N Nuneaton 1865 County Incident Polling Day. 3740 .. Quinalt, 1974 inStevenson&Q 
49 Jf!liijW£q~§lfif!jg~~iT ,r;~M~riJlOOf!?.~~)i I:~.'Ji~:·l~~§~;:l~~:£f>Hnt.Yi:;E~~2f11S.1i.Jf§~~fif .·::.·::·flnf/j§liiili~Tif·t ~~~;llii1Il~§.§Q;;r;J.:91Jlrt?ft;;·r.~~¥i!!J.$J.~ft~Hilh~fAii.~: 
50 WARWICKSHIRE,S Warwick 1865 County Incident Unknown 2550 Quinalt, 1974 in Stevenson&Q 
51 WILTSHIRE Chippenham 1865 Borough Riot Polling Day 392 Times, Non, C&DH 
52 WILTSHIRE Cricklade 1865 Borough Riot Polling Day- 2029 Times 
53 WORCESTERSHIRE Kidderminster 1865 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 612 
54 WORCESTERSHIRE Dudley 1865 Borough Riot Unknown 1358 
55 YORKSHIRE, WR.S Rotherham 1865 County Riot Polling Day 
56 YORKSHIRE, WR.S Huddersfield 1865 Borough Riot Unknown 
57 YORKSHIRE, E Hull 1865 Borough Disturbance Declaration 
County 
58 ESSEX 
59 YORKSHIRE, WR.N 
Place 
Colchester 
Bradford 
Year 
1867 
1867 
Election 
Borough BY 
Borough BY 
Disorder 
Incident 
Riot 
Timing 
Unknown 
Nomination 
2138 
5566 
BOR 
1405 
21158 
19908 
cou 
Times 
C&DH 
Nonconformist 
C&DH 
HLT 
Source 
Proceedings of the H.C. 
Select Committee 1868-9 
r 
Avvendix 262 
County Place Year Election Disorder Timing BOR COU Source 
60 CAMBRIDGESHIRE Cambridge 1868 Borough Incident Polling Day 4000 Gloucester Journal 
61 CAMBRIDGESHIRE Whittlesey 1868 County Riot Polling Day 9502 The Times 
62 ,:qjjftii!NJ~lj{gl)i; :~ 7~ ;;: "~f!~ii~Itfi miE~~~ • : ~ }868 '} :}?§fcftj~~; ' : ;r Jit6Ji:N~J1f>;·. Y¥if~i[~!it' ; ' •• ~ ~g~~~~j ,~T ,J ! s ;>; i i,Q~r(p~ij}J~q;J}~flirij~l· 
63 CARMARTHEN Carmarthen 1868 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 3286 Carmarthen Journal 
64 CARMARTHEN Carmarthen 1868 County Disturbance Polling Day 8026 Carmarthen Journal 
65 CARNARVONSHIRE Carnarvon 1868 Borough Incident Polling Day 3376 C&DH 
66 CHESHIRE Birkenhead 1868 Borough Incident Nomination 5892 Manchester Guardian 
67 :PlllS~ldlff§I;;::;:;c ···;:;~.:r;g:J~/E~~rrb:~~~~r:z.; ·',E.I~~§:~· .:· ". :§919liii~ ········· :·.• '::lb£~cien,f:;.,~;·'~J}iJlilltn.gJP~x~i~~:~§§~?:':" J~~IEi E~.'~! X '.::ftf{lhfi@~t~!I?'ft~r~l~h 
68 CHESHIRE,MID Sandbach 1868 County Riot Polling Day 7158 
69 CUMBERLAND Carlisle 1868 Borough Disturbance Unknown 4537 
70 CUMBERLAND,E Cumberland,E 1868 County Riot Declaration· 6672 
71 DENBIGHSHIRE Ruthin (Denbigh E 1868 Borough Incident Unknown 7623 
72 DERBY,E Clay Cross 1868 County Disturbance Polling Day 4550 
73 DERBY,S Ripley 1868 County Riot Polling Day 7873 
74 DEVON,S Hatherleigh 1868 County Riot Polling Day 8047 
75 DURHAM,N Durham City 1868 County Riot Polling Day 10576 
76 GLAMORGANSHIRE Cardiff 1868 Borough Riot Unknown 5388 
77 GLAMORGANSHIRE Aberdare (Merthy1 1868 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 14577 
78 GLOUCESTERSHIRE Cheltenham 1868 Borough Disturbance Declaration 3536 
79 GLOUCESTERSHIRE Coleford 1868 County Disturbance Polling Day 11463 
80 ISLE OF WIGHT Newport 1868 County Disturbance Unknown 3807 
81 KENT Gravesend 1868 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 2722 
82 KENT ,W Bromley 1868 County Disturbance Polling Day 8828 
83 LANCASHIRE Blackburn 1868 Borough Disturbance Nomination 9183 
Manchester Guardian 
CENA 
Manchester Guardian, G.J 
C&DH 
Derbyshire Courier 
DC, Richter 
The Times, GJ 
Manchester Guardian 
BDP, The Cambrian 
Bristol Daily Post 
Gloucester Journal 
Gloucester Journal 
Hansard(3)1870.Vol.202 p.1355 
Select Committee 1868-9 
Home Office Papers 
MG, CJ 
Avvendix 
County Place Year Election Disorder Timing BOR 
84 LANCASHIRE Bury 1868 Borough Disturbance Nomination 5587 
85 LANCASHIRE Wigan 1868 Borough Incident Polling Day 3939 
86 LANCASHIRE Warrington 1868 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 4470 
87 LANCASHIRE Preston 1868 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 10763 
88 LANCASHIRE Bolton 1868 Borough Riot Polling Day 12650 
89 LANCASHIRE Salford 1868 Borough Incident Polling Day 15862 
90 LANCASHIRE Ashton-u-Lyne 1868 Borough Riot Polling Day 4822 
91 LANCASHIRE Stalybridge 1868 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 5338 
92 LANCASHIRE Manchester 1868 Borough Disturbance Nomination 48256 
93 LANCASHIRE,S Blackburn 1868 County Riot Nomination 
94 LANCASHIRE,S.W Wigan 1868 County Disturbance Polling Day 
95 LEICESTERSHIRE,N Shepshed 1868 County Riot Polling Day 
96 LEICESTERSHIRE,S Hinckley 1868 County Riot Polling Day 
97 LINCOLNSHIRE Lincoln 1868 Borough Riot Declaration 4243 
98 LINCOLNSHIRE Boston 1868 Borough Disturbance Nomination 2527 
99 LINCOLNSHIRE,S Lincolnshire,S 1868 County Disturbance Declaration 
100 MIDDLESEX Finsbury 1868 Borough Disturbance Meeting 33601 
101 MONMOUTHSHIRE Newport 1868 Borough Riot Polling Day 3731 
cou 
19340 
19218 
6348 
8306 
263 
Source 
Manchester Guardian 
Manchester Guardian 
MG, Warrington Guardian 
MG 
MG 
MG 
MG, Hanham 
Select Committee 1868-9 
Gloucester Journal 
Manchester Guardian 
Nonconformist 
Derbyshire Courier 
MG, Times, GJ 
J.F.Hill (Victorian Lincoln)p.34 
Boston Gazette 
1 0493 Boston Gazette 
Alcester Chronicle 
102 MONMOUTHSHIRE Blanaevon 1868 County Riot Polling Day 7971 
MG, Home Office Papers 
Manchester Guardian 
1o3,,rffp'NAI{()I.Jrl-j~ljlfjg''I,~~ntypR~[E;,:I;1.~~~[ ~'~~u~~i,: .. Riot: · .. ~61/ih~(~g:,. '':' f~~f,t/' 
1 04,ft(19NMPUTHS1j{f(W .••..•••••...• ~l)~r?ychae . '··········~.1868'' '.;gotlpty,i::: F· •.• Riot; : ,. i ...••• P;q/QIJf/rEJEJY~::· r::,rr , ····,,,?~£1t 
105 MQNMOUTHSH/RE: ·····tf~c/~Q~( , ••..•.•.... ,~!t ~.fc§~§i. ,:~~2t~I!~L:: .. •·• ·Riot .. · · .,:·.· fg[l!f?dt~Y,i .... • .··. ~· ·~·,.((J7,tt•• ,;)r~'~"J!t,t[L''• 
106 NORTHAMPTONSHIRE Peterborough 1868 Borough Disturbance Declaration 2461 
107 NOTTINGHAMSHIRE Nottingham 1868 Borough Incident Meeting 14168 
108 NOTTINGHAMSHIRE,N Mansfield 1868 Coui!!Y. Riot Nomination 5205 
Boston Gazette 
The Times 
MG, Times, DC 
Avvendix 264 
Countv Place Year Election Disorder Timina BOR COU Source 
109 SHROPSHIRE Church Stretton 1868 County Riot Polling Day 5847 MG, Staffordshire Advertiser 
110 SOMERSET Bristol 1868 Borough Riot Polling Day 21153 MG, Times, GJ 
113 STAFFORDSHIRE Stafford 1868 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 3152 SA, Stafford Petition 
114 STAFFORDSHIRE Wednesbury 1868 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 14277 Staffordshire Advertiser 
115 STAFFORDSHIRE Lichfield 1868 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 1320 Staffordshire Advertiser 
116 STAFFORDSHIRE,W Wolverhampton 1868 County Disturbance Polling Day 9942 MG, The Times 
Jii~f!ll!~~:!ir•t,~,i ~i{!~~-~ ~JT~;~~:~~47i,,tl~:,ir~if~J$il 1''::r;, 
120 SUFFOLK Ipswich 1868 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 5352 lE & ESM 
121 SUSSEX Horsham 1868 Borough Incident Nomination 799 Richter, 1965 
122 \'\fARWICKSHIRE,s.. 1Le~mingto~ .. , 1868,, County. Distu~bance .· Decl~~.ation 6205 : < Boston (3a.~ette 123 ,W~FiJMRB~f:l(@t§ :. i§.t[~tf§i4t4~A~RIJ •. ::: t86i3. · ~fly~~<···-· ln(;k;ien.f; 1. l[nF.rO.itlli' $42fJ.~C · N~~tlii;t;hrp,qio[e:c'< 
124 WORCESTERSHIRE,E Hales Owen 1868 County Riot Polling Day 10313 Manchester Guardian 
125 ~W.C!l3XJ!r~tiii3~1f!{f§§.B~~~I146.:',:· .· J i::·l§§~i .. ; .. ;£~iif!tYXt ·• bfstiii:ban(;ef' ::e§!f(og.i~t .. x ,.:tr.::;.;<to343' ··· ··· '[~~t~f,ifP.lj~ofii£!~;:L"·~:T· 
126 YORKSHIRE,W.R.S Wakefield 1868 Borough Riot Nomination 36 27 
127 YORKSHIRE,W.R Halifax 1868 Borough Incident Polling Day 9328 
128 YORKSHIRE, E York 1868 Borough Riot Declaration 9088 
129 YORKSHIRE,W.R Bradford 1868 Borough Incident Declaration 21158 
130 YORKSHIRE,W.R Barnsley 1868 County Riot Polling Day 
Coun Place Year Election Disorder Timin BOR 
131 YORKSHIRE,W.R Bradford 1869 Borouah BY Riot Nomination 21158 
19908 
cou 
Manchester Guardian 
MG, Staffordshire Advertiser 
Bradford Advertiser 
Manchester Guardian 
Source 
1868-9 Select Committee o.143 
Avvendix 265 
Coun Place Year Election Disorder Timina BaR eau Source 
132 YORKSHIRE, N Rip on 1871 Borough BY Riot Polling Day 1025 Nonconformist 
Countv Place Year Election Disorder Timina BaR eau Source 
133 CORNWALL Penryn & Falmou· 1874 Borough Disturbance Declaration 1860 MG, 9 Feb 1874, p.8 
134 DERBYSHIRE, EAST Chesterfield 1874 County Incident Polling Day 4836 MG, 11 Feb 1874, p.6 
135 DERBYSHIRE Derby 1874 Borough Incident Declaration 11316 MG, 6 Feb 1874, p.7 
136DURHAM,NORTH Hetton 1874 County Riot PollingDay 12153 MG,11Feb1874,p.7 
137 Tl:>fl8lfM1Ef1lJif{f{fdiE :·._.:§~~&?!Jti:~:~~~·;··•··•·· :.I!~~~~r:::~~~[~g~fi.i~~~E.i·.• f#J1~"2~~~I:'0' e9Jlfi~FJ?.¥i .•. ~ ····~:~~·:r·;~~··· {~!5.?·:~::·~I·3:~&lJ,A:1tiifil/ii:'f§'t~{i?I:t:i:L•::;I[· .• ~ 
138 GLOUCESTERSHIRE Cinderford 1874 County Riot Polling Day 11463 Nonconformist 
139 LANCASHIRE Liverpool 1874 Borough Incident Declaration 54952 MG, 7 Feb 1874, p.5 
140 LANCASHIRE Stalybridge 1874 Borough Riot Polling Day 5129 MG, 5 Feb 1874, p.8 
141 LANCASHIRE Warrington 1874 Borough Incident Polling Day 5022 MG, 3 Feb 1874, p.8 
142 LINCOLNSHIRE Lincoln 1874 Borough Riot Polling Day 4689 Nonconformist 
143 NORTHAMPTONSHIRE Peterborough 1874 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 3056 Nonconformist 
144 NORFOLK Norwich 1874 Borough Incident Canvass 15166 MG, 4 Feb 1874, p.8 
145 NOTTINGHAMSHIRE Nottingham 1874 Borough Disturbance Declaration 16154 MG, 6 Feb 1874, p.6 
146 OXFORDSHIRE Oxford 1874 Borough Incident Meeting 5680 MG, 3 Feb 1874, p.8 
147 STAFFORDSHIRE Wolverhampton 1874 Borough Disturbance Meeting 23257 The Times 
:::1]~~;~ 'i"Ml~;,~:~llrl.~,~~:;~ ! ... ~~~@0 ~;~ji~r: il!!J;:·::·~~1~~~~~J~; .. r~J~%'Jl['l1 
150 §J["JJ£-E9RQ§!Tfl@ .· ... · ... 'lfil~flh<~lttWcofo(erhiftp). f8U;~: •: Bg£9,Ugf! ... · · Riot. • •·• , J?oflmgJf1<1Y.'•;;'23257 11 ;; :~ . ,• ; •..•.• :M(3,;fJRf!JbJ874,1p,.§,,.r. > · 
151 sTAFFD'RbsrHRE · wec!nesbury ·· · · 1874···· Borough Disturbance · Pollin9 bay···263'5f · ······· · ····staff. Chief constable Report 
152 STAFFORDSHIRE Stoke-on-Trent 1874 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 19129 Staff. Chief Constable Report 
153 'srA#i=6RO§FiiREC .• Stoke'"On-Trent ~ ·~;,'18741 X.'Bcit01i~iff~7 'iffFckient :1\lli:Jeiffr/il~··f· :1:912.9/.· ············ ..... 't~·wvt'Gli5.:Fi:J'b"if8't4,i>;({''~'{ ,,: 
Avvendix 266 
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154 SUFFOLK Ipswich 187 4 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 6619 The Times 
155 WORCESTERSHIRE Bewdley 1874 Borough Disturbance Declaration 1082 MG, 2 Feb 1874, p.8 
156 WORCESTERSHIRE Dudley 1874 Borough Riot Polling Day 5578 Journal of House of Commons 
.157 WORCESTERSHIRE, E Lye 1874 County Riot Polling Day 11105 MG, 13 Feb 1874, p.5 
158 [:Yf!lJF!i?~~Jli~§fiit{£);E 'Filr!@C9(f~'fl·· cJi:t:W4· ::.·Ig~~i'!ii .?~~l L:i:?fai , .. ~a: :~o[IfHg;Q.~'i~ · ;:: ;,;;· .. ~:~ ;1rtto5• :~ :. ··•- MP:; /t$fif!J~1~'fitk-~d 'EJi) 
159 YORKSHIRE, W.R Castleford 1874 County Disturbance Polling Day 19908 MG, 14 Feb 1874, p.7 
160 YORKSHIRE, W.R.S Barnsley 1874 County Disturbance Polling Day 29922 MG, 11 Feb 1874, p.6 
161 YORKSHIRE,W.R.S Sheffield 1874 Borough Disturbance Meeting 36701 Nonconformist 
162['{.6i3f5§1#JIB.$~: W}tfl§~_-.. .§~~(ff~tgJ:' ·:~·:12 ; ~;~~?.~ ~i· ~Ei§!P~"iiJxA.C .· f~~2tlfenf5:ri e~alag:fid?cx I :~~tl!.1l~;c? . L;LA. .: ; : •. ifv1/li;1/Jf;~§:[z,§:tft2P: :z .·. ; ' 
163 YORKSHIRE Hull 1874 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 22026 MG, 9 Feb 1874, p.7 
164 YORKSHIRE Pontefract 1874 Borough Incident Declaration - 2038 MG, 4 Feb 1874, p.5 
County Place Year Election Disorder Timing BOR cou Source 
165 WILTSHIRE Wilton 1877 Borough BY Disturbance Meeting 1401 Nonconformist 
County Place Year Election Disorder Timing BOR cou Source 
166 BUCKINGHAMSHIRE Great Marlow 1880 Borough Riot Declaration 941 Manchester Gua,rdian 
167 CHESHIRE Chester 1880 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 7611 Manchester Guardian 
168 CHESHI RE,M Northwick 1880 County Riot Unknown 8963 William Saunders, 1880 
169 CHESHIRE,W Neston 1880 County Disturbance Unknown 11097 William Saunders, 1880 
170 CUMBERLAND,W Barrow-i n-F urn es~ 1880 County Disturbance Unknown 7496 William Saunders, 1880 
171 DEVON,E Newton Abbot 1880 County Disturbance Unknown 10416 William Saunders, 1880 
172 DEVON,N Ex mouth 1880 County Incident Unknown 9496 William Saunders, 1880 
173 DORSET Dorchester 1880 Borough Riot Polling Day 817 Manchester Guardian 
174 DORSET Shaftesbury 1880 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 1388 William Saunders, 1880 
Avvendix 267 
Coun Place Year Election Disorder Timin BOR cou Source 
175 DURHAM South Shields 1880 Borough Riot Unknown 9893 Manchester Guardian 
176 DURHAM,S South Durham 1880 County Incident Unknown 10498 Manchester Guardian 
177 HAMPSHIRE Winchester 1880 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 2011 Manchester Guardian 
178 ISLE OF WIGHT Shanklin 1880 County Disturbance Meeting 5320 Manchester Guardian 
179 LANCASHIRE Warrington 1880 Borough Disturbance Polling Day 5919 MG, Warrington Guardian 
180 LANCASHIRE Ashton-u-Lyne 1880 Borough Incident Unknown 5901 Nonconformist 
181 LANCASHIRE,S.E Farnworth 1880 County Riot Polling Day 20631 Manchester Guardian 
182 LINCOLNSHIRE Lincoln 1880 Borough Disturbance Declaration 4243 J.F .Hill (Victorian Lincoln)p.193 
183 NORTHUMBERLAND Newcastle-u-Tyne 1880 Borough Incident Unknown 23800 Nonconformist 
184 SOMERSET Bath 1880 Borough Riot Declaration 5534 William Saunders, 1880 
185 STAFFORDSHIRE Lichfield 1880 Borough Incident Polling Day 1374 Lichfield Borough Petition 
186 WARWICKSHIRE,S Leamington 1880 County Riot Polling Day 6429 William Saunders, 1880 
187 WILTSHIRE Swindon 1880 County Disturbance Unknown 7249 Salisbury & Winchester Journal 
188 WORCESTERSHIRE,E Oldbury 1880 County Incident Meeting 12455 Manchester Guardian 
189 YORKSHIRE,W.R.S Pontefract 1880 Borough Riot Polling Day 2429 Manchester Guardian 
190 YORKSHIRE Hull 1880 Borough Incident Unknown 26193 Nonconformist 
191 YORKSHIRE,W.R.S Rotherham 1880 Coun Riot Polling Day 26329 William Saunders, 1880 
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Gloucester Journal 
Gravesend Journal 
Hampshire Chronicle 
Haverfordwest and Milford Haven Telegraph 
Hull and Lincolnshire Times 
Ipswich Express and Essex and Suffolk Mercury 
Lincoln Gazette 
Lincolnshire Chronicle 
Manchester Guardian 
Monmouthshire Merlin and Glamorgan and Brecon Silurian 
North Lincolnshire Herald 
Oswestry Advertiser and Montgomeryshire Mercury 
Salisbury and Winchester Journal 
Somerset County Herald and Great Western Advertiser 
Staffordshire Advertiser 
The Times 
Warrington Guardian 
The Welshman 
Wetherby News and Yorkshire Agricultural Gazette 
Yorkshire Advertiser and General Intelligencer 
B. Periodicals 
Nonconformist 
Annual Register 
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